Opinion
1-19-0244
09-30-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIAN ZAVALZA, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 15 CR 2043202 The Honorable Thaddeus L. Wilson, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LAVIN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Defendant failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, the principal law enforcement officer in the case properly testified as both an expert and lay witness against defendant, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and defendant's sentence was proper. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Julian Zavalza was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of cocaine and was sentenced to 27 years' imprisonment. See 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 2014). In this direct appeal, defendant challenges as improper the trial court's denial of his motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence. Defendant argues police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him and probable cause to arrest him since he was merely present but not a participant in the drug scene. Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Special Agent Keith Billiot, of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to testify both as an expert and lay witness against defendant. Defendant further maintains the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and his 27-year sentence was unduly excessive, unfair, and disproportionate to the crime. We affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was arrested after drug enforcement agents found a kilo of cocaine on the floorboard of his car and on the person of his codefendant and passenger, Jorge Salgado-Leon. The charges against defendant related to the kilo found on the floorboard. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress that evidence, arguing officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to believe he was engaged in illegal activity. He further argued police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to the search the vehicle. A joint suppression hearing was held with Salgado-Leon, wherein the parties called a single witness, Agent Billiot, who testified to the following facts.
¶ 5 During October and November 2015, Agent Billiot was investigating a Chicago narcotics cell block linked to a Mexican drug cartel. Although the investigation targeted a man nicknamed "Chelo," Agent Billiot and his team relied on a confidential source who fed them information, and they also observed that both defendant and codefendant Salgado-Leon were involved in the enterprise. While Chelo was higher up the cartel's organizational ladder and responsible for narcotics negotiations, Salgado-Leon "was probably a step down the ladder from Chelo" and he "worked for Chelo" or was associated with Chelo's trafficking organization. Defendant, as discussed further below, appeared to work with Salgado-Leon. For example, Agent Billiot cited an October 13 incident wherein Chelo and Salgado-Leon met with the confidential source in a Dunkin' Donuts to discuss selling cocaine kilos to the confidential source. Meanwhile, a woman named Rosalia and another Hispanic male remained in the car outside. Agent Billiot testified that based on his training and experience, criminals did not simply discuss business matters of a criminal nature unless the others were also involved in the crime, and it then became clear that Salgado-Leon was very close with Chelo.
¶ 6 From this meeting, Salgado-Leon and Chelo left in a Chevy Cruz. The Chevy Cruz was registered to a person named "Jorge Leon" at 3733 S. Kedzie Avenue. Agent Billiot and his team also saw the car next door at 3731 S. Kedzie Avenue, and placed both addresses under surveillance. On October 20, after learning from another DEA agent of a potential "money drop" to an undercover officer and involving Chelo, Agent Billiot and his team followed the movements of the Chevy Cruz and eventually observed defendant participating in the drug-related transaction. First, agents saw the Chevy Cruz being driven around by two different unidentified people, and it ended up outside 3733 S. Kedzie Avenue. Then, mid-morning, they saw Salgado-Leon exit the nearby residence carrying a white Centrella shopping bag, which he placed in the trunk of the Chevy Cruz before returning to the residence.
¶ 7 About 30 minutes later, defendant picked up Salgado-Leon in an Infiniti. The two proceeded to El Guero grocery store parking lot, where there was reportedly an undercover agent scheduled for the money drop. There, Salgado-Leon conversed with the undercover agent about moving locations as Salgado-Leon did not have the money with him, but the undercover agent refused, and both defendant and Salgado-Leon then left the scene, returning to 3733 S. Kedzie. While defendant proceeded towards the residence, Salgado-Leon hopped back into the Chevy Cruz (the same containing the Centrella bag) and drove to the grocery store, where he popped the trunk, and the undercover officer removed the bag containing $100,010. The so-called "money drop" was then complete, and Salgado-Leon returned to 3733 S. Kedzie Avenue.
¶ 8 Later that same day, DEA agents observed additional behaviors typical of the drug organization. For example, agents saw a male changing license plates on a van parked near 3733 S. Kedzie, but the plate was registered to another vehicle owned by a Jorge "Leon-Salgado" at a different address. In addition, officers observed the Infiniti (that defendant drover earlier) being driven by a different man who later also entered the Chevy Cruz with Salgado-Leon. Later that afternoon, Salgado-Leon exited the Chevy Cruz, entered the Infiniti, and his passenger then drove the Chevy Cruz around the block right back to the same address at 3733 S. Kedzie. Salgado-Leon reentered the Chevy Cruz, and they parked it. All these actions, according to Agent Billiot, wherein multiple people drove multiple vehicles registered to multiple addresses, plus the change in license plates, indicated involvement in the drug organization.
¶ 9 On November 10, the day in question, Agent Billiot saw Salgado-Leon with the cartel members, Chelo and Rosalia. The three drove around together in a car and entered/exited Chelo's residence and another apparent drug house at 2738 S. Kedvale. Around 4:20 p.m., Salgado-Leon exited that house bearing a distinctive bulge under his hooded sweatshirt and walked towards a GMC Denali driven by defendant but not registered to him. Agent Billiot, who by then believed Salgado-Leon was involved in narcotics trafficking, thought the bulge was a gun, drugs, money, or something criminal in nature. It was at this point that agents broke surveillance. Agent Billiot approached Salgado-Leon yelling in Spanish, "Police. Police. Show me your hands," as DEA Special Agent Erik Collins approached from the opposite side also ordering defendant to put his hands in the air. Meanwhile, other agents approached defendant on the driver's side. Despite Agent Billiot's verbal commands, Salgado-Leon then entered the front passenger-side of the vehicle and shut the door.
¶ 10 Agents ordered both Salgado-Leon and defendant out of the vehicle and made Salgado-Leon stand against the vehicle with his hands in the air, then conducted a pat-down search for weapons, as it was common for individuals involved in narcotics trafficking to carry them. Agent Billiot felt the bulge, similar to a box, under Salgado-Leon's clothing, then continued to frisk Salgado-Leon for weapons. In response to Agent Billiot's query, Salgado-Leon admitted it was a kilo of heroin (although it was actually cocaine). Salgado-Leon was handcuffed and the kilo taken. Meanwhile, Agent Billiot explained that for officer safety, they had extracted both defendant and Salgado-Leon simultaneously given that "weapons can be secreted anywhere in the vehicle." After defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, as Agent Billiot later learned, defendant tried to run and jump over a nearby fence. Agents found another kilo of cocaine inside a double bag and broken into chunks on the passenger-side floorboard and also secured it. Agent Billiot stated it was in plain view and he could see a portion of the white powder inside. He first noticed the bag in passing as he ordered Salgado-Leon out of the vehicle.
¶ 11 Following evidence and argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress finding that officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that both Salgado-Leon and defendant were involved in the narcotics operation, which supported the investigative stop and subsequent pat-down of Salgado-Leon for officer safety. The officer safety concern was corroborated by the fact that Agent Billiot continued to pat-down Salgado-Leon even after hearing him identify the narcotics under his shirt. The court added that the November 10 incident was the second observation of defendant in the apparent drug operation; that, plus his unprovoked flight, created reasonable suspicion to detain and question him. The court found that the facts then ripened into probable cause to arrest both defendant and Salgado-Leon. The court noted the kilo on the floorboard gave officers probable cause to arrest defendant and the search was also lawful as incident to arrest.
¶ 12 The cause proceeded to a jury trial, which reflected the aforementioned evidence, specifically with respect to November 10. In addition to testifying about the facts of the case, over defense counsel's objection, Agent Billiot also was certified as an expert in narcotics trafficking and assessing the street value of narcotics. He testified to his credentials, having worked as drug enforcement agent and supervisor for some 27 years following his bachelor and master's degree in criminal justice and extensive training. In addition, he had performed investigations in Central and South America. He was familiar with how drugs were trafficked, weighted, valued, and packaged. Agent Billiot was also familiar with how narcotics were sold on the street, their value, and knew how they were trafficked specifically in Chicago. For example, he noted that in 2015, an entire kilo of cocaine was potentially worth $100,000 and that the kilo on the floorboard appeared to have been broken up for packaging into smaller units for sale on the street. He explained that a retailer would buy kilos but the distributor who is selling drugs down the street never sells kilos to consumers. Rather, consumers buy tiny dime-bag amounts. Agent Billiot finally added that the day in question, November 10, was not cold (implying there was no need for Salgado-Leon's sweatshirt) and 2738 S. Kedvale was a "stash house" used for narcotics trafficking.
¶ 13 DEA Special Agent Ryan Parker also testified similarly to the facts of November 10. He noted that, pursuant to Agent Billiot's command to break surveillance, Agent Parker approached the driver's side of the Denali and ordered defendant outside the vehicle to a nearby fence, then told him to put his hands up. Defendant had his hands on the fence and Agent Parker had just begun to conduct a pat-down when defendant attempted to jump the fence, but instead landed facedown. Defendant was then handcuffed. Agent Collins similarly testified to the facts of November 10. The parties stipulated that the kilos were in fact cocaine weighing 928.5 grams.
¶ 14 The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Following evidence in aggravation and mitigation, defendant was sentenced to 27 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant first challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. When reviewing such a ruling, we ordinarily apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Eubanks, 2019IL 123525, ¶ 33. We will reverse the trial court's factual findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence (i. e., where the opposite conclusion is apparent or the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence), but we review de novo the trial court's ultimate ruling on whether the evidence should be suppressed. People v. Thornton, 2020IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 22. In doing so, we may consider all the trial evidence. Id.
¶ 17 The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress. People v. Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 34. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search or seizure, the burden then shifts to the State, which must produce evidence justifying the intrusion. Id.; Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23. However, "[t]he ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant." Id.
¶ 18 As before the trial court, defendant maintains police violated his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Since not every encounter between the police and a private citizen results in a seizure, courts have divided police-citizen encounters into three tiers: (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) brief investigative detentions, or" Terry stops," which must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3) encounters that involve no coercion or detention and thus do not implicate fourth amendment interests. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 544 (2006).
¶ 19 Defendant argues the police did not conduct a proper Terry stop and even if characterized as one, police improperly extended it into a warrantless arrest of defendant and illegal search of the car. Irrespective of Salgado-Leon, defendant maintains police lacked justification for their conduct towards him. We address each of his contentions in turn. Under Terry, police may conduct a brief, investigatory stop where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to, commit a crime. People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 25; Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 72. The investigatory stop must be justified at its inception, and the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. People v. Close, 238 Ill.2d 497, 505 (2010).
¶ 20 We agree with the State that the intrusion in this case was justified based on the agents' observations of defendant and Salgado-Leon over several months, which showed the two engaging in apparent drug trafficking. Specifically, the evidence showed that Salgado-Leon was involved with Chelo or a similar narcotics cell block linked to a Mexican drug cartel, as Salgado-Leon had met Chelo and a confidential source to discuss cocaine sales while Chelo's associates waited outside. The evidence also showed both Salgado-Leon and defendant driving various cars that were not registered to them but under names strikingly similar to codefendant's (such as "Jorge Leon" or "Leon-Salgado"). Other unidentified individuals also drove these cars, and they all frequented the same addresses. According to Agent Billiot, this and the changed license plates was indicative of involvement in a drug organization. Further, defendant participated in a "money drop" by driving Salgado-Leon to a grocery store parking lot, where the $100,010 proceeds (impliedly drug-related) were ultimately transferred to an undercover agent. Finally, defendant pulled his car alongside a known drug stash house. Salgado-Leon then walked out of that house with what was, according to Agent Billiot, a bulge appearing to be narcotics or a weapon protruding from his sweatshirt and entered defendant's vehicle. This was after Salgado-Leon had driven around with Chelo and Rosalia and gone in and out of the stash house with them earlier that afternoon.
¶ 21 These facts provided police with more than ample reasonable suspicion to seize and search Salgado-Leon at the very least and detain defendant outside the vehicle. See People v. Sutton, 2020 IL App (1st) 181616, ¶ 21; People v. Maxey, 2011 IL App (1st) 100011, ¶ 46 (noting, the evidence necessary to justify a Terry stop can even arise when no violation of the law is witnessed, so long as it does not constitute a mere hunch). Then upon doing so, Salgado-Leon's admission that he was carrying a kilo of cocaine, the suspect bag on the floorboard, and defendant's attempted flight, in total, created circumstances generally providing probable cause to arrest the two individuals. See People v. Hopkins, 235 Ill.2d 453, 472 (2009) (noting, probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances, considered as a whole, are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime); People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 19 (noting, an individual's unprovoked flight on seeing police in an area known for crime is suggestive of wrongdoing). While defendant argues for a more innocent explanation as to his flight, the most rational inference is that defendant fled because he did not want to be held responsible for the drugs inside his car. See Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 20 (noting, an innocent explanation does not lessen the officers' objective). We note that Agent Billiot stated the drugs were in plain view and he could see a portion of the white powder inside the bag, also supporting probable cause for defendant's arrest. See People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶ 31.
¶ 22 That brings us to our next point. The search of the vehicle was arguably proper as incident to arrest, where Salgado-Leon or defendant could have been in reaching distance of the floorboard. See People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 25 (noting, "[a] search incident to arrest falls under two lines of analysis: search of the person of the arrestee and search of the area under the control of the arrestee."); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335, 339, 346 (2009) (noting that an arrestee's "immediate control" is "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."). Regardless, the automobile exception applied because officers had reason to believe the vehicle contained additional narcotics, i.e., evidence relevant to the crime for which police arrested Salgado-Leon and for which defendant fled. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343-44; People v. Contreras, 2014 IL App (1st) 131889, ¶ 28 (noting, under the automobile exception, police officers may search a vehicle without a warrant where probable cause exists to believe the automobile contains evidence of criminal activity subject to seizure). They also had reason to believe it contained a weapon, making officer safety of concern. Contrary to defendant's contention otherwise, the aforementioned evidence supports the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
¶ 23 In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant's suggestion that he was simply an innocent bystander in the car when police detained him along with Salgado-Leon. Defendant argues mere presence is insufficient to satisfy the Terry standard. Defendant was not just an Uber driver or some random person showing up at the drug stash house. Rather, his prior actions and association with Salgado-Leon showed him to be an active participant in trafficking large quantities of drugs. For the reasons stated, his fourth amendment claim must fail.
¶ 24 Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to qualify Agent Billiot as an expert witness before having him offer any factual testimony. In that regard, defendant argues the State needlessly bolstered the testimony of its own witness. Defendant further maintains testimony about the street value of cocaine and the international drug trafficking system was irrelevant and prejudicial.
¶ 25 The admission of evidence, including expert testimony, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Becker, 239 Ill.2d 215, 234 (2010). Law enforcement officers may testify as both fact and expert witnesses, and indeed, they are especially likely to serve in that dual-capacity. People v. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶¶ 82-83. This is because officers frequently have special expertise in the kind of criminal activity afoot such that they are personally involved in the "factual underpinnings" of the case. Id. ¶ 83. Thus, contrary to defendant's suggestion otherwise, where a witness can qualify as both a lay fact witness and an expert witness, he may offer both lay and expert testimony in the same case. Id. ¶ 82. Additionally, "an expert may base an opinion (as a lay witness must) on facts that the expert has personally observed." Id.
¶ 26 Here, Agent Billiot testified about his personal observations as to the events and investigation leading to defendant's arrest. In that sense, he offered appropriate lay testimony with relevant and helpful opinion. See id. ¶ 88. Agent Billiot likewise offered opinions based on his expertise and long history in narcotics investigations. He educated the jury about general drug trafficking practices in Chicago in 2015 and the street value of the drugs. He noted Mexican cocaine usually came by private vehicle and discussed how it was packaged; for example, a kilo like that carried by Salgado-Leon typically appeared in rectangular form. That form made it easier for stacking and transport. On arrival, the kilo was then broken down into smaller units, like that found on the floorboard of defendant's vehicle, and offered for sale on the streets. Contrary to defendant's contention otherwise, this was valuable background information and insight into some of the behaviors exhibited by the parties in this multi-kilo drug trafficking case in the Chicagoland area. It explained the packaging of the 900 plus grams of cocaine found on the floorboard, which revealed it was intended for distribution and sale possibly reaping $100,000.
¶ 27 Agent Billiot thus offered appropriate expert testimony connected to the circumstances of defendant's arrest. See id. ¶ 89; cf. People v. Brown, 232 Ill.App.3d 885, 898 (1992) (noting, the officer's detailed profile testimony as to 1.6 grams of cocaine found on defendant was not connected to the circumstances surrounding his arrest). Given that Agent Billiot was properly tendered as an expert in his field, and given that a witness may offer both expert and lay testimony, we find no abuse of discretion on the trial court's part. Cf. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 106 (noting, where the officer was never tendered by the State, nor accepted by the trial court, as an expert in drug distribution, the admission of his expert testimony was error). We further note, it's common for experts to first be tendered as such before offering any opinion, whether expert or lay. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that it was improper to qualify Agent Billiot as an expert at the outset. Likewise, in arguing that Agent Billiot's expert status improperly bolstered his lay testimony, defendant cites irrelevant case law relating to closing arguments. See Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Marzouki v. Nagar-Marzouki, 2014 IL App 1st 132841, ¶ 12 (arguments not properly raised are waived).
¶ 28 As set forth, most of Agent Billiot's testimony was relevant to the issues at hand given that the State had to prove its drug case by circumstantial evidence, as discussed immediately below. See People v. Morales, 2012 IL App (1st) 101911, ¶ 39 (noting, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than absent the evidence). Regardless, Agent Billiot's testimony about the drug trade was not so overly expansive as to constitute reversible error or create unnecessary prejudice. See People v. Robertson, 312 Ill.App.3d 467, 469-70 (2000).
¶ 29 Defendant next contends the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. We will not overturn a criminal conviction except in instances where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to warrant a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 374 (1992). Because the trier of fact is better situated to observe the witnesses, the trier of fact is entitled to assess their credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141448, ¶ 14. Thus, we will not substitute the trier of fact's credibility assessments with our own. Id.
¶ 30 To prove defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver narcotics in this case, the State was required to establish that defendant had knowledge and possession of the drugs, both questions of fact for the jury. See Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 45. Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive, and actual possession need not be demonstrated if constructive can be inferred. People v. Dismuke, 2013 IL App (2d) 120925, ¶ 16; People v. Anderson, 2018 IL App (4th) 160037, ¶ 32. Constructive possession occurs when the defendant has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the controlled substance. Dismuke, 2013 IL App (2d) 120925, ¶ 16. This can be inferred where the defendant exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the item was found. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶ 47. Once possession has been proven, knowledge may be inferred from "the surrounding facts and circumstances" of the possession, including the defendant's declarations, acts, or conduct. Id. ¶ 56. As such, constructive possession is typically proved entirely through circumstantial evidence. People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (1st) 140051, ¶ 23.
¶ 31 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine with an intent to deliver. As set forth, defendant was found to have showed at a drug stash house driving a vehicle, not registered to him, which harbored cocaine packaged for delivery hidden inside another bag. Defendant had immediate and exclusive control over the vehicle and the floorboard where the cocaine was found and arguably had the same such control over the kilo under Salgado-Leon's sweatshirt, albeit for only seconds before police showed. The trial evidence further showed Salgado-Leon was associated with Chelo, who was involved in a large drug trafficking enterprise, which police had surveilled for several months. Those facts also support defendant's knowing possession of the drugs with intent to deliver and contradict defendant's repeated claim that he was innocently present at the scene. In addition, defendant's attempted flight would tend to prove his guilt. See People v. Lewis, 165 Ill.2d 305, 349 (1995) (noting that flight, when considered in connection with all other evidence in a case, is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury as tending to prove guilt). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding, and we will not substitute the jury's assessment of witness credibility and weight of the evidence, with our own. See Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141448, ¶ 14.
¶ 32 We thus reject defendant's suggestion that it was Salgado-Leon who deposited the drugs on the floorboard as he sat in the car. The evidence shows Salgado-Leon was present in the car mere seconds with the DEA agents simultaneously converging on the vehicle and commanding him to place his hands in the air. That does not support defendant's interpretation, nor does our standard of review requiring that we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. See Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.
¶ 33 Last, defendant contends that his sentence is unreasonably excessive in light of his limited participation in the crime, age, circumstances of supporting a family, and minimal criminal background showing two prior decades-old felonies of burglary and unlawful use of a weapon. He also maintains the court failed to consider his rehabilitative potential, and for these reasons argues his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11.
¶ 34 It's well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decision is entitled to great deference and weight. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 209 (2000); People v. Andrews, 2013 IL App (1st) 121623, ¶ 14. This is because a trial court's generally in a better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence, as the trial judge can weigh factors like the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d at 209. Thus, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently. People v. Fern, 189 Ill.2d 48, 53 (1999). A sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. at 54.
¶ 35 Here, defendant faced a sentence of 15 to 60 years' imprisonment for his crime. See 720 ILCS 570/401(a) (2) (D) (West 2014). His 27-year term was within the applicable statutory range, and is presumptively valid. See People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27 (noting, a sentence within the statutory range is presumptively valid). Moreover, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court expressly considered the trial evidence, gravity of the offense, presentence investigation report, financial impact of incarceration, statement of defendant, and defendant's rehabilitative potential, among other factors, before imposing the 27-year prison term.
¶ 36 The record thus contradicts defendant's contention that the court did not consider his rehabilitative potential when imposing the sentence. The State also noted in aggravation that defendant delivered an additional 50 grams of heroin to a confidential source while on bond for the present case, and was indicted for it. That fact does not inspire a finding of rehabilitative potential. Regardless, a court is not required to give a defendant's rehabilitative potential more weight than the seriousness of the crime, protection of the public and punishment. See People v. Harris, 294 Ill.App.3d 561, 569 (1998); People v. Wilburn, 263 Ill.App.3d 170, 185 (1994). Similarly, a court is not required to impose the minimum sentence simply because mitigation evidence was presented. See People v. Garibay, 366 Ill.App.3d 1103, 1109 (2006). For the reasons set forth, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. It was not greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
¶ 37 CONCLUSION
¶ 38 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 39 Affirmed.