Summary
In Perley v. Bailey, 89 N.H. 359, 199 A. 570 (1938), this court affirmed its dedication to upholding settlement agreements between counsel.
Summary of this case from Halstead v. MurrayOpinion
Decided May 3, 1938.
The entry of a decree or judgment upon a parol stipulation made by the parties or their counsel in open court is ordinarily made as a matter of course. The statute of frauds, P.L., c. 327, s. 1, does not apply to a decree of court made in conformity to a verbal agreement by the parties in court, whereby to compromise the suit the plaintiff should convey to the defendant certain land not involved in the litigation and also rectify lines of other land.
BILL IN EQUITY, to determine the location of a right of way decreed in a former proceeding in favor of the defendants over the plaintiff's land. Trial before a master, who reported: "After the introduction of the oral testimony and a view of the premises, and with the combined labor of the master and counsel, the parties were induced to enter into . . . [an] agreement before the Master to dispose of all the questions involved and to prevent future litigation, counsel and parties participating, and the Master was to report the same." The agreement, which was oral, though its terms were incorporated in the master's report, provided that the plaintiff should convey certain land to the defendants, and also rectified certain lines between lands of the parties not involved in the right of way.
This agreement was made on December 29, 1936. The master's report was filed on January 16, 1937. A decree in accordance therewith was on January 18, 1937, ordered by the Superior Court as of February 1, 1937, unless the order should be modified prior thereto.
On January 30, 1937, the plaintiff moved for a stay in the decree, and the court on April 10, 1937, ordered the decree held in abeyance until June 1, that the plaintiff might be heard. On February 3, 1937, plaintiff's counsel withdrew. The plaintiff moved on April 29, 1937, that the master's report be set aside, and shortly thereafter assigned as ground the fact that the oral agreement, being one to convey real estate, was within the statute of frauds.
The court heard the parties and on July 2, 1937, ordered a decree in accordance with the master's report. The plaintiff excepted to the denial of her motion to set aside the report. Transferred by Young, J.
Herbert W. Rainie and James H. Sullivan (of Massachusetts), (Mr. Rainie orally), for the plaintiff.
Conrad E. Snow (by brief and orally), for the defendants.
Our statute of frauds reads: "No action shall be maintained upon a contract for the sale of land unless the agreement upon which it is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by him thereto authorized by writing." P.L., c. 327, s. 1.
It will be observed that there is no expressed intention that the statute shall apply to any procedure other than an "action . . . upon a contract for the sale of land." This is not such an action. There is the further inquiry whether the legislature intended that the statute should operate upon anything except extra-judicial contracts. The case before us presents a procedural matter outside the field of contracts which the statute is designed to cover. Such a stipulation as we have here, made under the supervision of the court or of the court's representative, derives effect from the control of the court rather than from any virtue in the stipulation itself. Wallace v. Wallace, 74 N.H. 256, 259.
The entry of a decree or judgment upon a parol stipulation made by the parties or their counsel in open court has long been usually a matter of course. In re West Devon Great Consols Mine, 38 Ch. Div. 51; Holt v. Jesse, 3 Ch. Div. 177; Wyness v. Crowley, 198 N.E. Rep. 758; Beliveau v. Company, 68 N.H. 225. It is not the intention of the statute of frauds to affect such stipulations made in court and subject to the court's supervision and control.
Ample protection is afforded to the parties to such stipulations, wholly independent of the statute, upon general equitable principles. The court may grant relief from a stipulation because of mistake or surprise (In re West Devon Great Consols Mine, supra), or fraud (Daniell, Chancery Practice, (6th Am. ed.) 973, and see Beliveau v. Company, supra). Such relief is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless abused. Garretson v. Altomari, 190 Ia. 1194.
The trial judge has denied the plaintiff's motion. There is no suggestion of abuse of discretion. There was no surprise or mistake; the plaintiff admits the correctness of the stipulation reported by the master. The finding that the parties "were induced" to make the stipulation is not evidence that fraud or undue influence was exercised by the defendants on the plaintiff. We do not understand that the plaintiff seriously suggests that she was moved by any improper inducement whatever.
Decree affirmed.
All concurred.