Even if Janssen's encounter with Foote were not consensual, we would conclude that at the time he initially approached Foote, he objectively possessed specific, articulable facts combined with their rational inferences that could have led him to reasonably conclude that "something out of the ordinary [was] occurring" that was "related to crime," which provided the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative detention. Viveros v. State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see, e.g., Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Perkins v. State, No. 05-15-01300-CR, 2017 WL 2665157, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Morris v. State, No. 05-16-00256-CR, 2017 WL 908792, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Morris v. State, No. 02-09-00433-CR, 2011 WL 1743769, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that Janssen had reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention even though Janssen testified he did not.