Opinion
35495.
DECIDED MAY 23, 1955.
Workmen's compensation. Before Judge Paschall. Floyd Superior Court. October 16, 1954.
Wright, Rogers, Magruder Hoyt, for plaintiff in error.
C. T. Culbert, contra.
The full board of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation was fully authorized, acting in a de novo investigation, to find from the evidence that the disability, if any, of which the claimant complained did not result from an accident she had sustained arising out of and in the course of her employment, and to render an award denying compensation. Accordingly, the Superior Court of Floyd County erred in reversing the findings and award of the full board.
DECIDED MAY 23, 1955.
Pepperell Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff in error, will be referred to herein as the employer; Mrs. Corrine Mathis, the defendant in error, will be referred to as the claimant; the State Board of Workmen's Compensation will be referred to as the board; and the Director of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation will be referred to as the director — for the sake of brevity.
The claimant was injured while working for the employer, the injury being sustained on June 13, 1951, when she slipped on wet concrete and fell, injuring her left knee. The injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. She did not lose any time from work at that time or until February 14, 1953. She was then paid compensation under an agreement between her and the employer, which was approved by the board. These payments were discontinued in June, 1953, when the employer received medical evidence that the claimant had no further disability from the injury. The claimant asked for a hearing before the board to determine the extent of her disability. The hearing was held in Rome, Georgia, before the director on August 11, 1953. On the hearing the director asked if it was agreed and stipulated that the injury sustained by the claimant arose out of and in the course of employment, and counsel for the employer answered, "Yes, sir." Thereafter the director stated, "That narrows the issue down to determining the extent of disability." There was no response to this statement. Thereafter counsel for the employer stated, "I think we can enter into one or two other stipulations," which he named as follows: "Any disability she suffered began as of February 14, 1953," and "any injury for which recovery is sought is confined to an injury to the left knee." On the hearing the claimant testified that her knee had never quit hurting since the injury, and that at the time when she quit work she could not stand on her feet for eight hours a day and do her work as a weaver. She also testified that she could not sit for eight hours a day, because the knee then got stiff. She testified further that she had worked approximately one and one-half days since February 14, 1953, but that she could not do the work because of the pain in her knee. Doctors testified that there was no injury to the knee that showed up on X-rays, but that the knee could be injured and it would not show up on X-rays. There was positive testimony from physicians that the claimant did have osteoarthritis in the knees. The director on March 25, 1954, found from the facts and evidence that the claimant had a 50% partial disability of the left leg, which was the direct result of the accident and injury she received on June 13, 1951, out of and in the course of her employment with the employer. This award was appealed to the full board by the employer, and the board on April 21, 1954, reversed the director and issued the following order: "After hearing argument and careful consideration of the entire record, the majority of the board is of the opinion that the superior weight of the evidence shows conclusively that the disability the claimant complains of at this time is not a result of the accident and injury of June 13, 1951, nor did said accident and injury aggravate a previous condition, but the disability she complains of is the result of an arthritic condition and the award must be reversed and compensation denied." Later, on May 4, 1954, the claimant appealed this order to the Superior Court of Floyd County, Georgia, where the judge rendered the following judgment: "The claimant in this case worked on this job for a third of a century, and was in good physical condition when she fell and injured her knee (so far as the record discloses). She must have been a person of good character. No effort is made to impeach her. She knows more about her pains than all the doctors. For these reasons the finding of the board is reversed and the judgment of director Buckner affirmed and made the judgment of this court." It is to this judgment that the employer excepted.
In the brief of counsel for the claimant it is argued that, under the agreement of counsel for both parties, it was admitted that there was some disability as a result of the accident on June 13, 1951, and that the only inquiry was as to the extent of the disability. On the contrary, counsel for the employer contends that the issue was as to the extent of the disability if caused by the accident. Because of this difference of opinion we have set forth in the statement of facts the details on which the respective contentions are based. It will be seen from these recitals that the director asked if it was agreed that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. The answer of counsel for the employer was an unequivocal "Yes." The director then stated, "That narrows the issue down to determining the extent of disability." There was no response to this statement. Thereafter counsel for the employer stated, "I think we can enter into one or two other stipulations." He then stated: "We can stipulate that any disability she suffered began as of February 14, 1953," and that "any injury for which recovery is sought is confined to an injury to the left knee." (Italics ours.) Properly construed, we think the full context shows that counsel for the employer admitted that any disability the claimant suffered began as of February 14, 1953, but did not admit that the disability, if any, then arising was caused by her accident on June 13, 1951. He was therefore at liberty to contend as to whether or not the evidence showed disability arising from such accident or from some other cause. Upon a careful examination of the record, we hold that, while there was some evidence as to the disability, there was no evidence showing that the disability was traceable to or aggravated by the accident suffered by the claimant on June 13, 1951. It appears that she worked on her accustomed job for about one year and eight months thereafter and then had to quit her work because of swelling and pains in and about her left knee. The judge of the superior court apparently reversed the award of the full board because of the fact that the claimant complained of pain, and it was not shown that she was not in good physical condition on the day of the accident. However, it was shown that she continued on her job until February 14, 1953, and there was testimony from which the full board, acting in a de novo investigation, could find that her pains were due to arthritis in and about both knees or otherwise than because of the accident on June 13, 1951. Under repeated rulings of this court, when there is any evidence to support the findings of the full board, its award can not, in the absence of some error of law appearing, be reversed. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Wilbanks, 68 Ga. App. 631 ( 23 S.E.2d 519); Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385 (2a) ( 36 S.E.2d 842); Kell v. Bridges, 80 Ga. App. 55 (1) ( 55 S.E.2d 309); Fleming v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 89 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 79 S.E.2d 407). Accordingly, the Superior Court of Floyd County erred in reversing the award of the full board.
Judgment reversed. Felton, C. J., and Quillian, J., concur.