Upload a complaint or brief to quickly find on-point case law.
CARA A.I. uses the facts and legal issues in your document to find relevant authorities.
Drag a complaint or brief hereUpload a complaint or briefPDF documentWORD documentTXT documentOr, choose a document to uploadChoose DocumentSecure
Find on-point cases faster with CARA A.I.
§

Peretz v. Watson

3 Mass. App. Ct. 727 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975)
Depth of Treatment
Newest to Oldest
Oldest to Newest
Cite Count
Peretz v. Watson

12 Citing cases

  1. Ismert and Associates v. New England Mut. Life

    801 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1986)   Cited 54 times
    Noting that the option to refuse to sign a release and to litigate instead would defeat a claim for duress, and observing that “a strict interpretation” of the concept of “no real choice” is “what the Massachusetts courts intend” as a policy matter

    A counter-offer made upon receipt of an offer generally terminates the party's power to accept the original offer. See Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728, 324 N.E.2d 908, 909 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39(2) (1981). Furthermore, Mr. Ismert appears to have withdrawn his offer of the July 24 release by his later statement to Ms. Livingston that he would not sign any release.

  2. Marquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-11725-RGS (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    Dismissing TPP-based claims where borrowers acknowledged that they failed to provide income documentation

    Bank of United States v. Thomson & Kelly Co., 290 Mass. 224, 228 (1935). See Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass.App. 727, 728 (1975).David J. Tierney, JR., Inc. v. T. Wellington Carpets, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 240 (1979); accord Northampton Inst. For Savings v. Putnam, 313 Mass. 1, 7 (1943) ("[A]n acceptance of an offer must be in accordance with its terms, that is, by full performance by the offeree, in order that a contract may come into existence . . . .").

  3. Rebeiro v. the Travelers Insurance Company

    536 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    The insurance company was entitled to revoke its offer before it was accepted, and the offer, once rejected, could not thereafter be revived by an attempted acceptance, i.e., the act of the plaintiff's attorney in scheduling a lump sum conference with the department. See Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728 (1975). Another basis for the judge's decision is that, even had there been an agreement, the plaintiff took no steps to exhaust the administrative remedy available under G.L.c. 152, § 10, before seeking judicial intervention.

  4. David J. Tierney, Jr. v. T. Wellington Carpets

    8 Mass. App. Ct. 237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 32 times
    Finding permissible "other forms of acceptance" only where the offeror has failed to "clearly express[], in the terms of the communicated offer itself, his intention to exclude all other modes of acceptance."

    And if a purported acceptance substantially varies from the terms of the offer it is ineffective, creating no binding agreement. Bank of the United States v. Thomson Kelly Co., 290 Mass. 224, 228 (1935). See Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728 (1975). In our view there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Tierney accepted the offer of T. Wellington, thereby creating a binding agreement.

  5. Tull v. Mister Donut Development Corp.

    7 Mass. App. Ct. 626 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 48 times
    Explaining that document revised "in more than trifling detail" is counter-offer

    Champlin v. Jackson, 317 Mass. 461, 463 (1945). Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728 (1975). The insistence upon a guaranty of the lease by the parent, although this request hardly could have surprised Mister Donut, added another significant element of counter offer.

  6. Ben-Morris Co. v. the Hanover Insurance Co.

    3 Mass. App. Ct. 779 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 9 times
    In Ben-Morris, the mortgagee's right to insurance proceeds in such circumstances was held to be limited to the amount due it on the mortgage debt, even if the debt were reduced subsequent to the loss.

    Once the foreclosure sale took place, the amount of the mortgage debt was reduced, and the terms of the offer could not be met. See Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co. 246 Mass. 139, 148 (1923); Bank of United States v. Thomson Kelly Co. 290 Mass. 224, 228 (1935); Peretz v. Watson, ante, 727 (1975). Decree affirmed.

  7. Headquarters Hotel, LLC v. LBV Hotel, LLC

    1884CV02916BLS1 (Mass. Super. Jan. 3, 2020)

    Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 148 (1923) ("Moss"). See Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 727, 728 (1975) ("Peretz") (explaining that a response to a party’s offer that "varies from the terms of the offer in any material respect is in effect a rejection ... and ... an offer once rejected cannot thereafter be revived by an attempted acceptance thereof"). In this case, LBV has the explicit right under the ROFO Provision to determine for itself the price and other terms and conditions upon which it wishes to offer its Estate for Years for sale to Headquarters and to others, if at all.

  8. Kirin Produce Co. v. Lun Fat Produce, Inc.

    1684 CV 03338-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Feb. 6, 2017)

    And " an offer once rejected cannot thereafter be revived by an attempted acceptance thereof." Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass.App.Ct. 727, 727, 324 N.E.2d 908 (1975) (rescript). Kirin alleges that during a conversation on September 18 Mr. Tam said " that he would definitely sell the package if Kirin agreed to all of the terms in Mr. Wong's email."

  9. City of Malden v. Antonangelli

    1995 Mass. App. Div. 149 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    The "Agreement" for such waiver, forwarded to defendant's counsel in March, 1989, merely constituted an offer by the City to the defendant to agree to such waiver. The insertion by defendant's counsel of G.L.c. 41, § 111F language significantly varied the terms of the proposed Agreement, and thus did not constitute, a valid acceptance of the City's offer so as to create a binding contract, Tierney v. T.Wellington Carpets, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 240 (1979); Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728 (1975). There is also no merit in the City's final argument that the attorney's fee provision of § 111F is inapplicable herein because the defendant settled its claim against the third-party tortfeasor without ever commencing suit.

  10. Truck Center Leasing, Inc. v. Fiumara

    1992 Mass. App. Div. 16 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    These additional lessee burdens flatly contradict the letter offer. While they and the other changes or additions in the Rome lease are sugar-coated in the covering letter ("If I have not stated the terms correctly, please advise"), the Rome lease proposal might well have been deemed a rejection of plaintiff's offer, Peretz v. Watson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 728 (1975) ("A purported acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer in any material respect is in effect a rejection"), or at best a conditional acceptance which plaintiff was free to reject. Lawrence v. Rosenberg, 238 Mass. 138, 141 (1921).