Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co.

21 Citing cases

  1. Crebs v. World

    360 Ga. App. 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant in slip and fall because fence over which plaintiff tripped and fell was open and obvious, but distinguishing Pinder , Hagadorn , and Perkins on ground the static conditions in those cases were not discernable due to optical illusions and evidence of poor lighting

    Nor are we persuaded that Hagadorn v. Prudential Insurance Company , 267 Ga. App. 143, 598 S.E.2d 865 (2004), requires a different outcome for the same reason. See also Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (poor lighting and darkened surfaces raised a factual question about whether the plaintiff should have seen the curb over which he tripped). Amanda also contends that the trial court ignored her deposition testimony establishing that the protrusion was not obvious to her.

  2. Norwich v. the Shrimp Factory Inc.

    332 Ga. App. 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment when plaintiff had successfully negotiated a step up into a bathroom stall shortly before she attempted to descend the step under the same lighting conditions and fell

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010); see also American Multi–Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 444(2), 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009). In cases involving allegations of a static, dangerous condition such as the step at issue here, an invitee's actual knowledge of the condition relieves a proprietor of any duty to warn that invitee of that condition or hazard because “the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does.

  3. N. Fulton Cmty. Charities v. Goodstein

    367 Ga. App. 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). What differentiates a claim involving a static condition from other slip and fall cases is that

  4. Wiggins v. Belk, Inc.

    4:11-cv-88 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    "[E]ven where there is no proof of actual knowledge, the failure to discover an alleged defect 'through the exercise of reasonable care in inspecting the premises gives rise to constructive knowledge where the owner or occupier had an opportunity to discover the dangerous condition and to remedy it.'" Perkins v. Vol D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126, 128 (2010) (quoting Cocklin, 296 Ga. App. at 182-83). Robinson provides that the proprietor must:

  5. Jones Lang Lasalle Operations, LLC v. Johnson

    350 Ga. App. 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 7 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D’Aosta Co. , 305 Ga. App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). But "the rule imputing knowledge of a danger to a person who has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition before applies only to cases involving a static condition that is ‘readily discernible’ to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety."

  6. Joe Enter., LLC v. Kane

    341 Ga. App. 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 3 times
    Reversing denial of summary judgment to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff had successfully negotiated the same ramp shortly before her fall and because any hazard posed by the ramp was open and obvious

    This is so because " ‘a claim involving a static defect differs from other slip and fall cases in that when a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have equal knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom.’ " Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co. , 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). The rule imputing knowledge to an invitee of the danger posed by a premises feature is limited "to cases involving a static condition that is readilydiscernable to a person exercising reasonable care for his own safety.

  7. Pinder v. H & H Food Services, LLC

    326 Ga. App. 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 12 times
    Finding that a plaintiff "was not necessarily required to present expert evidence on [her] claim [that the design of a ramp created a hazardous condition] because nothing in the appellate record indicates that a determination of whether a hazard existed in this case requires a specialized expertise"

    Similarly, any inspection by H & H would have revealed the view of the handicap ramp as approached from the sidewalk and the amount of lighting in the area. Accordingly, H & H must be charged with knowledge of all these conditions.Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 129, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010) (owner charged with knowledge of the lighting conditions, the curb's height in relation to parking lot, the view of curb for someone descending stairs, and the absence of any paint or warning signs).Further, the McRories' testimony about the rusted condition of the bolt in the parking bumper and the location of the bumper before and after Pinder's fall raises a jury issue as to how long the bumper's condition had existed.

  8. Benefield v. Vance

    A11A1817 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2012)

    (Punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126, 128 (699 SE2d 380) (2010). "If nothing obstructs the invitee's ability to see the static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks."

  9. McLemore v. Genuine Parts Co.

    313 Ga. App. 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 26 times
    Affirming summary judgment for the defendant when the hazard was "open and obvious, and thus in the exercise of ordinary care, [the plaintiff] could have avoided it" and stating "[t]here is no duty to warn of the obvious"

    (Punctuation omitted.) Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga.App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380 (2010). (Punctuation omitted.)

  10. Connell v. Golden Corral Corp.

    No. 23-11472 (11th Cir. Jun. 11, 2024)

    Gervin v. Retail Prop. Tr., 840 S.E.2d 101, 104 (Ga.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 699 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ga.Ct.App. 2010)).