Political campaigns can be "as much a means of disseminating ideas as a means of attaining political objectives." Perez-Guzman v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 239 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding insufficient commonality of interest between political party and member to apply preclusion principles); Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1072 ("A person's interest in participating in the political process through voting and having his vote counted is a right both 'individual and personal in nature.' The value of meaningful participation extends beyond that of the interest of the candidate of one's choice in a victorious election.
Those cases don't squarely discredit all notarization challenges—there is, after all, no "litmus" test for determining whether the burdens imposed by a law are severe, Stone, 750 F.3d at 681—so it stands to reason that more draconian notarization requirements could cause a severe burden, either on their own or in combination with other state regulations. The First Circuit held as much in Perez-Guzman v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 243 (1st Cir. 2003), when it subjected a Puerto Rico notarization requirement to strict scrutiny because that restriction required every voter signature to be notarized in a state where only lawyers could be notaries. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled similarly in Green Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 89 F. Supp. 3d 723, 744-45 (E.D. Pa. 2015), when it determined that a Pennsylvania law requiring every signature page to be notarized caused a severe burden as applied to the named plaintiffs, as the cost to those plaintiffs to obtain notarizations made it nearly impossible for them to get on a ballot.
On June 19, 2003 at the Initial Scheduling Conference, the Court set the preliminary injunction for hearing (Docket No. 34). The preliminary injunction hearing was held on July 11 and 14, and after the parties filed their post hearing briefs an Opinion and Order was issued on July 21, 2003 (Docket No. 46). Defendants and Intervener filed Rule 59 Motions (Docket No. 47 and 48). Further, Defendants informed the Court that they opposed the issuance of a permanent injunction and that they might have additional evidence opposing the final relief. The Court provided defendants three weeks to inform the Court whether they had additional facts, otherwise the Court was ready to issue the permanent injunction following the case of Pérez Guzmán v. Aurelio Gracia, 346 F.3d 229 (1st Cir., 2003) (Docket Nos. 53 and 54). Said evidence was never produced and on December 16, 2003 the Court issued a final Order and Judgment (Docket No. 58). Said Hearing was scheduled only after the First Circuit in the case of Pérez Guzmán v. Aurelio Gracia allowed the stay of the Judgment.
In short, state ballot access laws seek to balance these state interests with "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." Rednour , 108 F.3d at 773 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes , 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) ); see also Perez-Guzman v. Gracia , 346 F.3d 229, 239 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[A] fine line separates permissible regulation of state election processes from impermissible abridgement of First Amendment rights. Plotting that line calls for a careful reconciliation of competing centrifugal and centripetal forces.").
This conclusion, however, in no way ends our analysis; it only opens the door for us to apply constitutional freedom of speech principles to the limitations Massachusetts places on its initiative process. We have recognized that "a fine line separates permissible regulation of state election processes from impermissible abridgement of First Amendment rights," Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 239 (1st Cir. 2003), and the same is true of regulation of state initiative procedures. In Pérez-Guzmán, 346 F.3d at 239-47, we invalidated Puerto Rico's requirement that petition signatures needed for registering a new political party to appear on the general election ballot be notarized, holding that it violated the First Amendment of the federal Constitution.
Timmons , 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364. "[T]aken as a whole," Williams , 393 U.S. at 34, 89 S.Ct. 5, the burden of a state's ballot access regime is severe if a "reasonably diligent" party or candidate could not be expected to satisfy the prerequisites for ballot access, Storer , 415 U.S. at 742, 94 S.Ct. 1274 ; however, an actual "showing of personal due diligence is not an element of a ballot access claim," Perez-Guzman v. Gracia , 346 F.3d 229, 243 (1st Cir. 2003). Accordingly, "[p]ast experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates [or minor parties] have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not."
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (delegating to state legislatures the power to prescribe the "[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives"). Such regulation ensures that elections are "fair and honest," Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, and prevents "the democratic process from disintegrating into chaos." Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Dobson v. Dunlap, 576 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (D. Me. 2008) (explaining that "state regulation of elections enhances the democratic process"). States have a "strong . . . interest in regulating all phases of the electoral process, including ballot access."
Yet the Puerto Rico res judicata statute's "perfect identity of parties" clause does not demand a literal identity; it operates, rather, as a privity requirement. R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 185-86 (1st Cir. 2006); Perez-Guzman v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 2003). This means that the clause is satisfied whenever "one party acts for or stands in the place of another in relation to a particular subject matter," KG. Fin. Corp., 446 F.3d at 187, or, in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's words, whenever those parties amount to the same "party really interested."
presents a question of law engendering de novo review. Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 233 (1st Cir. 2003).
We have suggested, in some of our cases, that "[o]nly a state court adjudication that itself has preclusive effect can bring the Rooker-Feldman doctrine into play." Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n. 5; see also Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (" Rooker-Feldman applies to state or territorial court judgments to which the federal courts would accord preclusive effect, and the federal courts 'can ascribe no greater preclusive force to a state court judgment than would the courts of that state.'") (quoting Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21; internal citation omitted); Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (same), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1724, 158 L.Ed.2d 401 (2004). The two concepts of finality serve very different purposes.