Perin v. Megibben

7 Citing cases

  1. Reavis v. Reavis

    98 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1899)   Cited 2 times

    If so, the court will arrange the parties according to their interest. Perin v. Megibben, 3 C.C.A. 443, 53 F. 86; Cilley v. Patten (C.C.) 62 F. 498; Board v. Blair (C.C.) 70 F. 414; Water Co. v. Babcock (C.C.) 76 F. 243. The situation of the parties, it is contended by counsel for the respondent Clarke, shows that the interests of D. M. Reavis, as well as of the complainants, would be best served by setting aside the deed conveying the property to D. M. and James J. Reavis, and thus securing from the respondent Clarke all the property described in the bill.

  2. Taylor v. Highland Park Corporation

    42 S.E.2d 335 (S.C. 1947)   Cited 7 times

    Where part of an entire contract relates to ordinary personal property and the rest to a subject matter, such as land, over which equity jurisdiction is commonly exercised, specific performance may be had of the whole contract, including the part that relates to personal property. Pomeroy's Specific Performance (3rd Ed.) 46, note. Perin v. Megibben, 53 Fed. 86, 3 C.C.A. 443 (corporate stock and real estate); Brown v. Smith, 109 Fed. 26 (plantation with stock, tools, etc.); other, state decisions cited in the note; 58 C.J. 1044; 49 Am. Jur. 150; 152 A.L.R. 16. A leading case in this state on the jurisdiction of equity to specifically enforce contracts wherein the right was extended to the vendor (thereby overruling the earlier case of Bacon v. Roche, 1829, not reported) is Gregory v. Bulow, 1832, Rich. Eq. 235. The opinion by the great Judge John Belton O'Neall is most instructive upon the subject.

  3. Gloyd v. Gloyd

    293 Mo. 163 (Mo. 1922)   Cited 8 times

    The surviving partner is not entitled to have and distribute himself from a court selling such lands the decedent partner's share not needed for the purpose of paying debts, etc. Especially is this true when in a court of equity such sale is made and the surviving partner is denying the right of one claiming as widow, heir or devisee of the decedent. Duhring v. Duhring, 20 Mo. 174; Holmes v. McGee, 27 Mo. 598; Willet v. Brown, 65 Mo. 138; Matthews v. Hunter, 67 Mo. 293; Young v. Thrasher, 115 Mo. 227; Armour v. Frey, 253 Mo. 447; Troll v. St. Louis, 257 Mo. 670, 671; Hartnett v. Fegan, 3 Mo. App. 1; Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U.S. 621; Clagget v. Kilbourne, 66 U.S. 346; Perrin v. Megibben, 53 F. 86; 19 C.J. 473, sec. 53; Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107. (3) It is not reasonable to say that an administrator or surviving partner or his bondmen could be charged or held to account by a probate court for any part of money or funds realized on a sale made by the circuit court, withheld by such circuit court. Such showing or report would completely as an act of law be a full accounting by the accounting administrator or surviving partner administering.

  4. Shanklin v. Ward

    236 S.W. 64 (Mo. 1921)   Cited 29 times
    In Shanklin v. Ward, 291 Mo. 1, 236 S.W. 64, it was held that the grantee of a purchaser at a void guardian's sale acquired the purchaser's equitable interest arising out of his right to subrogation.

    and trade of his own property to Shanklin's wife; the assumed $2500 purchase money went from Shanklin's estate to Berry instead of Berry to Shanklin. This was a fraud in law and in fact against Shanklin, and equity will not aid in the perpetration of a fraud, such as this, by subrogation or otherwise; and for this reason, the respondent, nor any one else, could be subrogated to any alleged rights or privileges of Berry, the fraudulent grantee in the pretended guardian's deed. Secs. 430, 505, 506, R.S. 1909; 37 Cyc. 372, 380, 381; 16 Cyc. 142, 194; 16 Am. Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 593; 27 Am. Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 204, 241; Tallent v. Fitzpatrick, 253 Mo. 18; Freeman on Void Judicial Sales (4 Ed.), secs. 4a, 9, 21, 36, 40, 50; Rannells v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 480; King v. Sipley, 25 Am. Eng. Ann. Cas. 1912d 704, 166 Mich. 258, 34 L.R. A. (N.S.) 1058; 14 R.C.L. 576; 12 R.C.L. 1127; Kearnes v. Nickse, 10 Am. Eng. Ann. Cas. 420, 80 Conn. 23; Woodward v. Jewell, 25 L.Ed. 481, 140 U.S. 247; Perin v. Megibben, 53 F. 97; Miller v. Staggs, 266 Mo. 449; Parker v. Bowers, 84 S.W. 382; German Savings Soc. v. Tull, 136 F. 1; Milwaukee Ry. Co. v. Stouter, 13 Wall. 517, 20 L.Ed. 543. (3) Without considering the fraudulent procurement of Shanklin's property by Berry, the respondent does not show a state of facts which would authorize him to be subrogated and substituted to any alleged rights or privileges of the said Berry against the appellant for the purchase money which the respondent paid to his grantor, Berry. 37 Cyc. 447, 448; Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 31 L.Ed. 537, 124 U.S. 534; McKenzie v. Donnell, 151 Mo. 471; Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App. 646; Berry v. Stigall, 253 Mo. 690; German Loan Soc. v. DeLashmutt, 67 F. 401; Roberts v. Best, 172 Mo. 67; McDonald v. Quick, 139 Mo. 484; 27 Am. Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 246, 204; Implement Co. v. Jones, 143 Mo. 253; Valle v. Fleming, 29 Mo. 160; 37 Cyc. 373, 391; Shanklin v. Boyce, 275 Mo. 5. (4) Respondent had personal knowledge and actual notice of the insanit

  5. Bridges v. Rea

    166 P. 416 (Okla. 1916)   Cited 15 times

    On hearing before the Appellate Division of the court in 21 App. Div. 183, 47 N.Y. Supp. 486, it was again held that the statute did not authorize an exchange of the guardian's real property. That the county court had no power in the matter other than that given by the statute, which provided that the real property, or an estate therein, belonging to an infant, "may be sold, conveyed, mortgaged, released, or leased in the manner prescribed," and that the contemplated execution of such power was that the sale be made for cash or its equivalent, that the proceeds might be invested. In Perin v. Megibben et al., 53 Fed. 86, 3 C. C. A. 443, in an opinion by Taft, Circuit Judge, it was said to be the settled rule in Kentucky that the powers of the equity courts to sell and reinvest an infant's real estate were not inherent, but were merely statutory, and that the statutes must be strictly followed or the proceedings were a nullity. It seems that by section 489 of the Civil Code of Kentucky (Carroll's Code Ky. 1889, p. 235), an infant's real estate could be sold by a court of equity (1) to pay debts of an ancestor; (2) to pay his own debts; (3) in an action by the guardian for the ward's maintenance and education; (5) in an action against the infant by his guardian for the sale of real estate and investment in other property.

  6. Gonzales v. Terry

    102 S.C. 86 (S.C. 1915)   Cited 2 times

    Messrs. Lyles Lyles, for respondent, cite: Maritimeliens barred by laches: 14 Wall. 653; Code of Laws S.C. 1912, sec. 4153, et seq.; 21 Wall. 558. Specific performance: Rich. Eq. Cas. 238; 48 S.C. 175; 38 Cyc. 558; 55 Eng. Rep., full reprint, 485; 57 Ib. 70; 56 Ib. 1126; 52 Ib. 239; 8 Barb. (N.Y.) 527; 36 Cyc. 565; 17 Ga. 177; 63 Am. Dec. 233; 6 Johns. Ch. 398; 10 Am. Dec. 343; 71 Am. Dec. 732; 51 Am. Dec. 584; 37 Am. Dec. 625; 53 Fed. 86; 3 C. C.A. 443. Effect of interposing counterclaim: 43 S.C. 187; 53 S.C. 130; 66 S.C. 459; 69 S.C. 141; 69 S.C. 196; 92 S.C. 389; 10 S.C. 476; 23 S.C. 145; 27 S.C. 235; 25 S.C. 72. Reference: 22 S.C. 357; 32 S.C. 585; 24 S.C. 452; 5 S.C. 206; 29 S.C. 413; 58 S.C. 457, 458; 84 S.E. 302. September 15, 1915.

  7. Strode v. Kramer

    169 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    Subsequent cases reaffirming the rule thus enunciated are Duncan v. Duncan, 93 Ky. 37, 18 S.W. 1022, 40 Am. St. Rep. 159; Davidson v. Richmond, 69 S.W. 794, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 699; Hill v. Cornwall Bro.'s Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S.W. 540; Bennett v. Bennett, 137 Ky. 17, 121 S.W. 495, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 407. In 25 A.L.R. 389 will be found an interesting annotation of many Kentucky cases involving this question and a quotation from an opinion by Judge Taft, Perin v. Megibben, 6 Cir., 56 F. 86, summarizing the rule to be gathered from the Kentucky cases with reference to partnership realty. From these authorities it is clear that title to partnership realty vests in the heirs at law of a deceased partner and not in his personal representative. This being true, the personal representative may not convey the partnership realty in the absence of power conferred by will.