Opinion
August 23, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Wood, J.H.O.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The extent of an easement claimed under a grant is generally determined by the language used in the grant ( see, Hunt v. Pole Bridge Hunting Club, 219 A.D.2d 618; Hudson Val. Cablevision Corp. v. 202 Developers, 185 A.D.2d 917; Mandia v. King Lbr. Plywood Co., 179 A.D.2d 150). Where the language in the grant is vague and unclear, extrinsic factors may be considered to determine the grantor's intent ( see, Route 22 Assocs. v. Cipes, 204 A.D.2d 705; 5 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Easements, § 5.02 [4th ed]). In this case, the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence of the grantor's intent in conveying the right-of-way since the language in the 1975 deed prepared by the plaintiffs' attorney was unclear ( see, Sordi v. Adenbaum, 143 A.D.2d 898; 49 N.Y. Jur 2d, Easements, § 36). The evidence presented at trial established that the right-of-way originally conveyed to the plaintiffs was limited in the manner set forth in the judgment of the Supreme Court.
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. S.
Miller, J. P., Santucci, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.