Opinion
2019-06972 Ind. 1484/17
03-16-2022
The People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Freddie T. Wright, appellant.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Priya Raghavan of counsel), for appellant. Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Aaron Spurlock, and Charles Pollak of counsel), for respondent.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Priya Raghavan of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Aaron Spurlock, and Charles Pollak of counsel), for respondent.
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, LARA J. GENOVESI, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Charles S. Lopresto, J.), rendered June 6, 2019, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and criminal trespass in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of robbery in the second degree (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v Quaye, 167 A.D.3d 661, 662). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of robbery in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644-645).
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's Batson challenges (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79) with respect to prospective juror No. 13 on the first panel of prospective jurors and prospective juror No. 6 on the third panel of prospective jurors. In both instances, the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating, under the third prong of the Batson test, that the facially race-neutral explanation given by the prosecutor was a pretext for racial discrimination (see People v Booker, 49 A.D.3d 658, 659).
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v Lawson, 40 A.D.3d 657, 658). In any event, to the extent that the prosecutor's comments included misstatements of certain facts adduced at trial, the remarks were not so egregious as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial (see People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 238; People v Lavayen, 200 A.D.3d 1069, 1071; People v Morales, 171 A.D.3d 945, 947).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly took into consideration uncharged crimes in imposing sentence is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Thomas, 178 A.D.2d 162, 163), and, in any event, without merit (see People v Powell, 125 A.D.3d 1010, 1012, affd 27 N.Y.3d 523). Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., ROMAN, GENOVESI and DOWLING, JJ., concur.