Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-332
01-13-2022
PERCY PEREZ Plaintiff, v. SCI FAYETTE SUPER. M. CAPOZZA CORRECTIONAL SGT. MCINTYRE CORRECTIONAL OFF. MEESE CORRECTIONAL LT. RHODES JAMES BARNACLE ANY & ALL JOHN/JANE DOE DEFENDANTS SCI FAYETTE Defendants.
ECF NO. 34 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants James Barnacle, M. Capozza, McIntyre, Meese and Rhodes be granted in part and denied in part. It should be granted as to all official capacity claims against all Defendants, and as to the individual capacity claim against Defendant Capozza. It should also be granted as to any independent Fourteenth Amendment claim against any Defendant. It should be denied as to the individual capacity claims against Defendants Barnacle and Rhodes, and therefore, the supervisory liability claims against them remain. The Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force against McIntyre and Meese remain, as Defendants did not move on these claims.
II. REPORT
A. RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Percy Perez (“Plaintiff” or “Perez”) is a current resident of SCI Greene and was an inmate at SCI Fayette at all times relevant to this § 1983 civil action. Complaint, ECF No. 7 ¶ II.1. Defendant M. Capozza (“Capozza”) is the superintendent at SCI Fayette. Id. ¶ II.2. Defendant McIntyre (“McIntyre”) is a correctional Sergeant at SCI Fayette. Id. ¶ II.3. Defendant Meese (“Meese”) is a correctional officer at SCI Fayette. Id. ¶ II.4. Defendant Rhodes (“Rhodes”) is a correctional Lieutenant at SCI Fayette, and Defendant James Barnacle (“Barnacle”) is a Correctional Investigator Director at the Department of Corrections Central Office at all times relevant to the Complaint. Id. ¶ II.5 & 6.
On April 6, 2019 Plaintiff was running on the track when approached by Defendants McIntyre and Meese. They stepped in front of Plaintiff to block his path. Id. ¶ III.1-3. As soon as Defendant McIntyre came within inches of Plaintiff, he slammed Plaintiff into the ground face first. Id. ¶ III.5. Plaintiff avers that he did nothing to provike this attack. . Id. ¶ III.6. Once Plaintiff reached the ground, Defendant McIntyre pinned Plaintiff with his face against the ground and began punching Plaintiff repeatedly in the face, head, ears, neck, and back, and attempted to break Plaintiff's fingers. Id. ¶ III.7. Defendant Meese then put Plaintiff in a military style choke hold obstructing Plaintiff's ability to breathe, while McIntyre punched Plaintiff in the face and body. Id. ¶ III.8-9. A third officer then arrived, who, after seeking permission from McIntyre, sprayed pepper spray into Plaintiff's face and mouth. Id. ¶ III.10. Simultaneously, McIntyre proceeded to twist and jerk Plaintiff's left arm until his upper bone snapped. Id. ¶ III.11.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was yanked to his feet in a shoulder lock and was moved to the corner yard gate where a bag was placed over his head, which obstructed his breathing. Id. ¶ III.13. Once the bag was removed, Plaintiff began to regain his senses only to find that a second bag was placed over his head while Plaintiff begged Defendants to stop. Id. ¶ III.14-16. Plaintiff was then brought to an isolated examination room where Defendants continued to beat him a second time. Id. ¶ III.17. Plaintiff alleges that at no time did he resist the officers, either verbally or physically. Instead, he continued to gasp for air and beg Defendants to stop beating him. Id. ¶ III.18.
Sometime later, a nurse requested that Plaintiff be moved to another room where she could examine him. It was at this time that the beatings stopped. Id. ¶ III.19. The nurse called for a second nurse who cleaned the blood from Plaintiff's face. Id. ¶ III.20. Thereafter, Defendant Rhodes ordered a camera to video tape Plaintiff during transport. Id. ¶ III.23.
Plaintiff was then taken to Uniontown Hospital but later transferred to UPMC Mercy in Pittsburgh because his injuries were too severe to treat at Uniontown Hospital. Id. ¶ III.24-25. UPMC determined that Plaintiff required emergency surgery to insert plates and screws into his arm. Id. ¶ III.26. Plaintiff remained in the hospital for 13 days in recovery and was then transferred to SCI Greene. Id. ¶ III.27-28. Plaintiff's family and another inmate filed grievances on Plaintiff's behalf because Plaintiff was unable to do so due his medical condition and because he was placed in a Prisoner Observation Cell and later in the RHU, where he had no access to grievance forms, pens or other property. Id. ¶ III.29-32. SCI Fayette denied the grievances as untimely, but the matter was forwarded to the Department of Corrections Bureau of Investigations, and specifically to intelligence officer James Barnacle. Id. ¶ III.33-34. Defendant Barnacle closed the investigation, concluding that Plaintiff's allegations were “unsubstantiated.” Barnacle also indicated that no further action would be taken as to the corrections officers involved. Id. ¶ III.35.
Plaintiff further alleges that SCI Fayette Superintendent Capozza, Lt. Rhodes, and a John Doe failed to discipline, train, or instruct Defendant correctional officers and aided in the concealment of the incident by failing to acknowledge the assault. Id. ¶ III.36. The John/Jane Doe Grievance coordinator/investigator also concealed this incident by obstructing Plaintiff's right to grieve. Id. ¶ III.37.
In Count I, Plaintiff appears to allege an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force against the correctional officers who allegedly beat him, namely McIntyre, Meese and a John Doe. In Count II, Plaintiff attempts to make out a claim for supervisory liability against Defendants Capozza, Rhodes, Barnacle and other John Does in that they knowingly failed to instruct, supervise, control, or discipline, on an ongoing basis, the Defendant Correctional Officers to refrain from assaulting Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aptly summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler[v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d [203, ][] 213 [(3d Cir. 2009)] (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir.2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester Cnty. Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Importantly, the Court must liberally construe the factual allegations of the complaint because pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Therefore, if the Court “can reasonably read [the] pleadings to state a valid claim on which [plaintiff] could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or [plaintiff's] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Wilberger v. Ziegler, No. 08-54, 2009 WL 734728, at *3 (W.D. Pa. March 19, 2009) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982) (per curiam)).
C. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
Defendants first argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim against the Defendants in their official capacities. The Court agrees. When a state official is sued in an official capacity, the real party in interest is the government entity that employs the official. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions in the federal courts against, inter alia, states and their agencies. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies). “Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it ... a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)).
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Moreover, an agency or arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are not “persons” against whom a civil rights action may be brought pursuant to § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Consequently, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against the individual Department of Corrections employees are, in essence, claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and therefore, are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity unless an exception applies.
The courts have carved out three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which will permit suit against a state or state agency: “(1) congressional abrogation; (2) state waiver; and (3) suits against individual state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell Atlantic of Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). None of these exceptions apply here. The Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act does not abrogate a state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment insofar as states and their agencies are not “persons” subject to suit within the meaning of the Act. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990); Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66. As to the waiver exception, “[t]he state either must voluntarily invoke [federal] jurisdiction by bringing suit . . . or must make a ‘clear declaration' that it intends to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” MCI Telecomm Corp., 271 F.3d at 504 (quoting College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither situation exists in the case at bar. As to the third exception, the Amended Complaint does not seek prospective injunctive relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law.
Thus, none of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment Immunity applies here, and Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice.
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT/SUPERVISORY LIABILITY OF CAPOZZA, RHODES AND BARNACLE
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of Capozza, Rhodes and Barnacle.
To establish personal liability against a defendant in a § 1983 action, a defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.3 (1981)). “In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term ‘supervisory liability' is a misnomer.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Instead, each Government official, regardless of his or her title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. However, “it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more than he or she did.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations suggest that Defendant supervisors had knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the subordinates' unconstitutional conduct. Although Plaintiff, in his responsive brief, attempts to echo the language of Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), Monell liability is limited to local government units and does not apply where the supervisory defendant is a state employee. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71 (“[W]e consequently limited our holding in Monell ‘to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes[.]'” See also O'Hara v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 171 F.Supp.2d 490, 499 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (observing that holdings in Monell and its progeny are limited to local government entities and their employees; when state government entities and their employees are sued in their official capacities, they are protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
Barnacle
Plaintiff alleges that Barnacle, the Department of Corrections Bureau of Investigations and Intelligence Officer, was charged with investigating Plaintiff's grievance. Plaintiff describes in detail the alleged beating he sustained at the hands of Corrections Officers McIntyre and Meese. ECF No. 7-1. Yet, in closing the investigation, Barnacle states only that Plaintiff's allegations were “unsubstantiated.” ECF No. 7-3. Barnacle offers absolutely no explanation as to why these officers were justified in beating Plaintiff to the extent that he required 13 days in a Pittsburgh hospital to recover from his injuries, including emergency surgery to insert plates and screws into his arm. Plaintiff's factual allegations, taken as true, suggest that Barnacle acquiesced in the subordinate Officers' alleged unconstitutional conduct, sending a message that this degree of force in its DOC facilities would be tolerated. Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for supervisory liability as to Defendant Barnacle. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the supervisory liability claim against Barnacle should be denied.
Rhodes
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Supervisor Rhodes, “after waiting until the blood was cleaned off of Plaintiff's face, then ordered a camera be brought to video tape Plaintiff during transport.” ECF No.7 ¶ III.23. In his responsive brief, Plaintiff notes that after he was initially beaten by Meese and McIntyre, Rhodes allowed the officers to yank Plaintiff to his feet, put him in a shoulder lock, allowed the bag to be placed over his head, ripped off while the elastic band was left tightly around his neck, and another bag placed over his head. Plaintiff continues that he was bleeding profusely and pleaded for the officers to stop, yet Rhodes did not intervene. He states that “compound security cameras will verify.” ECF No. 40 at 18-20. Plaintiff further states that security cameras will also verify that Rhodes was present when Plaintiff was taken to medical and then allowed Plaintiff to be taken off camera when the second beating occurred in a secluded eye examine room. Id. at 20-21. Liberally construing all of Plaintiff's allegations, and taking all of Plaintiff allegations as true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for supervisory liability against Rhodes in that he knew of and acquiesced in his subordinates' allegedly unconstitutional behavior. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Rhodes for supervisory liability should be denied.
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court considers facts stated in his responsive brief.
Capozza
Defendants argue that the only allegations against Defendant Capozza sound in respondeat superior. The Court agrees. Plaintiff sets forth no facts concerning any actions taken by Capozza to suggest he participated in, directed or acquiesced in the alleged constitutional violations of his subordinates. The Motion to Dismiss the supervisory claim against him should be granted.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
The Court also agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff's claims are properly brought under the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.”). Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss any independent Fourteenth Amendment claim should be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants James Barnacle, M. Capozza, McIntyre, Meese and Rhodes be granted in part and denied in part. It should be granted as to all official capacity claims against all Defendants, and as to the individual capacity claim against Defendant Capozza. It should also be granted as to any independent Fourteenth Amendment claim. It should be denied as to the individual capacity claims against Defendants Barnacle and Rhodes, and therefore, the supervisory liability claims against them remain. The Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force against McIntyre and Meese remain, as Defendants did not move on these claims.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.