Summary
affirming defendant's § 245 conviction for running a red light during a police chase because "[a]ny reasonable person under virtually any circumstances would be aware a collision was a probable result of speeding through a traffic-light-controlled intersection against a red light"
Summary of this case from United States v. GomezOpinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, John Conley, Judge, Super. Ct. No. 06WF1555
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and James D. Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
Introduction
Defendant Robert Sydney Yorba sped through a red light and crashed into another car while evading a police pursuit. Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, as well as several other crimes. He argues there was insufficient evidence of assault with a deadly weapon, because a reasonable person in his position would not have been aware a collision was a direct, natural, and probable result of his conduct. We disagree because a collision was a highly probable result of his reckless driving.
Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to offer the testimony of two police officers detailing an earlier incident involving defendant. We find no abuse of discretion. The heart of defendant’s case was that a beating by the police in April 2006 caused him to be in fear of his life, and that he was therefore acting in self-defense when he evaded a later police pursuit. Because defendant offered testimony about the April 2006 incident from five defense witnesses, including himself, the prosecution was entitled to offer the rebuttal testimony of the officers involved. The testimony was not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.
Finally, defendant argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that two of the conditions of defendant’s probation are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and we direct the trial court to modify those conditions.
We affirm the judgment as modified.
Statement of Facts
Prosecution Case-in-chief
On June 7, 2006, Officers Clifford Kraus and James Berecki of the Huntington Beach Police Department were parked near defendant’s residence, preparing to execute an arrest warrant on defendant. At approximately 12:30 p.m., defendant got into a white Ford pickup truck and began driving away. When defendant stopped at a stop sign, Officers Kraus and Berecki pulled up behind him and activated their patrol car’s light bar. Defendant looked in his rearview mirror, then turned onto Garfield Avenue, failing to yield to the officers. Officer Berecki activated the patrol car’s siren, and began chasing defendant’s truck. Defendant ran a stop sign and two red lights. When defendant drove onto the 405 Freeway, Officers Kraus and Berecki terminated the pursuit.
About the time Officers Kraus and Berecki were terminating their pursuit of defendant, Fountain Valley Police Officers Jesse Hughes and Jennifer McCollum had parked their marked patrol cars about five or six feet from each other near the driveway entrance of a gas station at the corner of Brookhurst Street and Talbert Avenue. Defendant’s truck entered the gas station’s driveway on Brookhurst at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour and turned toward the two patrol cars. Officer Hughes put his car in reverse and floored the accelerator, avoiding a collision as defendant sped through the gas station. The skid marks made by Officer Hughes’s car and defendant’s truck showed that defendant’s truck drove through the very location the patrol car had been parked in before it backed up. Defendant did not slow down as he drove through the gas station.
Defendant turned right onto Talbert as he exited the gas station, traveling approximately 60 miles per hour in a 45-miles-per-hour zone. Officer McCollum and Officer Hughes followed defendant’s truck with the patrol car’s lights and sirens on. Defendant used the left-turn lanes and the right shoulder of the street to get around other vehicles. Defendant turned into a parking lot; Officer Hughes lost sight of defendant, but observed vehicles in the parking lot were parked in abnormal ways, shopping carts were overturned, clothing and food were strewn about, and pedestrians were lying on the ground.
The police pursuit of defendant continued northbound on Magnolia Street, eastbound on Slater Avenue, and northbound on Brookhurst. Sergeant Robert Sweaza of the Fountain Valley Police Department became the lead pursuit vehicle as defendant turned from Slater onto Brookhurst; Officer McCollum was behind Sergeant Sweaza. Defendant was driving between 60 and 80 miles per hour, and was weaving in and out of traffic. He ran three red lights along Brookhurst without slowing down. Sergeant Sweaza then lost sight of defendant’s truck as defendant weaved in and out of traffic. Sergeant Sweaza saw the tail end of defendant’s truck fly into the air, which he testified was consistent with the truck having been in a collision.
Antonia Casillas had been stopped at a light in the left-turn lane on McFadden Avenue, waiting to turn northbound onto Brookhurst. When the light changed to a green arrow, Casillas looked left, right, and left again and determined it was safe to make a left turn. She did not see a vehicle approaching on Brookhurst before beginning her turn. Suddenly, Casillas felt a jolt at the back right side of her car. The windows of her car shattered, the roof of the car caved in, and the car spun around and hit a fire hydrant; Casillas believed she was going to be crushed to death.
Casillas had glass imbedded in her left arm and face, multiple cuts and bruises, a fractured right clavicle, a cervical strain, and neck, shoulder, and back pain. Her injuries were still causing her pain at the time of trial.
When Sergeant Sweaza reached the scene, defendant’s truck was parked 100 feet past the fire hydrant Casillas hit, on a side street off Brookhurst. Defendant was stopped by other officers in a nearby parking lot. Defendant struggled with the officers before they were able to handcuff him.
Defense Case
In December 2005, defendant and his longtime girlfriend, Lori Patino, separated. In January 2006, defendant learned Patino had obtained a restraining order against him. Defendant contacted Patino numerous times in violation of the restraining order. He was still trying to get in touch with her, despite the restraining order, at the time of trial. Defendant told his brother he was aware the police were investigating him for violating the restraining order.
Defendant was arrested on three occasions between January and June 2006 for driving under the influence.
Defendant testified Huntington Beach police officers were stalking and harassing him, and had pulled him over for no reason on six to eight occasions.
Before midnight on April 14, 2006, defendant saw a police car behind him, but did not recall it having its lights or siren on. Defendant did not drive erratically or drive over the curb. After defendant pulled into his driveway, he got out of his truck; two police officers rushed up and threw him to the ground. Defendant testified one officer was six feet five inches tall, and the other was at least six feet tall, and both weighed over 200 pounds. Defendant denied ever taking a fighting stance, clenching his fists, or struggling with the officers. Defendant testified the police beat him up, hitting him in the face at least 10 times, and claimed he was a victim of assault and battery.
Defendant’s mother, brother, and two friends testified defendant told them the police had beat him up, giving him a black eye and causing facial swelling and other injuries. These witnesses testified defendant changed after the incident with the police, becoming more depressed, paranoid, and fearful of the police.
On June 6, 2006, defendant went to his mother’s house, and told her he was being followed by the police; he was anxious, paranoid, shaking, and stuttering. Defendant spent the night at his mother’s house, and returned to his own home at 4:30 or 5:00 o’clock the next morning.
Around noon on June 7, 2006, defendant left his house, and was followed by a marked police car. Defendant denied exceeding the speed limit, denied running any red lights, and denied hearing any police sirens or seeing any police lights until he got off the freeway.
When defendant exited the freeway at Brookhurst, he drove through the gas station at Brookhurst and Talbert. Defendant testified there was plenty of room to drive between the two patrol cars in the gas station. Defendant saw a patrol car with its overhead lights on as he proceeded westbound on Talbert; he denied using the left-turn lane to pass traffic. Defendant admitted running the red light at Bushard Street and Talbert, but explained he slowed to 25 to 30 miles per hour and looked both ways. He entered a parking lot at the corner of Talbert and Magnolia traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour, but claimed pedestrians were not diving away from his truck or lying on the ground. Defendant then went northbound on Magnolia, accelerating to 60 miles per hour, and making lane changes without “weaving” in and out of traffic. He claimed he did not pull over because he feared for his life and did not want to get beaten up. Defendant rolled through the red light at Magnolia and Slater, and then proceeded eastbound on Slater at 65 miles per hour in a 45-miles-per-hour zone. He ran several red lights; he sounded his horn as he did so, and believed other vehicles were stopping for him although they had the right-of-way.
Defendant saw Casillas’s car as he approached the intersection of Brookhurst and McFadden; he believed Casillas saw him as she looked to the right. Casillas’s car stopped, but then rolled into the intersection, where defendant struck her car. Defendant jumped out of his truck and ran toward Casillas’s car. When defendant saw the police however, he ran the other way.
Prosecution’s Rebuttal
Patino testified she obtained a restraining order against defendant after moving out of his residence because she was afraid for herself and her children. After defendant was served with the restraining order, he made hundreds of calls to Patino’s cell phone, and left many voicemail messages, ultimately causing her to get a new number. Patino gave the police access to her voicemail so they could hear defendant’s messages. Once, while Patino was at the police station making a report about defendant’s violation of the restraining order, defendant called on her cell phone. Patino gave the phone to a police officer, who told defendant not to call Patino. After the officer hung up, defendant immediately called Patino.
Defendant left Patino one message asking her to keep calling the police because he was “cocked and ready and loaded, and waiting for them.” Patino told the police about defendant’s message.
Huntington Beach Police Officers Daniel Boldt and Zach Pricer were in a marked patrol car about 1:10 a.m. on April 14, 2006, when they observed a white truck traveling at a high rate of speed. The patrol car was about 500 yards behind the truck; although the patrol car was traveling at 75 to 80 miles per hour, it was unable to gain any ground on the truck.
After the truck stopped at a red light, the police officers pulled in behind it and activated the patrol car’s lights. The truck pulled to the right, but did not stop. The officers then activated all emergency lights and sirens. The driver of the truck looked in the rearview mirror, but did not stop. The truck locked its brakes and went into a partial skid while making a right turn, traveled on the wrong side of the street, made a sudden left turn, and turned into a driveway after almost hitting a truck and partially going over the curb. Officer Boldt recognized the house where the truck had turned into the driveway; he had been informed that other officers had seen a rifle in the living room of that house when they were executing a warrant.
Defendant got out of the truck and stood in the driveway. Officer Boldt ordered defendant to get on the ground; defendant did not do so, instead he said, “[w]hat the fuck” in an angry tone of voice. Officer Boldt did not have his gun drawn, and did not have his baton or pepper spray out. Defendant took a step away from the truck and clenched his fists. As defendant began to raise his clenched fists, Officer Boldt grabbed defendant’s shirt and the two men started to wrestle. Officer Boldt repeatedly told defendant to get on the ground and tried to push him to the ground. Officer Boldt pushed defendant over a two- or three-foot high wall. While defendant and Officer Boldt were struggling on the wall, Officer Pricer punched defendant three times in the face. Officer Pricer did not use pepper spray or his baton.
Defendant landed on his stomach on the other side of the wall, and refused to comply with the command to put his arms behind his back. Officer Pricer then applied a carotid restraint for about five seconds, until he felt defendant go limp. The officers then handcuffed defendant. Defendant smelled of alcohol. The officers did not know defendant was the driver of the truck when they first began following it.
Procedural History
Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon against a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c) [counts 1 and 2]); evading a police officer while driving recklessly and causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3 [count 3]); hit and run with injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a) [count 4]); evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2 [count 5]); and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) [count 6]). As to counts 3, 4, and 6, the information alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)
The trial court dismissed count 2 after the prosecution presented its case. The jury found defendant guilty on counts 3 through 6. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 1, and found the great bodily injury enhancement to be not true.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years’ formal probation; one of the conditions of probation was to serve 365 days in county jail.
Discussion
I.
Was there sufficient evidence of assault with a deadly weapon?
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (count 6), because a reasonable person in his position would not have been aware a collision with Casillas would occur as a direct, natural, and probable result of his conduct. “In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘“Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’ [Citations.]”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
“[A]ssault only requires an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790.) “[A] defendant guilty of assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based on facts he did not know but should have known. He, however, need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might occur.” (Id. at p. 788.)
To summarize defendant’s argument most charitably, defendant contends he could not have realized, as he was speeding through a red light, that a collision might occur with another car whose driver was proceeding legally with the left-turn arrow and who had looked both ways before entering the intersection, because defendant was honking his horn while approaching the intersection, was being chased by police cars with their sirens on, and had illegally driven through other traffic-light-controlled intersections while evading the police at unsafe speeds well in excess of the posted speed limits without being involved in other collisions.
Any reasonable person under virtually any circumstances would be aware a collision was a probable result of speeding through a traffic-light-controlled intersection against a red light. It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail to obey traffic signals (Veh. Code, §§ 21461, subd. (a), 21462), to exceed posted speed limits (id., §§ 22350, 22351, subd. (b)), or to fail to comply with a peace officer’s signal to stop (id., §§ 2800, subd. (a), 2800.1, subd. (a), 2800.2). Defendant was guilty of all these violations, and more.
The circumstances surrounding the police pursuit of defendant before the time of his collision with Casillas provide ample evidence of defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant had only missed hitting Officer Hughes’s patrol car because Officer Hughes accelerated quickly in reverse while defendant drove through the gas station at Brookhurst and Talbert. Defendant’s driving at a high rate of speed through a parking lot had also caused other cars and pedestrians to scramble to avoid being hit. Defendant ran multiple stop lights and stop signs, weaved in and out of traffic, and drove at excessive speeds throughout the police pursuit. The jury is the sole judge of credibility, and was therefore entitled to reject any or all of defendant’s testimony regarding the circumstances of the police pursuit. (People v. Baker (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.) That defendant had not been involved in a collision earlier was sheer luck, not the basis for an objective belief that as long as he honked his horn all other drivers would stay out of his way.
II.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting rebuttal testimony regarding the April 14, 2006 incident between defendant and the police?
The trial court permitted the prosecution to offer rebuttal evidence from Officers Boldt and Pricer regarding the altercation between defendant and these officers outside defendant’s residence on April 14, 2006. Defendant argues the prejudicial effect of this testimony outweighed its probative value.
We review the trial court’s decision to permit rebuttal testimony for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912.)
The April 14, 2006 incident was not mentioned during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. When defendant presented his defense, however, the April 14 incident became a major focus of testimony. All the defense witnesses, including defendant, testified about the incident. According to the defense witnesses, defendant was viciously beaten up by the police without any reason, and, as a result, was afraid of the police and believed the police would attempt to stop him again without reason.
The April 14 incident was the basis for defendant’s defense against the current charges. Defendant’s theory at trial was that because of the April 14 incident he believed the police would beat him up again if they stopped him, which was why he failed to pull over, drove erratically and over the speed limit, and ran away from the accident scene. Defendant therefore contended he acted in self-defense.
Defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the officers’ rebuttal testimony is frivolous. Defendant made the April 14, 2006 incident the focal point of his defense case. It would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to prevent the prosecution from offering the officers’ testimony about the incident. Defendant cannot contend he was somehow misled into opening the door to this rebuttal testimony; the prosecutor advised the trial court and defense counsel she had rebuttal witnesses who would testify if defendant intended to argue the April 14 incident caused him to be in fear of his life on June 7, 2006.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to offer rebuttal evidence to counter the evidence offered by defendant. (See People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 912-913 [defense evidence that the defendant was gentle, shy, and not aggressive with women properly countered by rebuttal testimony of “a more brooding, aggressive quality in his relations with women”]; People v. Shea (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1267-1268 [the defendant’s testimony minimized the facts of a prior rape conviction; the prosecution could call the victim as a rebuttal witness]; People v. Page (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 574-575 [when the defendant called a witness who testified about a prior incident involving the defendant, “the door was wide open” to permit the prosecutor to present the rebuttal testimony of the officer investigating that incident].)
The testimony of Officers Boldt and Pricer was highly probative of the issue defendant had made the focus of his defense. Their testimony was not unduly prejudicial simply because it cast serious doubt on that defense. For purposes of analysis under Evidence Code section 352, “‘prejudicial’ means uniquely inflammatory without regard to relevance.” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1138.)
Even if the trial court somehow abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of Officers Boldt and Pricer, the error would be harmless. Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt on counts 3 through 6, it is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if the testimony had been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
III.
Two of defendant’s probation conditions must be modified.
Defendant argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that two of defendant’s probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
The conditions that defendant not associate with anyone disapproved of by his probation officer, and that defendant not be present in any establishment where the primary items for sale are alcoholic beverages, must be modified to limit the prohibited classes of persons and places to those defendant knows or reasonably should know have that status. Defendant cannot simply disclaim knowledge and have such disclaimer be dispositive.
Disposition
We direct the trial court to modify its minute order and its probation order, both dated February 2, 2007, to provide in relevant part as follows: (1) “Consume no alcoholic beverages and do not be present in any establishment where you know or reasonably should know the primary items for sale are alcoholic beverages”; and (2) “Do not associate with anyone you know or reasonably should know is disapproved of by your Probation Officer.” In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.