It is equally well established that a trial court's refusal to give an instruction regarding the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance is not error where the evidence only supports delivery or intent to deliver, and the jury would only be justified in returning a verdict of guilty or not guilty on the greater offense. People v. Zipprich (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 490 N.E.2d 8. • 5 Here, although defendant denied possession altogether, we do not find that fact dispositive, but instead consider whether there is evidence in the record upon which the jury could have conceivably based a verdict of possession. While the officers observed defendant engaging in suspicious behavior by driving a certain circuit, the officer never saw him actually selling the narcotics.
People v. Ziehm, 120 Ill. App.3d 777, 76 Ill.Dec. 188, 192, 458 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1983). Accord, People v. Zipprich, 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 95 Ill.Dec. 535, 538, 490 N.E.2d 8, 11 (1986). "However, the mere possibility of tampering alone will not render the chain broken or the evidence inadmissible."
The State cites three cases in support of its argument, and while we agree with the holding in these cases, they contain fact patterns where the amount of the controlled substance was much greater than the amount in the instant case, or the sale and/or delivery of the controlled substance was directly observed by the police. (See People v. Zipprich (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 490 N.E.2d 8; People v. Knight (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 248, 478 N.E.2d 1082; People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 516, 464 N.E.2d 659.) None of these cases hold that 11.2 grams of cocaine are greater than an amount intended for personal use, and there was no direct evidence of any sale or delivery of the controlled substance in defendant's possession.
This was also not a case where an instruction on the lesser offense would have allowed the jury to reach a compromise verdict. ( Cf. People v. Zipprich (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 127-28, 490 N.E.2d 8, 12.) Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give this lesser tendered instruction and, therefore, we remand the case for a new trial.
Thus, it is not error for a court to refuse to give an instruction on possession where the evidence presented by the State concerns delivery or intent to deliver a controlled substance, and the defendant neither rebuts the evidence of delivery nor shows he was merely in possession of the substance. ( People v. Zipprich (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 490 N.E.2d 8.) Evidence sufficient to support the lesser and relatively minor crime must be presented at trial to require a court to give an instruction defining that lesser offense. According to the testimony at trial, when police officers gained entrance to the apartment, they found the defendant along with three others — Terrell Cole, Candy Thomas and John Smith — present in the south bedroom.
Therefore, where the evidence is sufficient for a conviction on the greater offense, it is not reversible error to instruct only on that offense. People v. Zipprich (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 123, 127, 490 N.E.2d 8. In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed that the victim sustained multiple lacerations to her neck and face which resulted in permanent scarring.