Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-332
01-30-2023
PERCY PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. SCI-FAYETTE SUPERINTENDENT M. CAPOZZA, et al., Defendants.
ECF No. 85
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 85) as to all claims against Defendants Allen and House be denied.
II. REPORT
A. RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Percy Perez (“Plaintiff” or “Perez”) is currently housed at SCI-Greene but was an inmate at SCI-Fayette at all times relevant to this § 1983 civil action. Am. Compl., ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶ 1. Plaintiff has sued a number of employees at SCI-Fayette (“collectively the “Corrections Defendants”) over the events that occurred on April 6, 2019. On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 82) in which he added eleven defendants, two of which have brought the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings. The moving Defendants are Lois Allen, the acting grievance coordinator at SCI-Fayette, and Rhonda A. House, the Correctional Grievance Coordinator, at all relevant times. ECF No. 82 at § II, ¶¶ 1011. The relevant facts giving rise to this lawsuit are as follows.
The newly added Defendants were previously referred to as John/Jane Does in Plaintiff's original Complaint (ECF No. 7).
On April 6, 2019, Plaintiff was walking on the exercise track when approached by Defendants McIntyre and Meese. Id. at § III, ¶ 1. They stepped in front of Plaintiff to block his path. Id. § III, ¶ 2. As soon as Defendant McIntyre came within inches of Plaintiff, he slammed Plaintiff into the ground face first. Id. at § III, ¶ 4. Plaintiff avers that he did nothing to provoke this attack. Id. at § III, ¶ 5. Once Plaintiff reached the ground, Defendants McIntyre and Meese pinned Plaintiff on the ground and began punching Plaintiff repeatedly in the face, head, ears, neck, and back, and attempted to break Plaintiff's fingers. Id. at § III, ¶¶ 6-7. Defendant Meese then put Plaintiff in a military style choke hold obstructing Plaintiff's ability to breathe, while Defendant McIntyre punched Plaintiff in the face and body. Id. § III, ¶¶ 8-9. A third officer, Defendant Joseph Gray, then arrived who, after seeking permission from McIntyre, sprayed pepper spray into Plaintiff's face and mouth. Id. at § III, ¶ 10. Simultaneously, McIntyre proceeded to twist and jerk Plaintiff's left arm until his upper bone snapped. Id. § III, ¶ 11.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was handcuffed by Defendant Gray while Defendants McIntyre and Meese continued to punch him while Meese maintained the choke hold around his neck and mouth. Id. at § III, ¶¶ 14,18. Plaintiff was then yanked to his feet in a shoulder lock and was moved to the corner yard gate where a bag was placed over his head, which obstructed his breathing. Id. at § III, ¶¶ 19-21. Once the bag was removed, Plaintiff began to regain his senses only to find that a second bag was placed over his head while Plaintiff begged Defendants to stop. Id. at § III, ¶¶ 23-24. Plaintiff was then brought to an isolated examination room where Defendants continued to beat him a second time. Id. at § III, ¶27. Plaintiff alleges that at no time did he resist the officers, either verbally or physically. Id. at § III, ¶ 28. Instead, he continued to gasp for air and beg Defendants to stop beating him. Id.
Sometime later, a nurse requested that Plaintiff be moved to the main triage room where she could examine him. It was at this time that the beatings and racial slurs stopped. Id. at § III, ¶ 29. The nurse then called for the PA on call, Darla Cowden, who cleaned the blood and pepper spray from Plaintiff's face. Id. § III, ¶¶ 30-31. The medical staff determined that Plaintiff needed to be transported to an outside hospital emergency room for treatment. Id. at § III, ¶ 32. At this point, Defendant Rhodes ordered a camera to video tape Plaintiff during transport. Id. at § III, ¶ 33.
Plaintiff was initially transported to Uniontown Hospital but was later transferred to UPMC Mercy in Pittsburgh because his injuries were too severe to treat at Uniontown Hospital. Id. at § III, ¶¶34-35. The doctors at UPMC Mercy determined that Plaintiff required emergency surgery to insert plates and screws into his arm. Id. at § III, ¶36. Plaintiff remained in the hospital for 13 days in recovery during which time he was treated with pain medication which affected his ability to think clearly. Id. at § III, ¶ 37. Plaintiff was discharged from UPMC Mercy on April 18, 2019 and transferred to SCI Greene. Id. at § III, ¶ 38; Ex. F to Am. Compl., ECF No. 82-1 at 8.
While at SCI-Greene, Plaintiff enlisted the help of his family and another inmate to file a grievance on his behalf as he was unable to do so because of his medical condition and placement in a Prisoner Observation Cell (“P.O.C.”) and later in the RHU, where he had no access to grievance forms, pens or other property. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶¶ 39-42; ECF No. 82-1 at 8. That grievance was dated May 6, 2019, mailed on May 9, 2019, and assigned grievance number 801342. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶¶ 39-42; ECF No. 82-1 at 3. Defendant Allen rejected the grievance as untimely but noted that the grievance was being forwarded to the Security Office for investigation in accordance with Department Policy DC-ADM 001. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶¶ 44-45; Ex. C to Am. Compl., ECF No. 82-1 at 4.
The Court takes judicial notice of DC-ADM 804-Inmate Grievance System Policy which provides that grievances dealing with allegations of inmate abuse are to be handled in accordance with Department Policy DC-ADM 001, “Inmate Abuse.” See DC-ADM 804, Sec. 1, Part D.2, available at https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievan ces.pdf.
On June 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second grievance along with a follow up letter to Defendant House explaining that he was still recovering and the denial of basic privileges. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶ 43, ECF No. 82-1 at 5-6, 15. Defendant House rejected this grievance as untimely despite the grievance being filed at the earliest possible time due to Plaintiff's extreme injuries, medications, placement in the RHU, and retaliation tactics by SCI-Greene. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶ 44; ECF No. 82-1 at 7. Defendant House also indicated that she was forwarding the grievance to the Security Office for investigation in accordance with Department policy DC-ADM 001. ECF No. 82-1 at 7.
Defendant James Barnacle was the intelligence officer assigned to investigate the allegations of inmate abuse. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶ 45. Defendant Barnacle closed the investigation on Plaintiff's alleged assault, concluding that Plaintiff's allegations were “unsubstantiated” and that no further action would be taken as to the corrections officers involved. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶46; Ex. K to Am. Compl., ECF No. 82-1 at 16.
In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has sued Defendants Allen and House, among others, for supervisory liability and concealment in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at § IV, ¶¶ 49-56. Plaintiff claims that Allen and House acted as supervisors in their roles as the SCI-Fayette grievance coordinators assigned to either assign an investigator or personally investigate inmate grievances/complaints against officers, and discipline or otherwise correct officers for said misconduct and make a record of it. Id. at § IV, ¶ 52. He further alleges that Allen and House, among others, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, and/or with callous disregard and/or deliberate indifference to his rights failed to stop, intervene, instruct, supervise, control, or discipline the corrections officers on an ongoing basis to refrain from the assault and inflicting severe injury and mental anguish upon him in deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at § IV, ¶ 53. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Allen and House had knowledge, or had they exercised their duties to instruct, supervise, control and discipline on an ongoing basis, they would have known that the wrongs as alleged were done or about to be committed, and they actively concealed this incident by obstructing his right to grieve the misconduct of the Defendants. Id. at § IV, ¶ 54. Plaintiff further contends that Allen and House approved or ratified the unlawful, deliberate, malicious, reckless, wanton, and/or negligent conduct of the corrections officers, and actively concealed the incident by failing to report or investigate it accurately if at all and exercise their supervisory obligations in connection with this incident. Id. at § IV, ¶ 55. According to Plaintiff, as the grievance coordinators at SCI-Fayette, Defendants Allen and House had a duty to investigate and protect his rights to have his grievances fully and properly investigated and instead concealed the incident by obstructing his right to grieve. ECF No. 82 at § III, ¶ 48.
As a result of the actions of Allen and House, Plaintiff claims he suffered severe mental anguish, emotional distress, and extreme physical injury some of which is permanent, and disfigurement of his body, in connection with the deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, for which he seeks compensatory, punitive and nominal damages in the amount of $1,000,000 jointly and severally against all Defendants. Id. at § IV, ¶ 56.
After Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on August 11, 2022, the Corrections Defendants simultaneously filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 84) along with the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 85) on August 24, 2022. Plaintiff filed a timely response objecting to the motion on October 28, 2022. ECF No. 98. Thus, the motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants Allen and House have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which provides “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) ‘is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.'” Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010)). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “the court must ‘view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,' and may not grant the motion ‘unless the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, “in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may only consider ‘the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.'” Id. (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aptly summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler[v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d [203,][] 213 [(3d Cir. 2009)] (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir.2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester Cnty. Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Importantly, when considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. ANALYSIS
In order to “state a claim of liability under §1983, [a plaintiff] must allege that [he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, to state a claim for relief under §1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that the defendants were acting under color of state law and that a constitutional violation was directly caused by their conduct. Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Moreover, it is well established that a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.3 (1981) (other citation omitted)); see also C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir.2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc)). A plaintiff must aver this personal involvement through allegations of participation, personal direction, or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. These allegations “must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between the supervisor's directions and the constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to ‘demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus' or ‘affirmative link' between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.'”) (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has identified two general instances in which the conduct of a supervisor-defendant or the policies/procedures of a supervisordefendant may constitute personal involvement, thus warranting a finding of individual supervisory liability for a constitutional tort. First, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Second, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Moreover, a defendant's mere participation in the grievance process is insufficient to confer knowledge of, and acquiescence to, a constitutional violation. Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D.Pa. 2013); see also Sears v. McCoy, No. 1:17-cv-00869, 2017 WL 4012658, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept.12, 2017) (“the filing of a grievance, participation in ‘after-the-fact' review of a grievance, or dissatisfaction with the response to an inmate's grievance does not establish the involvement of officials and administrators in any underlying constitutional deprivation.”).
In support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants Allen and House argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement on their part. They argue that the only allegations made regarding them are that they denied Plaintiff's grievance as untimely and they are both only alleged to have been involved in the grievance investigation process. Thus, Defendants Allen and House submit that these allegations are not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for personal involvement. As such, Defendants Allen and House seek judgment on all claims against them.
In response, Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently pled facts in his Amended Complaint and attached exhibits to show the personal involvement of Defendants Allen and House. In particular, these documents show that Plaintiff was hospitalized from April 6th to April 18th, 2019 at UPMC Mercy in Pittsburgh, was released from the hospital on April 18th,and transferred to SCI-Greene where he was deprived of any writing materials upon his arrival and placement in a POC cell and then in the RHU. ECF No.82 at § III, ¶¶ 39 & 42; ECF No. 82-1 at 1-2, 5-6, 8, 1112. Despite not having access to writing materials or the grievance form, Plaintiff was able to enlist the aid of another prisoner and family members to file grievance no. 801342 on May 9, 2019, which he avers was timely. ECF No. 83 at § III, ¶ 39-42; ECF No. 82-1 at 3.
The Court takes judicial notice of the 2019 calendar which shows that May 9th was the fifteenth working day after Plaintiff's release from the hospital.
Nonetheless, on May 16, 2019, Defendant Allen denied Plaintiff's grievance as untimely stating that it was not submitted withing fifteen working days after the events upon which his claims were based. ECF No. 82-1 at 4.
While Plaintiff's initial grievance dated May 6, 2019 does not explicitly state that he was unable to file the grievance within fifteen working days of April 6th due to his medical situation, it does state that he was hospitalized at UPMC Mercy Hospital for his injuries. It can be implied from this statement that a full investigation of his grievance should have revealed that he was not released from the hospital until April 18th when he was given an emergency transfer to SCI-Greene. As such, Plaintiff submits that Defendant Allen should have been aware of the medical emergency he sustained and yet still rejected his grievance along with his constitutional right to grieve the abuse. He maintains that these actions by Defendant Allen show a knowing disregard and complicity by Defendant Allen to absolve herself and attempt to cover up the incident.
As to Defendant House, Plaintiff alleges that on June 4, 2019, he wrote to her claiming that he never received the pink action return copy of his grievance along with his grievance number. Ex. J. to Am. Compl., ECF No. 82-1 at 15. He requested that she send him the pink action return copy as well as a copy of any decisions rendered. Id. Before Plaintiff received any response to this letter, he submitted a second grievance on June 6, 2019 to Defendant House to which she issued a second grievance rejection on the basis that it was not submitted within fifteen working days after the events upon which the grievance was based. Ex. D & E to Am. Compl., ECF No. 82-1 at 5-7. Plaintiff argues that in doing so, Defendant House abdicated her responsibility to fully investigate his grievance which provided clear details and instead she rejected the grievance in order to cover up the incident and absolve herself of accountability. ECF No. 98 at 11, ¶ 20. He further argues that she assigned the same grievance number to the second grievance he submitted on June 6th even though the grievances were similar but not identical. Id. at ¶ 21. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant House disregarded her responsibility and dumped an alleged untimely, rejected second grievance to the DOC Bureau of Investigation to investigate. Id. at 11-12, ¶ 22. According to Plaintiff, these actions were orchestrated by Defendant House to cover up the incident when she is very capable of investigating a timely and detailed grievance within her area of “professionalism.” Id. at 12, ¶ 23.
The Court finds that the Amended Complaint and attached exhibits set forth allegations which go beyond alleging personal involvement based solely on Defendant Allen's and Defendant House's participation in the grievance process. Rather, the allegations show or suggest that Defendants Allen and House personally participated in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights when, with knowledge of the alleged misconduct, they actively concealed the misconduct by obstructing his right to grieve the alleged misconduct or, in other words, by rejecting the grievance as untimely. As grievance coordinators, Defendants Allen and House had a duty to conduct a full and fair investigation of the events set forth in Plaintiff's grievance. The Amended Complaint and attached exhibits suggest that had they done so, Defendants Allen and House should have discovered that immediately after his alleged assault, Plaintiff was hospitalized in Pittsburgh and then transferred to SCI-Greene where he was denied access to grievance forms and writing materials. Instead, when presented with the serious and troublesome allegations of misconduct in his grievance, Defendants Allen and House chose to summarily reject the grievance as untimely.
At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show or suggest the personal involvement by Defendants Allen and House to allegedly conceal the alleged assault on Plaintiff, thereby obstructing his right to grieve. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Allen and House be denied.
Plaintiff also argues that the motion for judgment on the pleadings is premature when filed in the pre-answer stage. However, this argument lacks merit. The Corrections Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint simultaneously with the filing of the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings. See ECF No. 84. As such, the pending motion is not premature.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to all claims against Defendants Allen and House be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.