As the statute of Vermont not only imposes a liability upon railroad companies for the destruction of property near and adjoining the route of the railway, but expressly confers upon them an insurable interest in such property, and authorizes them to procure such insurance in their own name and behalf, the damages in the case at bar were not too remote; and the company is liable, whether the fire was communicated directly and immediately to the property destroyed, or through another building. Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44; Webb v. R.R. Co., 49 N.Y. 420; Piggot v. R.R. Co., 54 E.C.L. 229; Smith v. R.R. Co., 5 Com. Pleas, 98; Fant v. R.R. Co., 4 Chicago Legal News (1 Redf. Cas., 2d ed., 350); R.R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Webb (Kan.), 354; Kellogg v. R.R. Co., 26 Wis. 223; Hart v. R.R. Co., 13 Mass. 99; Perley v. R.R. Co., 98 id. 414; Quigley v. R.R. Co., 8 Allen, 438; Hooksett v. R.R. Co., 38 N.H. 242; Cleveland v. R.R. Co., 42 Vt. 449. The cases of Ryan v. N.Y. Cen. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, and Penn. R.R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353, are contrary to the doctrine announced in all the other authorities bearing upon the question.
Prospective changes in the original construction were contemplated, and compensation therefor was included in the original award of damages. Dearborn v. Railroad, 24 N.H. 179; Perley v. Railroad, 57 N.H. 212, 214. The case is like a change of highway grade before the law of 1848 (Benden v. Nashua, 17 N.H. 477; Waldron v. Berry, 51 N.H. 136, 143), where no damages could be recovered if the change was reasonably necessary.