Moreover, the record does not contain competent substantial evidence establishing the quantity, quality and duration of the attendant care services that claimant contends her husband performed or that should be performed in the future by an outside attendant. See Barkett Computer Services v. Santana, 568 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). On the question of medical need for attendant care, Dr. Yates' testimony was unrefuted.

“A blanket award of attendant care without regard to the actual performance of those services is error.” Perez, 541 So.2d at 654 (citing Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ).The JCC accepted as credible Mrs. Hennessey's deposition testimony as to the specific amount of time she spent assisting Claimant with attendant care activities from the date of the accident until November 20, 2013, when Claimant's wound showed significant signs of healing.

However, the JCC properly denied this claim for attendant care based upon the alternative theory that the claimant's proof of the quantity, quality or duration of the care requested was not sufficient. The burden is on the claimant to prove by competent, substantial evidence the quantity, quality, and duration of the compensable attendant services claimed. Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(quoting Walt Disney World Co. v. Harrison, 443 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). Attendant care services are generally not compensable "when those services merely reflect a claimant's individual choice as to `quality of life'" Beverly Enterprises v. Collingsworth, 670 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Much of the attendant care sought by Claimant was for non-compensable "quality of life choices," and the evidence was not sufficiently specific to permit a reasoned determination of how many hours of care were compensable and how many were to be devoted to non-compensable "quality of life choices."

Moreover, the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence establishing the quantity, quality, and duration of the attendant care services that claimant contends her husband performed or that should be performed in the future by an outside attendant. See Barkett Computer Services v. Santana, 568 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

The JCC erred in basing his award solely upon the claimant's need for attendant care without regard to the services actually performed by the caregiver. See Ramada Inn South Airport v. Lamoureux, 578 So.2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 587 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1991); Orange County Sheriff's Dep't v. Perez, 541 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Although the JCC's order cites competent substantial evidence establishing the claimant's need for care, no mention is made of the hours expended by the husband. In fact, the husband's own testimony indicates that only six hours per day were spent caring for his wife and, when ordinary household tasks were excluded, he only spent three hours per day.

We have held that it is improper to order payment for past attendant care based solely upon the claimant's need for care, and without regard to the services actually performed. See Orange County Sheriff's Department v. Perez, 541 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Because there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that claimant's son spent 50 hours per week assisting her, we must reverse the award and remand for further proceedings so that testimony may be taken on the issue of how much time was actually spent by the son in performance of attendant care services for which reimbursement may be had. See Orange County, supra. For the purpose of determining the rate to be paid to the son for services rendered after October 1, 1988, we direct the JCC's attention to our holdings in Williams v. Amax Chemical Corporation, 543 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and Mr. C's TV Rental v. Murray, 559 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

It is well established that the claimant has the burden of establishing the quantity, quality and duration of the necessary attendant care. See Jones v. McGhee, 502 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Perez v. Pennsuco Cement Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Walt Disney World Co. v. Harrison, 443 So.2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In the instant case, the JCC awarded $200.00 per week without making any findings concerning the number of hours needed, the rate of pay or the quality of care required by claimant.

A blanket award of attendant care without regard to the actual performance of those services is error. Perez v. Pennsuco Cement and Aggregates, 504 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Even assuming that the medical evidence taken below supports the need for attendant care during the period in question, if no services were actually performed for claimant (or if he took care of himself), an award of attendant care would be inappropriate.