Opinion
March 6, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Groh, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We perceive no reason to disturb the hearing court's findings that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed to the crime. An effective waiver of Miranda rights may be made by an accused of subnormal intelligence so long as it is established that he understood the immediate meaning of the warnings (see, People v Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285; People v. Munoz, 134 A.D.2d 532, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 958; People v. Gerald, 128 A.D.2d 635, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 646; People v. Avilez, 121 A.D.2d 391, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 767; People v. Dorsey, 118 A.D.2d 653, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 1052). The defendant's submission of the evaluation of a clinical psychologist made six months prior to the commission of the instant offense on an unrelated matter in Family Court which found him to be of "borderline to low average intellectual functioning" is insufficient to establish that he was unable to comprehend the meaning of his Miranda warnings. We find that the hearing court properly excluded the testimony of this psychologist as there was no need for expert testimony to amplify the findings contained within her report.
With respect to the defendant's assertion that suppression of his admission was improperly denied because he was unable to understand his Miranda warnings in English, we agree with the hearing court's determination that credited the testimony of the detective who stated that the defendant knowingly said "yes" when asked if he understood his constitutional rights (see, People v Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, cert denied 400 U.S. 851; People v. Hayes, 127 A.D.2d 607, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 704; People v. Armstead, 98 A.D.2d 726). We further conclude that the hearing court properly denied suppression of the physical evidence since the record shows that the defendant was arrested and the weapon located in the home of his sister-in-law, who clearly gave her knowing and voluntary oral and written consent to a search of the premises (see, People v Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286; People v. Messam, 112 A.D.2d 449, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 616). In any event, an application of the factors set forth in People v. Mathis ( 132 A.D.2d 626, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 801), established that the search was justified under the exigent circumstances exception as (1) the crime was a cold-blooded murder in a bungled robbery attempt, (2) the weapon was a gun and there was good reason to believe that the defendant was armed, (3) the codefendant informed the police of the defendant's commission of the crime, (4) the codefendant entered the premises moments before the police and confirmed that the defendant and his weapon were inside, and (5) there was a possibility of escape. Accordingly, those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements were properly denied. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Kunzeman and Spatt, JJ., concur.