Opinion
C081132
02-17-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAKE XIONG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15F05066)
Defendant Jake Xiong pleaded no contest to vehicle theft, a felony (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), in exchange for a stipulated term of 364 days in county jail and five years of formal probation. The trial court sentenced defendant consistent with the terms of his plea agreement. The terms of probation included a condition prohibiting defendant from knowingly owning or possessing any dangerous or deadly weapon (the weapons condition) and a condition prohibiting defendant from knowingly owning or possessing any firearms (the firearms condition).
On appeal, defendant contends the weapons condition is invalid. He also contends the weapons and firearms conditions are both unconstitutionally overbroad. We conclude neither of defendant's claims has merit and shall affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
We omit a recitation of the factual and procedural background as it is not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. --------
Defendant contends the weapons condition is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent). We disagree.
A trial court has broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation in order to promote the rehabilitation of the probationer. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j); see People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its determination is arbitrary or capricious or " ' "exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered." ' " (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234.)
Under Lent, a probation condition is invalid if it " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' " (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) All three prongs must be met to invalidate a probation condition. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379; see Lent, at p. 486, fn. 1.) "As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality." (Olguin, at pp. 379-380.)
Although possessing a deadly weapon is not itself criminal and nothing in the record suggests any weapon played a role in defendant's current offense, the weapons condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality. As noted by the trial court, this condition is intended to protect the probation officer who will be supervising defendant. "[T]he protection of the probation officer while performing supervisory duties is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of a probationer for the purpose of deterring future criminality." (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 381.) We thus conclude the weapons condition is valid.
Defendant further contends the weapons condition and firearms condition are both unconstitutionally overbroad because they infringe on his constitutional right to self-defense. We disagree.
"When a probationer has been convicted of a violent crime, imposition of a strict condition of probation prohibiting ownership or possession of weapons is essential to promote public safety." (People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083.) Like our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, "[w]e are satisfied that no reasonable law enforcement official or court will interpret [either of these provisions] to extend to a fleeting possession of a weapon in the event, for example, that [defendant] is assaulted and [he] temporarily seizes an object to use as a weapon in self-defense." (Ibid.) We thus conclude that neither the weapons condition nor the firearms condition is overbroad.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUTZ, Acting P. J. We concur: MAURO, J. DUARTE, J.