Having abandoned their suit for administrative review, the plaintiffs were not restricted to the evidence admitted before the city council. They were entitled to a trial directly challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied to their situation and the concomitant right to present evidence in support of their position. ( Perko v. City of Palos Heights (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 505, 274 N.E.2d 652.) In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs' request for relief was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
However, it does not matter which way we choose to address the problem, for the standard of review applicable to the denial of a special use permit is equivalent to that applicable in a challenge to the underlying zoning classification. Perko v. City of Palos Heights (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 505, 274 N.E.2d 652. • 2 The standards for judicial review and the factors for consideration in a challenge to a zoning ordinance are those announced in the case of La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65, and repeated in several subsequent decisions of our supreme court. (See, e.g., Goffinet v. County of Christian (1976), 65 Ill.2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442; Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 64 Ill.2d 172, 354 N.E.2d 899; County of Cook v. Priester (1976), 62 Ill.2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 41; La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston (1974), 57 Ill.2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625.)