People v. Yanus

15 Citing cases

  1. People v. Oates

    104 A.D.2d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 63 times

    Applying these principles to the case before us, it becomes clear that defendant's statements to the police were not the product of a custodial interrogation. The inquiry by the lone plain-clothes officer, Detective Meyers, at the hospital and his subsequent accompanying of defendant and his mother to the scene where defendant claimed he had been accosted, the latter location being one block from defendant's home, was, given defendant's behavior, which cannot be characterized as other than consistent with that of a victim, clearly in the nature of investigatory police work rather than conduct consistent with the taking of a suspect into custody ( People v Yukl, supra; People v Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 839; see People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674). Further, inasmuch as defendant's mother admittedly accompanied defendant to the hospital, was present when Detective Meyers arrived at that institution and accompanied the officer and her son to the site of the alleged attempted robbery and the precinct, it cannot be said that the police engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to isolate defendant from his family (cf.

  2. People v. Sampson

    134 A.D.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    County Court could also discredit defendant's claim that he requested an opportunity to consult with his wife and an attorney prior to being questioned. It is further clear that the initial questioning of defendant, which began shortly after 10:00 A.M. on November 13, 1984, was of an investigatory rather than an adversarial nature (see, People v. Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 839, affd 64 N.Y.2d 826; People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675). Defendant maintains, however, that the atmosphere at the police station transformed into a custodial situation prior to any admissions and that his ensuing statements were the product of an illegal detention.

  3. People v. Sanchez

    133 A.D.2d 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    cally abused by the officers were contradicted by the officers' testimony, by the defendant's appearance at his videotaped statement, by his failure to complain to the authorities and by his failure to seek medical attention (see, People v. Crawford, 113 A.D.2d 771; People v Dean, 112 A.D.2d 947, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 918; People v. Chalos, 111 A.D.2d 827, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 918; People v. Alver, 111 A.D.2d 339). Under the circumstances, the voluntariness of the defendant's statements presented an issue of credibility and the Supreme Court's determination of that issue, which is fully supported by the record, should not be disturbed on appeal (People v. Alver, supra; People v. Gee, 104 A.D.2d 561). Furthermore, we find that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the precinct, and the questioning of him by the police prior to their advising him of his Miranda rights was investigatory rather than custodial (see, People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, cert denied 434 U.S. 1018; People v. Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674; People v. Krystof, 84 A.D.2d 566). Once the investigation focused on the defendant as a suspect, all questioning stopped and the defendant was provided with full Miranda warnings. Finally, the sentence imposed was not unduly harsh or excessive. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Lawrence and Spatt, JJ., concur.

  4. People v. Morano

    119 A.D.2d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    We have little difficulty concluding that defendant voluntarily accompanied Freer to the police station (see, People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, cert denied 400 U.S. 851; People v. Baird, 111 A.D.2d 1044, 1045 [and cases cited therein]). Moreover, the initial questioning was clearly of an investigatory, not adversarial, nature and constituted a proper facet of the fire investigation (see, People v. Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 839, affd 64 N.Y.2d 826; People v. Critzer, supra; People v. Mertens, 97 A.D.2d 595; People v. Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674; People v. Ellis, 83 A.D.2d 652). The problem that arises, however, is that during the December 7, 1984 hearing, no inquiry was made as to the nature of the questioning process. The focus was solely on whether counsel had been retained and whether the police were aware of this fact.

  5. Matter of Melinda

    110 A.D.2d 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 1 times

    A review of the facts indicates that respondent was not in custody and did not believe that she was in custody at the time she made the statements. The questioning by the police was investigatory rather than custodial in nature and was a proper discharge by the police of their obligation to investigate allegations of sexual abuse of respondent's daughter ( see, People v. Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 839, affd 64 N.Y.2d 826; see also, People v. Mertens, 97 A.D.2d 595; People v. Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675). Accordingly, Family Court's order denying suppression should be affirmed.

  6. People v. Estrada

    109 A.D.2d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 17 times

    This argument has been specifically rejected by this court ( People v. Davis, 94 A.D.2d 900). We note that there was some testimony which indicated that the Albany police sought to have defendant requestioned during the period of time after he had been taken into custody by the Baltimore police but before the arrest warrant was issued in Albany, arguably in an attempt to avoid the strictures established in People v. Samuels ( 49 N.Y.2d 218) ( cf. People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675). However, no statements made by defendant during this period were offered in evidence at trial.

  7. People v. Lance

    103 A.D.2d 893 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    The proof showed that two witnesses saw defendant on the roof of the burglarized premises on Amsbry Street placing items in a box. This information provided ample basis for the police to go to his residence and question him (see People v. Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675). A review of the record further confirms that he voluntarily accompanied the police to the station (see People v. Wilson, 96 A.D.2d 653; People v. Munro, 86 A.D.2d 683). Once at the station, adequate Miranda warnings were given and, after waiving his rights, defendant freely and voluntarily confessed. There is nothing in this record to demonstrate that defendant either desired to or could not terminate the interview at any time. Nor is there anything to indicate defendant was aware that the interrogation room door was automatically locked.

  8. People v. Cooper

    101 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 32 times

    In finding that the accused's right to counsel had not attached and that his prearraignment confession was admissible, the court, referring to its decision in People v Wilson ( 56 N.Y.2d 692), distinguished the type of case where unnecessary delay can result in a per se deprivation of the right to counsel. In Wilson, the court in holding a prearraignment confession to be admissible observed that "[t]here is nothing to suggest that the short delay in arraignment in this instance was designed to afford an opportunity for prearraignmentinterrogation or was otherwise calculated to deprive defendant of his right to counsel" ( People v Wilson, supra, p 694; emphasis added; see People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675; People v Lindo, 85 A.D.2d 643). From People v Hopkins ( supra) and People v Wilson ( supra), emerges an exception to the general rule, i.e., that if there has been unnecessary delay in filing the accusatory instrument or in arraignment, and the police have caused this delay for the purpose of depriving the defendant of his right to counsel, his critical stage right to counsel will be deemed to have arisen.

  9. People v. Smiley

    100 A.D.2d 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    The comprehensive record made at the dismissal hearing further establishes that there was no police activity involving defendant, such as interrogation or even identification procedures, between June 5 and his arraignment on the indictment. Therefore, the record supports no inference that the delay in commencing formal criminal proceedings was for the purpose of invading defendant's rights, for the protection of which counsel was necessary ( People v Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474, 485; People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674, 675). The vague, "routine-like" generalities of defendant's assertion that he was prejudiced by the delay are not entitled to any weight (cf.

  10. People v. Winchell

    98 A.D.2d 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 25 times

    Defendant conceded that he voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station and there is nothing to refute Spraker's testimony that defendant was considered a victim, not a suspect, prior to questioning at the station house. These circumstances prevailing, it is clear that the questioning by the police was investigatory rather than custodial in nature and constituted a proper discharge of their duty to investigate his complaint of an alleged assault ( People v. Mertens, 97 A.D.2d 595; People v Yanus, 92 A.D.2d 674). That the interview was conducted, in part, at the police station does not compel a different result since there was no indication that defendant was not free to leave ( People v. Ellis, 83 A.D.2d 652).