Opinion
2018-2203 N CR
10-21-2021
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ray Zuniga-Mejia, Appellant.
Ray Zuniga-Mejia, appellant pro se. Nassau County District Attorney, for respondent (no brief filed).
Unpublished Opinion
Ray Zuniga-Mejia, appellant pro se.
Nassau County District Attorney, for respondent (no brief filed).
PRESENT:: TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, P.J., TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Lynbrook, Nassau County (William J. McLaughlin, J.), rendered September 25, 2018. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of disobeying a traffic-control device, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the facts, the accusatory instrument is dismissed, and the fine, if paid, is remitted.
On August 15, 2017, defendant was charged in a simplified traffic information with disobeying a traffic-control device (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110 [a]), to wit, driving a vehicle weighing more than 8, 000 pounds upon a street where vehicles of that weight were prohibited, and notice of which was provided by a posted traffic control sign. Defendant represented himself during a nonjury trial held on September 25, 2018, but due to an electronic malfunction that went undiscovered until later, the trial was not recorded. Immediately following the trial, the court found defendant guilty and sentenced him to pay a $150 fine.
The Criminal Procedure Law requires "that, in response to an affidavit of errors, the court 'summarize evidence, facts or occurrences in or adduced at the proceedings resulting in the judgment, sentence or order, which constitute the factual foundation for the contentions alleged in the affidavit of errors' to the degree necessary for a proper determination of the appeal" (People v Sullivan, 27 Misc.3d 134 [A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50749[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010], quoting CPL 460.10 [3] [d]; see People v Wright, 19 Misc.3d 140 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50904[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]). In response to defendant's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the Justice Court did not set forth what evidence was received at trial to satisfy the prosecution's burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's work vehicle was over the 8, 000 pound (lb) limit (see e.g. People v Fallah-Braimah, 57 Misc.3d 144 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51445[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]; People v Schlessinger, 35 Misc.3d 150 [A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51122[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]). Instead, the court seemed to view the evidence in a way that improperly shifted the burden of proof away from the prosecution by asserting in its return that defendant "never denied the vehicle... was a commercial vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of over 8, 000 lbs."
Under the circumstances presented, because the Justice Court did not adequately refute defendant's weight of the evidence claim with respect to the vehicle's weight, we deem the return to admit that the judgment of guilt after trial was against the weight of the evidence at least with respect to the vehicular weight element of the charge (see Wright, 19 Misc.3d 140[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50904[U], *1; People v Williams, 5 Misc.3d 131 [A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51345[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]; People v Hill, 2002 NY Slip Op 40096[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002]).
In view of the foregoing, we reach no other issue.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.
RUDERMAN, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.