Opinion
DBDCV196031013S
08-12-2019
Peopleready, Inc. v. S Payuk Associates, LLC aka
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): D’Andrea, Robert A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
D’ANDREA, ROBERT A., J.
The issue presented is whether the plaintiff, Peopleready, Inc. ("PR"), is entitled to summary judgment, on its two-count complaint dated April 11, 2019, on the grounds that there exists no genuine issue of material fact in the complaint. The motion for summary judgment alleges that the defendant S Puyuk Associates LLC d/b/a/ Payuk Associates ("Payuk") filed an answer to the complaint stating that it is leaving PR to its proof without any other substantive statements/denials, etc.
BACKGROUND
PR filed its two-count complaint dated April 11, 2019, alleging in the first count that on or about June 6, 2018, PR entered into an agreement with Payuk to provide Payuk with the services of workers for temporary staffing, in which Payuk agreed in the event of default to pay interest and all costs of collection including reasonable attorneys fees. In accordance with the agreement, RP provided the services of workers for temporary staffing for the outstanding balance due of $38, 967.82. Despite requests for payment, Payuk has refused and neglected to pay PR the balance due. In second count PR claims that Payuk has been unjustly enriched for receiving from PR the benefit of the services of workers for temporary staffing without paying PR the reasonable value of those services of $38, 967.82.
PR claims that the May 31, 2019 answer to both counts of PR’s complaint respond that either "[D]efendant does not deny but leaves the Plaintiff to its proof," or "[D]efendant is without sufficient information to admit or deny ... and therefore leaves the Plaintiff to its proof," as to each paragraph of both counts of the complaint. In support of its motion for summary judgment, PR submitted with the motion, an affidavit of debt dated April 26, 2019 showing a balance due and payable of $38, 967.82 (exhibit A); and a copy of the agreement between the parties for the PR to supply temporary staffing to Payuk; an affidavit of reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $1, 785; and itemized statement of account for the balance due of $38, 967.82, along with copies of all invoices; and a memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment.
PR provides in its memorandum a recitation of what it determined is the applicable law in support of the motion for summary judgment. PR claims that with its affidavit in support of its liquidated damages claim, and its supporting material, that based on the answer provided by Payuk, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in the complaint, and PR is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the present action, Payuk has filed no opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ... However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010); LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 250, 802 A.2d 63 (2002). The test is whether the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, 282 Conn. 722, 728, 924 A.2d 816 (2007); Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Service, 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
"[T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment ... [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 81 Conn.App. 798, 803, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004). "On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence in deciding the motion for summary judgment ... If the parties present conflicting evidence, it should be submitted to the fact finder." (Citations omitted.) Papa v. Schroeder, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6052720-S (March 1, 2016, Peck, J.); see also Martin v. Westport, 108 Conn.App. 710, 728, 950 A.2d 19 (2008) (affirming trial court’s granting of motion for summary judgment, reasoning that court may review, but not weigh, evidence). However, "[o]nce the moving party has met its burden [of production] ... the opposing party [to survive summary judgment] must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 366, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). "To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must ‘provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). Evidence is defined as ‘[s]omething (including testimony, documents and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009)." Voris v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 297 Conn. 589, 602, 999 A.2d 741 (2010). "When a party moves for summary judgment and there are no contradictory affidavits, the court properly decides the motion by looking to the sufficiency of the movant’s affidavit and other proof. See Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995)." General Insurance Company of America v. Okeke, 182 Conn.App. 83, 93, 183 A.3d 158 (2018).
After reviewing the evidence and memorandum submitted by PR in support of the motion for summary judgment, the court finds that PR has met its burden of production as to counts one and two of its complaint; see Rosenthal v. Bloomfield, 178 Conn.App. 258, 263, 174 A.3d 839 (2017); see also Credit One, LLC v. Head, 117 Conn.App. 92, 100, 977 A.2d 767, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 907, 982 A.2d 1080 (2009). In the present action, Payuk has filed no opposition to the PR’s motion for summary judgment. Since Payuk has not provided any denial to the two-count complaint, nor has it provided any affidavit, memorandum in opposition or any other information or material that tends to prove the existence of an alleged fact, it has failed to provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, PR’s motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two of the complaint is GRANTED.
Judgment is rendered for PR against Payuk for damages in the amount of $38, 967.82; costs in the amount of $487.42 (court entry fee $360, marshal’s fee $77.42, and indemnity fee $50); attorneys fees in the amount of $1, 785, for a total of $41, 240.24; and postjudgment interest in the amount of 10 percent per annum.