People v. Zerbst

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Sanchez

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 50149 (N.Y. App. Term 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Here, that corroboration "includ[ed] the defendant's own statements to the police" (id.; People v McIver, 15 AD3d 677, 678 [2008]). Finally, although the circumstances herein involved the corroboration of the statements of defendant and the victim with respect to each other, it is well settled that such cross-corroboration is permitted (see People v Zerbst, 147 AD2d 844, 846 [1989], affd 74 NY2d 888 [1989]; see also People v Coleman, 42 NY2d 500, 506 [1977]; People v Berlin, 39 AD3d 351, 352 [2007]; People v Bitting, 224 AD2d 1012, 1013 [1996]).

  2. People v. Byron

    85 A.D.3d 1323 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 10 times

    Moreover, her response to County Court's inquiry of her, prior to testifying, demonstrated that she was sufficiently intelligent to give unsworn testimony. Under these circumstances, County Court's decision to permit such testimony was a proper exercise of its discretion and the testimony was sufficiently corroborated to support defendant's convictions ( see CPL 60.20; People v Zuke, 304 AD2d 910, 911-912, lv denied 100 NY2d 601). Likewise, defendant's confession was adequately corroborated by the victim's testimony, her consistent out-of-court statements and the testimony concerning her behavior following the incident ( see CPL 60.50; People v Coleman, 42 NY2d 500, 506; People v Bitting, 224 AD2d 1012, 1013, lv denied 88 NY2d 845; People v Zerbst, 147 AD2d 844, 846, affd 74 NY2d 888; People v Philipp, 106 AD2d 681, 682). Additionally, it is undisputed that the victim was under the age of 11 at the time the abuse occurred and defendant confessed to having touched her vaginal area both outside and inside her clothing.

  3. People v. Berlin

    39 A.D.3d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 7 times

    The court properly concluded that the child victim was capable of giving unsworn testimony, and her account of the crime was consistent with defendant's statements to the police. These two forms of evidence, each requiring corroboration, properly cross-corroborated each other ( see People v Coleman, 42 NY2d 500, 506; People v Zerbst, 147 AD2d 844, 846, affd 74 NY2d 888). Moreover, there was additional evidence establishing defendant's opportunity to commit the crime, and connecting him to it.

  4. People v. Sargent

    194 A.D.2d 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 10 times

    Police Officer Ralph Peluso testified that defendant agreed to talk to him privately, was advised of his Miranda rights which he said he understood and, although he appeared nervous, his speech was clear, logical and intelligent. Peluso stated that defendant did not have glassy eyes or the smell of alcohol and his face, although cut, was not bleeding. The testimony at the Huntley hearing was conflicting and the ensuing credibility question was resolved in favor of Peluso and against defendant (see, People v. Zerbst, 147 A.D.2d 844, 845, affd 74 N.Y.2d 888). County Court could conclude from the evidence presented, including defendant's testimony, that defendant was not intoxicated to such a degree that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights (see, People v Merrick, 188 A.D.2d 764; People v. Duffy, 185 A.D.2d 371, 372, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 929).

  5. People v. Harris

    191 A.D.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    Defendant did not request counsel during interrogation for the crime at issue until after he had given his oral statement, and police were under no duty to inquire as to defendant's possible representation on pending charges (see, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331; People v. Vail, 182 A.D.2d 331; People v. Terry, 179 A.D.2d 833, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 839). Defendant's contention that his statement was involuntary due to his alleged intoxication and the length of the interrogation are similarly meritless. The police officers who observed and questioned defendant testified that defendant was not intoxicated (see, People v. Zerbst, 147 A.D.2d 844, affd 74 N.Y.2d 888). In addition, the approximately two-hour length of defendant's interrogation does not in itself indicate that the statement was involuntary (see, People v. Charon, 165 A.D.2d 914, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 837).

  6. People v. Ford

    174 A.D.2d 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 12 times

    ndant never requested the results in his demand to produce pursuant to CPL 240.20. Although he did request this material in his demand for a bill of particulars, the People properly refused this request since the bill of particulars is meant to provide what the People intend to prove (see, e.g., People v Byrnes, 126 A.D.2d 735), not show how they intend to do so (see, 2 Waxner, New York Criminal Practice ΒΆ 9.11). Moreover, since defense counsel received the material prior to the time the applicable prosecution witness testified and did not request an adjournment, we fail to find any substantial prejudice to defendant (see, e.g., People v Bennett, 162 A.D.2d 820; People v Jiminez, 157 A.D.2d 575). With respect to defendant's final contention that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, we fail to find any clear abuse of the sentencing court's discretion or other extraordinary circumstances which would justify reducing the sentence (see, People v Zerbst, 147 A.D.2d 844, 846, affd 74 N.Y.2d 888). Weiss, J.P., Yesawich Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.

  7. People v. Bleecker

    165 A.D.2d 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

    Appeal from the County Court of Sullivan County (Hanofee, J.). Defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender to an indeterminate prison term of 3 to 6 years after pleading guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. Under the circumstances of this case, which include an admission by defendant that he had sexual contact with his four-year-old stepdaughter over an approximate period of three months, we find no merit to defendant's contention that his sentence was harsh and excessive (see, People v. Zerbst, 147 A.D.2d 844, 846, affd 74 N.Y.2d 888; People v. Carlin, 136 A.D.2d 781, 783). Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P.J., Weiss, Mikoll, Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.

  8. People v. Graham

    161 A.D.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that admission of autopsy photographs showing fractures of victim's skull and brain hemorrhaging and bleeding were properly admitted

    We also find no error in County Court's refusal to charge the defense of justification as requested by the defense, since no reasonable view of the evidence established that defense (see, People v. Reynoso, 73 N.Y.2d 816, 818). Review of the record demonstrates that there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree (including the element of a depraved indifference to human life) beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 413; see also, People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d 692, 697) and that "the wounds inflicted by the defendant operated as causes of death" (People v. Kane, 213 N.Y. 260, 277). Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that County Court abused its discretion in the sentence it imposed or that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting a reduction in the sentence (see, People v. Zerbst, 147 A.D.2d 844, 846, affd 74 N.Y.2d 888). Judgment affirmed. Kane, J.P., Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.