Nor are we persuaded that Hagadorn v. Prudential Insurance Company , 267 Ga. App. 143, 598 S.E.2d 865 (2004), requires a different outcome for the same reason. See also Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (poor lighting and darkened surfaces raised a factual question about whether the plaintiff should have seen the curb over which he tripped). Amanda also contends that the trial court ignored her deposition testimony establishing that the protrusion was not obvious to her.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010); see also American Multi–Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 444(2), 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009). In cases involving allegations of a static, dangerous condition such as the step at issue here, an invitee's actual knowledge of the condition relieves a proprietor of any duty to warn that invitee of that condition or hazard because “the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). What differentiates a claim involving a static condition from other slip and fall cases is that
"[E]ven where there is no proof of actual knowledge, the failure to discover an alleged defect 'through the exercise of reasonable care in inspecting the premises gives rise to constructive knowledge where the owner or occupier had an opportunity to discover the dangerous condition and to remedy it.'" Perkins v. Vol D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126, 128 (2010) (quoting Cocklin, 296 Ga. App. at 182-83). Robinson provides that the proprietor must:
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D’Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). But "the rule imputing knowledge of a danger to a person who has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition before applies only to cases involving a static condition that is ‘readily discernible’ to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety."
This is so because " ‘a claim involving a static defect differs from other slip and fall cases in that when a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have equal knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom.’ " Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). The rule imputing knowledge to an invitee of the danger posed by a premises feature is limited "to cases involving a static condition that is readilydiscernable to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety.
Similarly, any inspection by H & H would have revealed the view of the handicap ramp as approached from the sidewalk and the amount of lighting in the area. Accordingly, H & H must be charged with knowledge of all these conditions.Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 129, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (owner charged with knowledge of the lighting conditions, the curb's height in relation to parking lot, the view of curb for someone descending stairs, and the absence of any paint or warning signs).Further, the McRories' testimony about the rusted condition of the bolt in the parking bumper and the location of the bumper before and after Pinder's fall raises a jury issue as to how long the bumper's condition had existed.
(Punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126, 128 (699 SE2d 380) (2010). "If nothing obstructs the invitee's ability to see the static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks."
(Punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). (Punctuation omitted.)
Gervin v. Retail Prop. Tr., 840 S.E.2d 101, 104 (Ga.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 699 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ga.Ct.App. 2010)).