From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Wright

Court of Appeal of California
Jan 6, 2009
A118574 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009)

Opinion

A118574

1-6-2009

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.

Not to be Published in Official Reports


INTRODUCTION

Curtis Wright appeals the judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in state prison. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that appellant violated the terms of his probation by furnishing cocaine base and resisting arrest. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the probation violation finding. We shall affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Underlying Offense

On the evening of October 17, 2002, a group of San Francisco police officers conducted an undercover drug bust operation in the area of 16th and Mission Streets in San Francisco. Appellant was approached by an undercover officer who asked appellant if he had a "solid," a euphemism for base cocaine. Appellant handed the officer two rocks of cocaine in exchange for $30. Additional police officers then emerged from hiding. Appellant attempted to flee but was caught and arrested.

In an information filed on November 14, 2002, appellant was charged with two counts of sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a).) The information also alleged that: (1) appellant committed the felony offenses while on bail and on his own recognizance (Pen. Code, § 12022.1); (2) appellant had five prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)); (3) appellant had two prior felony convictions for sale or transportation of a controlled substance (Pen. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); and (4) appellant had two prior convictions for sale of a controlled substance (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11).)

On September 26, 2003, appellant pled guilty to one count of sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and admitted to a three-year sentence enhancement for his prior conviction for sale or transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2).

The court sentenced appellant to eight years in state prison, but suspended execution of the sentence. The court granted appellant five years of probation, subject to appellant serving one year in county jail and complying with standard probation conditions including the following: "Defendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to defendants person, premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation officer."

The Probation Violation

San Francisco Police Officer Lori Detra testified that, on December 11, 2006, she was on patrol in uniform in the area of 16th and Mission Streets in San Francisco. At the time, Officer Detra had been a San Francisco police officer for five and one-half years. She had worked as an undercover officer for four of those years, specializing in narcotics investigations and arrests. While working undercover, Officer Detra had purchased narcotics hand-to-hand more than 100 times, including approximately 65 base cocaine purchases.

At or around 9:00 p.m. on December 11, 2006, Officer Detra was on patrol on Mission Street along with Officer Wilberg, a police recruit. As Officer Detra was walking northbound on Mission Street, she observed appellant and a woman walking southbound, directly towards her and Officer Wilberg. When she was within five feet of appellant, Officer Detra saw him hand the woman a "white rock." The woman took the "white rock" from appellant and put it in her jacket pocket. Officer Detra recognized the "white rock" to be base cocaine and believed that she had just witnessed a narcotics sale.

Immediately after handing the "white rock" to the woman he was with, appellant looked up and saw Officers Detra and Wilberg standing directly in front of him in full police uniforms. Officer Detra testified that "he seemed surprised to see us" because "his eyes open[ed] up wide, and he began to run." Appellant started to run past the officers. Officer Detra told appellant to "stop" but appellant continued to run. Officer Detra then tackled appellant, forcing him to the ground. Appellant landed on his stomach and Officer Detra landed on appellants back. Officer Detra testified that appellant pulled his hands underneath his body to avoid being handcuffed. While attempting to handcuff appellant, Officer Detra said, "`stop resisting" and "`police, stop resisting," but appellant refused to remove his hands from underneath his body. Officer Detra testified that appellant attempted to stand up while she was on his back. After approximately one minute of struggling, Officer Detra was able to handcuff appellant with assistance from Officer Wilberg. During the struggle, the woman who had been with appellant fled, and neither she nor the "white rock" were recovered. Following appellants arrest, the officers found $23 in his pocket.

On January 24, 2007, the People moved to revoke appellants probation based on charges of furnishing cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). At a hearing on that day, Officer Detra testified as to what she observed on the night in question. Appellant did not testify or offer any evidence. The court concluded that appellant had violated his probation and ordered probation revoked. The court found the evidence was sufficient to show appellant had furnished base cocaine and resisted arrest.

Before sentencing, appellant asked the court for mercy, stating: "I live on this street. . . . I was just trying to get back into my apartment. [¶] . . . [¶] I was just trying to go home. It wasnt no sales. I was just coming home. Thats all I was doing." The court found both charges true and revoked appellants probation, observing that appellant had "gotten serious breaks" over the years and noting that appellant had five previous probation revocation hearings and four modifications of his probation since his original conviction for drug sales in 2003. The court also observed that appellant had only been out of jail for three hours before the events in question, having just been released from five months in custody. The court awarded appellant credit for time served and ordered him to serve the remainder of his original eight-year sentence in state prison. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

"Probation is not a right but an act of clemency that may be withdrawn if the privilege is abused." (People v. Taylor (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 393, 395.) A court has broad discretion to revoke probation if "the interests of justice require it and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe . . . that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation . . . or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has been prosecuted for such offenses." (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a).) The standard of proof for facts supporting a probation revocation is a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441; People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197.)

While trial courts are given broad discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443), the resolution of disputed factual questions must be supported by substantial evidence (People v. Johnson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 284, 290). "Substantial" refers to the quality, not the quantity, of the evidence, but is not synonymous with "any" evidence. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) The evidence must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) In assessing whether substantial evidence exists, we must view all factual matters in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and we defer to the determinations by the trier of fact regarding witness credibility. (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053, disapproved on other grounds in DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim (1999) 20 Cal.4th 659, 668; Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)

II. The Trial Courts Finding That Appellant Resisted Arrest Was Supported By Substantial Evidence

The trial court based its revocation of appellants probation on two separate findings: that appellant furnished cocaine base and that he resisted arrest. Appellant contends the trial court erred because: (1) no evidence demonstrated appellants intent to resist arrest; and (2) the courts finding that appellant furnished cocaine base was based entirely on speculative testimony since the "white rock" Officer Detra saw was never recovered, and thus never tested, to determine whether it was cocaine base or something innocuous such as a mint, a piece of chalk, a crumpled note, a bit of soap, a semi-precious stone, a vitamin, or a mineral.

The record here reveals ample evidence to support the trial courts determination that appellant resisted arrest and intended to do so. According to the undisputed testimony of Officer Detra, appellant saw her and Officer Wilberg in full police uniform and then began to run. After Officer Detra told appellant to "stop," he disobeyed her order and continued to flee. Officer Detra tackled appellant and forced him to the ground, but appellant put his hands underneath his body to avoid being handcuffed and ignored her command to "stop resisting." Officer Detra testified that appellant attempted to stand up with her on his back. She was finally able to handcuff appellant only with assistance from Officer Wilberg, after appellant had struggled for approximately one minute.

Officer Detra testified that appellant resisted arrest. More importantly, she described his conduct in detail. This description, related above, provides substantial evidence in support of the trial courts finding that appellant resisted arrest. Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] any public officer, peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge [his or her] duty." "If one knows or should know he is being arrested by a peace officer, he has a duty to refrain from forcible resistance." (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 916; In re Gregory S. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) Appellant does not dispute Officer Detras testimony that he ran away after he saw her in full police uniform and continued running after she shouted at him to "stop." Appellant does argue that Officer Detras interpretation of his actions was mistaken and offers an alternate explanation for them—that he was tackled before he had a chance to submit and did not present his hands only because he used them to break his fall and then they became trapped under his body due to the weight of Officer Detra on his back. However, as creative as this alternative explanation may be, it was neither offered to the trial court at the probation revocation hearing, nor does it address the question of whether Officer Detras testimony constituted substantial evidence. Our function as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence, and a trial courts judgment will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary may also exist and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.)

Based on Officer Detras eyewitness account, the trial court concluded that appellants actions in fleeing and struggling after being told to "stop" constituted resisting arrest. The testimony of a single, credible witness can constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 369, pp. 426-427.) Moreover, as a probationer, appellant had a heightened duty to comply with the reasonable requests of police officers as spelled out in a specific condition of his probation: "Defendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to defendants person, premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation officer."

We conclude that Officer Detras testimony provided the trial court with substantial evidence to support its finding that appellants continuing to run away after being told to stop by a uniformed officer, his refusal to present his hands when commanded to do so, and his attempt to stand up with a police officer on his back constituted resisting arrest. Officer Detras testimony in this regard was not mere speculation but a first-hand account of her observations, and appellant offered no evidence that undermined the credibility of her version of events.

The court revoked appellants probation after finding both that appellant furnished cocaine and that he resisted arrest. We are confident, based on the courts comments at the hearing, that the court would have revoked appellants probation even if it had only found that appellant resisted arrest. In so doing, the court would have been properly exercising its broad discretion regarding probation revocation decisions. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443; see People v. Self (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 414, 419 [it falls within trial courts discretion to revoke probation on alternate grounds].) Therefore, since we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the courts finding of resisting arrest, we need not analyze the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether appellant also furnished cocaine base. (See also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582; People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [affirmance when trial courts ruling was correct on any theory].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur:

Lambden, J.

Richman, J. --------------- Notes: After hearing from the parties, the court said: "The only issue in this case is—I dont have any problem with imposing that sentence if its appropriate on the facts. Im not talking about if the sentence itself is appropriate; hes had enough breaks, which he shouldnt have had in the first place. Its an ESS [execution of sentence suspended], eight years. I dont have a problem with that. [¶] My only concern is whether theres sufficient evidence to find that hes in violation of his probation in this instance. [¶] And we dont have a rock. It had not been tested. [¶] It is true that Mission—this area is a high narcotics area. [¶] He doesnt have sufficient money to show a sale, I would agree with [the defense attorney] on this. The $23 doesnt show anything. [¶] But we have two people who are basically taking off when this officer in full uniform is there. [¶] There is a furnishing in this particular case. [¶] He is resisting arrest. Its true she didnt say youre under arrest, but shes fully dressed in a police uniform. So its not like he didnt [know] who she is. If its someone that comes along on the street and tackles him, we would all be resisting. But shes in police uniform. [¶] Im going to find hes in violation of his probation, and I am going to impose the eight year sentence in this particular case." (Italics added.)


Summaries of

People v. Wright

Court of Appeal of California
Jan 6, 2009
A118574 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Wright

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS WRIGHT, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeal of California

Date published: Jan 6, 2009

Citations

A118574 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009)