People v. Zehr

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Runyon

    2018 Ill. App. 3d 170234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)

    Regarding the seriousness of the crimes, defendant's acts were particularly egregious in that he committed them in a position of trust by abusing his own step-grandchildren while he was babysitting them. See People v. Zehr, 143 Ill. App. 3d 875, 879 (1986) (a sentencing court may consider nonstatutory factors during sentencing). We find no abuse of discretion.

  2. People v. Newman

    2013 Ill. App. 5th 120197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    "When considering aggravating or mitigating factors in imposing sentence, a trial court may properly consider nonstatutory aggravating factors." Id. (citing People v. Zehr, 143 Ill. App. 3d 875, 879 (1986); People v. Allen, 119 Ill. App. 3d 845, 846 (1983)). We also agree with the State that the circumstances of a crime along with its effect on the community are relevant to the aggravating factor of deterrence. ΒΆ 20 The defendant argues that the court errantly considered "the inherent danger of the offense as a factor in aggravation" with the comments "[p]eople sticking people[ ] up with guns" and "whacking them in the head with guns.

  3. People v. Scott

    363 Ill. App. 3d 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 8 times
    In Scott, the defendant pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter for unintentionally and recklessly killing her newborn daughter.

    In determining a sentence, the trial court may consider nonstatutory factors in aggravation. People v. Zehr, 143 Ill. App. 3d 875, 879, 493 N.E.2d 727, 729 (1986). Defendant argues the trial court improperly considered three nonstatutory factors in aggravation.

  4. Hanrahan v. Klincar

    167 Ill. App. 3d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 2 times

    The 1973 version of the statute simply set a minimum number of required Board members; the Board has always had the discretion to make a given parole determination en banc, even at the time appellant committed the crimes for which he is incarcerated. We find this case to be analogous to People v. Zehr (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 875, 493 N.E.2d 727, in which a defendant argued that considering the victim's age as a statutory aggravating factor at his sentencing hearing violated the proscription against ex post facto laws because the victim's age had not been a statutory aggravating factor at the time the defendant committed the crime. The appellate court held that consideration of the victim's age did not depend on the existence of the statute because a court had always been able to consider non-statutory aggravating factors, including the victim's age.

  5. People v. Floyd

    160 Ill. App. 3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    When considering aggravating or mitigating factors in imposing sentence, a trial court may properly consider nonstatutory aggravating factors. People v. Zehr (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 875, 879, 493 N.E.2d 727, 729; People v. Allen (1983) 119 Ill. App.3d 845, 846, 457 N.E.2d 77, 78. In comparing the various factors in aggravation and mitigation, we find that the trial court's decision to sentence the defendant to 10 years in excess of the minimum was both reasonable and justified, and not an abuse of discretion.