At that point, the officers had a basis independent of the traffic stop to briefly detain Boyd pursuant to Terry, supra, to investigate their reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Perez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 241, 242-243 ( 633 SE2d 572) (2006). To investigate this suspicion, the officers immediately summoned a trained drug-sniffing dog, and detained Boyd for about 15 minutes before the dog arrived, sniffed Boyd's shoes, and alerted to the presence of illegal drugs.
State v. Gunter, 249 Ga. App. 802, 803 ( 549 SE2d 771) (2001).Perez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 241, 243 ( 633 SE2d 572) (2006). 3. Pincherli next contends that the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury (a) on the definition of trafficking in a manner different from that charged in the indictment, (b) as to how the jury should consider evidence of statements made by the defendant, and (c) as to the form of the jury's verdict.
(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Perez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 241 ( 633 SE2d 572) (2006). (d) At one time the questions had to be related, however obliquely, to the reason for the traffic stop.
(Citation omitted.) Perez v. State, 280 Ga. App. 241, 243 ( 633 SE2d 572) (2006). Here, immediately after telling Garvin to "have a good night," the officer asked for consent to search (which Garvin refused to give) and then immediately asked for consent to conduct a free air search around the vehicle.