Opinion
March 6, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Katz, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant argues that the hearing court should have suppressed the complainant's testimony concerning the lineup and her in-court identification because the hearing testimony of the police officer who established the legality of the arrest which gave rise to the lineup was hearsay and because the lineup was unduly suggestive. However, it is well established that the People may use hearsay at a suppression hearing to establish the legality of police conduct (CPL 70.10; 710.60; see, People v Feingold, 106 A.D.2d 583). Further, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the lineup was properly conducted (see, People v Gaddy, 209 A.D.2d 430; People v. Norris, 122 A.D.2d 82).
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his objection to the prosecutor's opening statement (CPL 470.05). In any event, absent bad faith or undue prejudice, the prosecutor's failure to prove every statement in his or her opening will not result in a jury's verdict being reversed (see, People v. De Tore, 34 N.Y.2d 199, 207, cert denied sub nom. Wedra v. New York, 419 U.S. 1025).
Finally, the defendant argues that reversal is warranted due to the admission of certain hearsay testimony during trial. However, the court's prompt curative instruction vitiated any prejudice to the defendant (see, People v. Baez, 208 A.D.2d 638). Accordingly, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a mistrial (see generally, People v. Ortiz, 54 N.Y.2d 288). O'Brien, J.P., Ritter, Santucci and Friedmann, JJ., concur.