Smith v. McDowell, supra at 734-736. In this regard, Ms. McDowell contends that the current case is similar to Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835-836 (2) ( 476 SE2d 592) (1996), which held that a secretary's early release of students pursuant to procedures set forth in a school handbook was a discretionary task. However, Perkins is materially different from this case because in Perkins the "rules in the handbook, when properly construed, required [the secretary] to exercise discretion as to the manner in which students were to be dismissed early from school."
Therefore he was covered by official immunity. See Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835(2) ( 476 S.E.2d 592) (1996); Wrightv. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 91 ( 469 S.E.2d 268) (1996).
The murder was simply too remote to be considered a probable or natural consequence of her single act of failing to recognize that the court calendar had not been processed and thereby failing to initiate his release. See id. (holding inmate's fatal shooting of bystander several hours after and six miles away from courthouse was too remote to be a foreseeable consequence of sheriff's deputies’ alleged negligence in allowing his escape); see also Goldstein, Garber & Salama, 300 Ga. at 841 (1), 797 S.E.2d 87 (holding nurse anaesthetist's sexual assault of patient while under anesthesia was not a foreseeable consequence of dental practice's breach of duty to supervise); Cope, v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car , 250 Ga. App. 648, 652 (2), 551 S.E.2d 841 (2001) (holding assault of woman whose rental truck broke down due to rental company's failure to maintain it was "too remote to be foreseeable"); Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist. , 222 Ga. App. 831, 837 (3), 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996) (holding school defendants’ allegedly negligent conduct in allowing student's early release "was, at best, a remote cause" of the student's subsequent murder). To be sure, Wynn would not have had to opportunity to murder DeMontae had DeMontae been timely released from confinement.
” Perkins v. Morgan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 222 Ga.App. 831, 835(2), 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996) (emphasis supplied); accord Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga.App. 219, 224(2), 617 S.E.2d 575 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007); see also Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga.App. 282, 285(1), 643 S.E.2d 814 (2007) (“The determination of whether an action is discretionary or ministerial depends on the character of the specific actions complained of, not the general nature of the job, and is to be made on a case-by-case basis.” (punctuation omitted)); Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga.App. 91, 94, 469 S.E.2d 268 (1996) ( “[T]he general task imposed on teachers to monitor, supervise, and control students has ... been held to be a discretionary action which is protected by the doctrine of official immunity.
See Leakev. Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219, 225 (3) ( 617 SE2d 575) (2005); Chamlee v. Henry County Bd. of Ed., 239 Ga. App. 183, 184 (1) ( 521 SE2d 78) (1999); Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 835-836 (2) ( 476 SE2d 592) (1996). Significantly, moreover, decisions concerning the supervision of students and school personnel are considered discretionary, "even where specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated."
Because the written policy did not define the term "explosive materials," the policy required the instructor to engage in a discretionary act, i.e., to exercise personal deliberation and judgment by examining the facts and reach a reasoned conclusion with regard to the applicability of the dictates of the written policy. Where the written policy requires the public official to exercise discretion in the implementation of the written policy, the policy does not require the performance of a ministerial duty. Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831 ( 476 SE2d 592) (1996). See also McDowell v. Smith, supra, 285 Ga. at 594 (distinguishing Perkins from McDowell). Because the eye-protection policy required the teacher to perform a discretionary act to determine if the policy was applicable, the policy did not impose a ministerial duty upon the teacher, and the trial court correctly ruled that official immunity shielded her from personal liability.
Chamlee v. Henry Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 239 Ga.App. 183, 184 (1), 521 S.E.2d 78 (1999) ; see also Perkins v. Morgan Cty. Sch. Dist. , 222 Ga.App. 831, 836 (2), 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996).
School Dist., 259 Ga.App. 713, 715, 578 S.E.2d 146 (2003) (sending a student to the school garage to retrieve an object was discretionary), quoting Gamble v. Ware County Bd. of Ed., 253 Ga.App. 819, 824(2)(b), 561 S.E.2d 837 (2002) (supervising students on a school bus was discretionary). See also Butler v. Doe, 328 Ga.App. 431, 433–434, 762 S.E.2d 145 (2014) (supervision of students during a presentation was a discretionary function); Payne v. Twiggs County School Dist., 232 Ga.App. 175, 177(2), 501 S.E.2d 550 (1998) (decisions regarding enforcing policy prohibiting students from carrying weapons on school property were discretionary); Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga.App. 831, 835(2), 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996) (decisions regarding enforcing policy governing early dismissal of students were discretionary); Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga.App. 91, 93–94, 469 S.E.2d 268 (1996) (decisions regarding enforcing policies prohibiting students from leaving school and governing students' use of cars on campus and class attendance were discretionary).Aliffi, 259 Ga.App. at 716, 578 S.E.2d 146.
As we have repeatedly held, an employee's responsibilities necessarily involve the exercise of discretion when no written policy describes the extent of those responsibilities. Hendricks, 311 Ga.App. at 99(1), 714 S.E.2d 739 (supervision of grass cutting was discretionary when done without an “established policy addressing the timing, manner or method of execution of the cutting of the grass”); Perkins v. Morgan Cty. School Dist., 222 Ga.App. 831, 836(2), 476 S.E.2d 592 (1996) (granting early dismissal to students was discretionary because “monitoring, supervising, and controlling student activities involve discretionary decisions, even when rules regarding these activities have been promulgated”). Moreover, even if we were to assume that Washington created a reasonable expectation that she would follow up her advisory session with Roberson by sending her an updated version of the life insurance premium chart, there is no suggestion or proof that Washington acted with wilfulness, malice, or corruption when she failed to do so.
As we have repeatedly held, an employee's responsibilities necessarily involve the exercise of discretion when no written policy describes the extent of those responsibilities. Hendricks, 311 Ga. App. at 99 (1) (supervision of grass cutting was discretionary when done without an "established policy addressing the timing, manner or method of execution of the cutting of the grass"); Perkins v. Morgan Ctyl. School Dist., 222 Ga. App. 831, 836 (2) (476 SE2d 592) (1996) (granting early dismissal to students was discretionary because "monitoring, supervising, and controlling student activities involve discretionary decisions, even when rules regarding these activities have been promulgated"). Moreover, even if we to assume that Washington created a reasonable expectation that she would follow up her advisory session with Roberson by sending her an updated version of the life insurance premium chart, there is no suggestion or proof that Washington acted with wilfulness, malice, or corruption when she failed to do so.