3. GSK cites Aurura Cable Comm. Inc. v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 600, 603 (W.D.Mich. 1989) and Peoples Sav. Bank v. Stoddard, 102 N.W.2d 777, 796 (Mich. 1960) in arguing that Michigan's antitrust statute requires the plaintiffs to show that some of the anti-competitive conduct at issue occurred within Michigan. Id. However, the court in Peoples Savings Bank simply observed that the monopolistic activities in question in that case were predominantly local.

Attorney General, ex rel. James, v. National Cash Register Co., 182 Mich. 99, 107 (Ann Cas 1916D, 638); People, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Detroit Asphalt Paving Co., 244 Mich. 119, 122, 123. In Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard (1960), 359 Mich. 297, 329 (83 ALR2d 344), this Court said: "Monopoly may be said to be the result of the practical elimination of effective business competition which thereby creates a power to control prices to the harm of the public."

Gulf says that perhaps the single most important fact about the entire lawsuit is the fact that although its subsidiary G.A.L.C. Company acquired 46% of Fenestra's outstanding stock, it has never acquired control of Fenestra (it will be remembered that the events leading up to this lawsuit happened well in advance of the next scheduled annual meeting of stockholders). Gulf says, this being a civil conspiracy suit, that plaintiff Fenestra must satisfy the court that two or more of the defendants combined either to accomplish a lawful purpose through unlawful means or to accomplish an unlawful purpose, citing Veriden v. McLeod, 180 Mich. 182, and Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297 (83 ALR2d 344). Gulf says, first of all, that there was nothing unlawful in the means by which it obtained Fenestra's shares.

A trial court does not have the authority to grant relief based on a claim that was never pleaded in a complaint or requested at any time before or during trial. See Peoples Savings Bank v Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 325; 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960); City of Bronson v American States Ins Co, 215 Mich. App. 612, 619; 546 N.W.2d 702 (1996). Further, although trial courts have the power to allow posttrial amendment of pleadings to conform to the proofs absent a showing of surprise or prejudice, Gorelick v Dep't of State Hwys, 127 Mich. App. 324, 338; 339 N.W.2d 635 (1983), plaintiffs never moved to amend their complaint to conform to the proofs.

Tying, the restrictive practice at issue, is not specifically prohibited by either the Sherman Act or the Michigan Trusts, Monopolies and Combinations Act, and no Michigan authority has been found specifically holding that tying is a restrictive practice prohibited by the Michigan act. In Peoples Savings Bank v Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 329; 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960), the Michigan Supreme Court, without deciding whether or not tying was prohibited by the act, did state that tying has been held to be a restrictive practice. The definition of tying is contained in Northern Pacific R Co v United States, 356 U.S. 1; 78 S Ct 514; 2 L Ed 2d 545 (1958), where the Court stated:

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, Foote's offer, made only after another offer had been rejected, points to a purpose other than one to restrict trade or commerce. Surely lacking here is the picture of `high finance and less lofty subterfuge' which the court found so repugnant in Peoples Savings Bank v Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297 [ 102 N.W.2d 777] (1960). "2.

The approach has been to reconcile the relevant state and federal interests and to find that the states have a valid interest in regulating unfair competitive practices within their jurisdictions, and that this power is not lost merely because the activity affects interstate commerce. ( Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 51 [ 172 P.2d 867] ("Since there is no conflict between the law of this state and the Sherman Act, plaintiff may invoke the state law even if interstate commerce is involved."); Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297 [ 102 N.W.2d 777, 83 A.L.R.2d 344]; State v. Allied Chem. Dye Corp., 9 Wis.2d 290 [ 101 N.W.2d 133]; State v. Sterling Theaters Co., 64 Wn.2d 761 [ 394 P.2d 226]; Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249 [ 93 N.E.2d 751]; Leader Theater Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280 [58 N.Y.S.2d 304]; affd. 273 App. Div. 844 [76 N.Y.S.2d 846].

The Court has denied the efforts of Michigan National Bank to acquire stock of an existing competing bank in Port Huron which would leave the Michigan National Bank as the only bank in the area. The Court in interpreting the statute in Peoples Savings Bank v Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 329-330; 102 N.W.2d 777, 793 (1960), said after quoting MSA 28.31 and MSA 28.62: "`Monopoly may be said to be the result of the practical elimination of effective business competition which thereby creates a power to control prices to the harm of the public.

For example, the Supreme Court held in 1924 that the National Bank Act did not impede the ability of a state attorney general to bring an action against a national bank to enforce a valid state law prohibiting the establishment of branch banks. First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 659-60, 44 S.Ct. 213, 68 L.Ed. 486 (1924); see also First Nat'l Bank of Bay City v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 421-22, 37 S.Ct. 734, 61 L.Ed. 1233 (1917) (considering and denying on merits state attorney general's quo warranto action testing authority of national bank to engage in trust services under state and federal law); Minn. v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F.Supp.2d 962, 966 (D.Minn. 2001) (holding that state could bring action to enforce state fraud and deceptive trade practice laws against national bank); Alaska v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 425-26 (Alaska 1982) (holding that state could sue national bank to enforce state consumer protection laws); Peoples Savs. Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777, 782, 796-97 (1960) (applying, in suit brought by state attorney general, state antitrust law to national bank); cf. Dickinson, 396 U.S. at 129, 130, 138, 90 S.Ct. 337 (denying declaratory and injunctive relief to national banking association following state comptroller's letter requesting national bank to cease and desist activities prohibited by state law and incorporated into federal law under 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)); Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627, 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming, in suit brought by state banking commissioner, judgment barring national bank from engaging in branching activity prohibited by state law and incorporated into federal law under 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)); Utah ex rel. Dep't of Fin. Insts. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank of Ogden, 615 F.2d 903, 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1980) (same); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding state banking commissioner could intervene in suit to enjoin Comptroller of Currency from authorizing national bank to open branch in contravention of state

The antitrust statutes of Michigan, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin, are unquestionably directed toward intrastate commerce. See Peoples Savs. Bank v. Stoddard, 102 N.W.2d 777, 796 (Mich. 1960) (holding state antitrust statute is not preempted by federal law and that a state has the authority to enforce its own antitrust statute where the effect of the anticompetitive conduct is primarily intrastate); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 172 (D.Me. 2004) (holding that Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected requirement that conduct "predominantly" affect intrastate commerce, instead concluding that Tennessee's antitrust statute "applies to illegal conduct that substantially affects commerce within this state") (quoting Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No. M2000-01850-COA-R9CV, 2003 WL 21780975, at *21 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003) (emphasis in quotation); W.Va. Code § 37-18-3 ("[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this State [West Virginia] shall be unlawful"); Meyers v. Bayer AG, 735 N.W.2d 448, 464 (Wis. 2007) (noting that Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that state's ant