Summary
declining notwithstanding Arnone to limit punitive damages award under § 31–51q to amount of attorney's fees
Summary of this case from Jennings v. Town of StratfordOpinion
No. CV 00 037 81 99 S
August 12, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action stems from a trial based on a claim of employment discrimination. The jury found that the defendants, the employer of the plaintiff and its agents, improperly retaliated against the plaintiff, impermissibly acted against her based on her race and intended to inflict emotional distress. They awarded a verdict totaling $2 million in non-economic and punitive damages. The defendants have moved for a directed verdict, for the verdict to be set aside, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, alternatively, remittitur of the damages.
The Connecticut Supreme Court recently discussed the standard for a motion for directed verdict or a motion to set aside a judgment. The Court said:
The defendant must overcome a high threshold to prevail on either a motion for a directed verdict or a motion to set aside a judgment. Directed verdicts are not favored . . . A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion . . . In reviewing the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . Although it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation . . . A directed verdict is justified if . . . the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party . . . Similarly, [the trial court] should not set aside a verdict [when] it is apparent that there was some evidence [on] which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside [when] the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion . . . that, in the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 432, 948 A.2d 982 (2008).
Regarding the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, "[t]he rules of practice establish a procedure pursuant to which a motion for a directed verdict, if denied, is considered renewed by the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." Salaman v. Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 309, 717 A.2d 161 (1998); Practice Book § 16-37. "The issues raised in the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, therefore, logically must be made on the same grounds as the motion for a directed verdict . . . As the present case involves a motion to set aside the verdict made in conjunction with a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis of the same grounds, this court will treat the two motions as one for purposes of resolution of the defendants' alternative claims." Macchietto v. Keggi, 103 Conn.App. 769, 779, 930 A.2d 817, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007).
Based on the record before the court in the present matter, it is not evident that the justice of the verdict need be called into question. The jury heard ample testimony to reach an informed decision regarding the plaintiff's claims. Based on the evidence presented by all parties, it is not clear that the jury misapplied the law to the facts or engaged in any conduct that would be deemed "clear abuse." Consequently, the motions for directed verdict, to set aside the verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are denied.
The defendants also moved to reduce the amount awarded by the jury to the plaintiff. The jury awarded the following specific amounts: $250,000 in non-economic damages and $250,000 in punitive damages for plaintiff's claim that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against her; $250,000 in non-economic damages and $250,000 in punitive damages for her claim that she was discriminated against based on her race and $500,000 in non-economic damages and $500,000 in punitive damages for the finding that the defendants were guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants argue that all of the non-economic damages awarded arise from the same set of facts and, therefore, are unnecessarily duplicative. Also, the defendants argue that punitive damages for the finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress are limited to attorneys fees.
The plaintiff, in her fifth revised complaint, lists three counts against the defendants. The first count details two separate occasions, during the period from 1998 through 2006, when the defendants engaged in wrongful conduct against the plaintiff. The first allegation of wrongful conduct against the defendants alleges that the plaintiff was subjected to acts of retaliation as a consequence for her reporting of assaults by two teachers against students.
The next allegation of wrongful conduct against the defendants involves the manner in which the plaintiff was investigated and placed on administrative leave following a charge that she abused a student. At the conclusion of the first count, the plaintiff alleges the following harm: "As a result of the conduct of the Defendants, the Plaintiff has, and/or will suffer loss of wages, extreme emotional distress and harm to her professional reputation as a result of the Defendants' conduct whereby they subjected her to retaliation and discrimination in response for her cooperation with DCF and the investigation of the assaults as delineated and in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-101e and 31-51q." The second count of the complaint incorporates the entire first count and alleges new facts to demonstrate that the defendants, in the course of investigating the student abuse charge against the plaintiff, treated the plaintiff differently because of her race. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges: "Caucasian school principals and teachers have been involved in allegations of physical and/or racial abuse of students but were given the opportunity to hear the charges against themselves and admit or deny such charges before being placed upon administrative leave or otherwise disciplined." The second count only alleges these new facts in relation to the student abuse allegations leveled against the plaintiff and does not allege any relation between them and the other allegation in the first count related to the alleged retaliation she suffered as a result of her reporting a student assault.
Meanwhile, the third count, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, also incorporates the entire first and second count of the complaint, but goes on to describe, in paragraph twenty-eight, the harm suffered by the defendant as "great mental pain and suffering including tremendous upset, anguish, emotional trauma and discomfort, which require medical treatment." The third count appears to merely incorporate the facts alleged by the prior two counts without alleging anything more.
A court must be careful to evaluate the plaintiff's complaint and determine whether each count asserted by the plaintiff is capable of sustaining an individual damages award, or whether each count is merely a factual duplicate of the counts but is based on a different legal premise. "Although plaintiffs are allowed to allege alternative theories of liability in separate claims, they are not entitled to recover twice for harm growing out of the same transaction, occurrence or event." Catalina v. Nicolelli, 90 Conn.App. 219, 225, 876 A.2d 588 (2005). Jonap v. Silver, 1 Conn.App. 550, 561 (1984).
Regarding the first and second counts of the complaint, it is apparent that the facts alleged by the plaintiff relate to discrete incidents in which the plaintiff suffered harm. It is not the case here that the plaintiff sustained a single harm as the result of a single "transaction, occurrence or event." The first incident is that she was improperly retaliated against because she reported a student assault. The second incident is that she was mistreated by the defendants when faced with allegations of abusing students. It is entirely plausible then for the jury to have made the first two awards of non-economic compensatory damages based on the premise that the plaintiff alleged that she suffered harms stemming from two separate actions by the defendants. It cannot be said, regarding the first two counts of the complaint, that the plaintiff merely alleged two bases for liability for the same harm — the chronology of events make it clear that the harms resulted from separate and distinct acts taken by the defendants.
The complaint's third count, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, does not, however, delineate new facts or alleged harms in a way that could permit it to be read as stemming from transactions, occurrences, or events different than those alleged in the complaint's prior counts. The harms described by the third count only expand on the claim of "emotional distress" previously asserted by, at the very least, the first count. The third count amounts to a duplicative claim, and the plaintiff is not entitled to collect non-economic compensatory damages in the manner awarded. The $500,000 non-economic compensatory award for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot stand.
The jury found that the defendants did act in violation of the law regarding all three claims contained in the plaintiff's complaint. This was the right of the jury and, as stated earlier, there is no reason for the court to believe that the jury abused their right to find for the plaintiff. The court will examine the awards here, however, not just as to the amount awarded but also as to whether any punitive damages were permitted at all for any or all of the counts.
The first count, for which the plaintiff was awarded $250,000 in punitive damages, is based in part on a violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51q. Section 31-51q, in pertinent part, states: "Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state . . . shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages."
The other statute upon which the plaintiff's first count is based, Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-101e, limits any award to "a civil penalty of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars and may order such other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
Therefore, the jury was not acting outside the scope of its authority to award punitive damages.
Regarding the second count of the complaint, the jury again awarded punitive damages of $250,000. This count, however, not only incorporated the § 31-51q claim, but also claimed a violation of rights enunciated in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981. The § 1981 claim is central to the plaintiff's allegation of racial discrimination, and in order to collect punitive damages on such a claim the plaintiff must have convinced the jury of "facts establishing evil motive, intent, recklessness or callous indifference." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Waterbury, 30 Conn.App. 620, 623, 621 A.2d 764 (1993) (citing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). Again, as discussed earlier, deference is given to the jury's verdict. It is not unreasonable to believe that the jury could have, based on the evidence presented at trial, reached the conclusion that the defendants acted recklessly and maliciously against the plaintiff based on her race. Punitive damages under this count are permissible.
The third claim, alleging the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress, resulted in the jury awarding punitive damages of $500,000. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 811, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). Based on the plaintiff's allegations and evidence presented at trial it cannot be said that the jury was unreasonable in finding that the defendant' did act outrageously and in a manner indicating that they intended to cause severe emotional distress in the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to punitive damages here.
What is at issues with all three punitive damages awards, however, is the amount given and whether the sums are appropriate. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated: "The amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, in this case, the jury . . . The size of the verdict alone does not determine whether it is excessive. The only practical test to apply to [a] verdict is whether the award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption." Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 536, 729 A.2d 740 (1999).
Regarding the first count of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants argue that the damages should be limited to attorneys fees, as was done in the case of Burrell v. Yale, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 00-0159421-S (May 10, 2004, Schuman, J.) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 60). In that case the court found that § 31-51q should be interpreted as permitting, consistent with the common-law scheme, an award of punitive damages solely in the form of attorneys fees. The court in Burrell stated that the statute neither explicitly abandons the common-law scheme for punitive damages, nor does it, as recognized by the Appellate Court in Arnone v. Enfield, 79 Conn.App. 501, 521, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003), specifically state what may be awarded as punitive damages. In this matter, however, the court should not be persuaded that § 31-51q is devoid of any guidance. The language of the statute says, regarding punitive damages and attorneys fees that employers who violate the statute are liable "to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages." (Emphasis added.) The statute appears, based on its plain language, to allow for punitive awards to be for more than attorneys fees. This court orders the punitive damages awarded for this claim be left undisturbed.
Regarding the second claim, the defendants argue that the amount awarded is excessive and exceeds any deterrent purpose a punitive award is intended to have. The amount, while indeed large, is not so large as to shock the conscience of this court. The $250,000 punitive award on the second claim should stand.
Finally, regarding the third claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, this is where the defendants' argument that the common-law scheme regarding limiting punitive damages to attorneys fees is applicable. "[C]ommon law punitive damages . . . are limited to the plaintiff's attorney fees and non-taxable costs, and thus serve a function that is both compensatory and punitive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonderner v. United Services Automobile Ass'n., 222 Conn. 480, 492, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992). As intentional infliction of emotional distress is a common-law claim, the punitive award in this matter is restricted to attorneys fees.
The defendant's motions for directed verdict, motion to set aside judgment, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are denied. The motion for remittitur is granted in part, keeping intact the two separate awards of $250,000 in non-economic compensatory damages for claims of retaliation and race discrimination, as well as the two separate awards of $250,000 in punitive damages for the retaliation and race discrimination claims, but eliminating the $500,000 non-economic award for intentional infliction of emotional distress and reducing the punitive award for that claim to attorneys fees and non-taxable costs.
Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to submit an affidavit evidencing the attorneys fees in this matter within thirty days of this order. The court will then hold a hearing affording all parties an opportunity to be heard. Thereafter, the court will award reasonable attorneys fees through a separate memorandum.