Thereafter he was not at liberty to abandon her case without (1) justifiable cause, (2) reasonable notice to her, and (3) the permission of the court. Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133; Gosnell v. Hilliard, 205 N.C. 297, 171 S.E. 52. Whether an attorney is justified in withdrawing from a case will depend upon the particular circumstances, and no all-embracing rule can be formularized. It is generally held, however, "that the client's failure to pay or to secure the payment of proper fees upon reasonable demand will justify the attorney in refusing to proceed with the case."

Moreover, "[a]n attorney who undertakes the conduct of an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination and is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause and reasonable notice."Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 152 (1951) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 9 F. Supp. 2d 572, 583-84 (W.D.N.C. 1998).

Smith v. Bryant, 264 N.C. 208, 210, 141 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1965). Citing Woodall v. Drake Hotel, Inc., 913 F.2d 447, 449 (7th Cir.1990); see also Smith v. Anderson-Tulley Co., 608 F.Supp. 1143, 1146-47 (S.D.Miss.1985), aff'd, 846 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Bryant, 264 N.C. 208, 141 S.E.2d 303 (1965); Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133 (1951). See also Huang v. Board of Governors University of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1990); Anderson-Tulley, 608 F.Supp. at 1147.

In addition, the guardian ad litem argues that "the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in allowing retained counsel to withdraw." More particularly, the guardian ad litem contends that "[respondent-mother's] counsel was not required to formally serve her with the motion to withdraw" given that N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 5, which governs the service of motions, is not applicable to withdrawal motions, which require "no more than ‘adequate’ or ‘reasonable’ notice to the client," citing Hensgen v. Hensgen , 53 N.C. App. 331, 335, 280 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1981) ; Perkins v. Sykes , 233 N.C. 147, 152–53, 63 S.E.2d 133, 137–38 (1951) ; and Trust Co. v. Morgan-Schultheiss and Poston v. Morgan-Schultheiss , 33 N.C. App. 406, 414, 235 S.E.2d 693, 697–98 (1977). According to the guardian ad litem , Mr. Dawson's representations to the trial court that respondent-mother had asked him to withdraw amply demonstrated that respondent-mother "had adequate and reasonable notice" that he intended to seek leave to withdraw from his representation of respondent-mother given that trial courts "should be able to reasonably consider the statements of counsel in regards to notice to a client in a motion to withdraw," citing Baker v. Varser , 240 N.C. 260, 267, 82 S.E.2d 90, 95 (1954) ; Rule 3.3 of the N.C. Rules of Professional Conduct ; and State v. Choudhry , 365 N.C. 215, 223, 717 S.E.2d 348, 354 (2011).

An attorney who undertakes the conduct of an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination and is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause and reasonable notice. Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133 (1951). Reaves' resignation without prior notice and thereafter secreting himself beyond the ability of the sheriff to find him, was a circumstance beyond the control of the respondent, and the record reflects that the Town officials acted diligently after being apprised of the fact The hearing in question was to be held on April 28th, the day following receipt by respondent of the resignation of its counsel.

For two years counsel had been out of touch with his client, and even if we assume that the client's failure to answer the letter about the arrears in support payments had embarrassed counsel, that moreover the client was neglectful in failing to keep in touch with his attorney when he must have known he had this pending case, those circumstances did not excuse what was done. Though an attorney be warranted in withdrawing, he should do so only on reasonable notice to the client, allowing him time to employ another lawyer. 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 39; Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133; Finch v. Wallberg Dredging Co., 76 Idaho 246, 281 P.2d 136; Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 44, adopted by Rule 16(a) of this court. The withdrawing attorney did not state in his withdrawal papers that he had notified his client of his withdrawal and according to the statement attributed to him in the minutes of December 15, 1958 he neither had done so nor attempted to do so.

A defendant is not entitled to have a judgment by default set aside in the absence of a showing by him and a finding by the court that his neglect was excusable and that he had a meritorious defense to plaintiff's cause of action. Wilson v. Chandler, 238 N.C. 401, 78 S.E.2d 155; Stephens v. Childers, 236 N.C. 348, 72 S.E.2d 849; Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133; Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N.C. 526, 39 S.E.2d 266; Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 208, 34 S.E.2d 67. In the absence of a showing of excusable neglect, the question as to whether or not the defendant has a meritorious defense becomes immaterial.

We have consistently held in a long line of cases that the findings of fact by the trial court upon the hearing of a motion to set aside a judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, G.S. 1-220, are conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence. Sanders v. Chavis, 243 N.C. 380, 385, 90 S.E.2d 749; Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 151, 63 S.E.2d 133; Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N.C. 229, 233, 53 S.E.2d 84; Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N.C. 450, 452, 38 S.E.2d 525; Carter v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 529, 531, 181 S.E. 750; Helderman v. Mills Co., 192 N.C. 626, 628, 135 S.E. 627. "The findings of fact by the judge are conclusive, except when there is no evidence to support them.

Therefore, such findings are binding on review. Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133; Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N.C. 229, 53 S.E.2d 84; Carter v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 529, 181 S.E. 750. In our opinion, the remaining assignments of error present no error sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to justify a reversal of the judgment below.

" See also Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 63 S.E.2d 133. Appellants further assert that denial of their motion for continuance cannot be made to rest upon their failure to pay the asserted expenses of one of respondent's witnesses, the obligation of payment of which the trial court imposed as a condition precedent to the granting of the last continuance.