The State thus asks us to find that the defendant was under arrest for a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code when he was transported to the hospital for testing. ¶ 44 In support of its position, the State cites People v. Gamblin , 251 Ill. App. 3d 769, 191 Ill.Dec. 271, 623 N.E.2d 861 (1993), People v. Brantley , 248 Ill. App. 3d 580, 188 Ill.Dec. 93, 618 N.E.2d 663 (1993), and People v. Wozniak , 199 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 146 Ill.Dec. 54, 557 N.E.2d 996 (1990). We note that all three of these cases arise under a different statute than the one at issue here—section 11–501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

Our research, however, reveals a case that directly refutes defendant's position. See People v. Wozniak, 199 Ill. App. 3d 1088 (1990). In Wozniak, the defendant was charged with DUI. Wozniak, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.

Furthermore, the Appellate Court for the Third District has since called into question Monckton's engrafting of section 11.501.1(c) implied-consent protections onto the admissibility of chemical tests for DUI prosecution. People v. Woznik (3d Dist. 1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1088, 1091. The defendant's other authorities, People v. Romano (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 999, and People v. Frazier (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 563, are similarly unpersuasive.

Id. ¶ 23-24, 29-35 (citing People v. Wozniak, 199 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1091 (1990) (the predicate-arrest provision of the summary-suspension statute did not extend to a DUI prosecution)); see also Hayes, 2018 IL App (5th) 140223, ¶ 58 ("[O]ur holding does not limit the admissibility of test results in cases where the defendant has actually given voluntary consent or in cases where some other recognized exception to the requirement of a warrant applies.").

People v. Gamblin, 251 Ill. App.3d 769, 771 (1993). Besides the sworn report, factors to consider when determining if and when a suspect has been arrested for driving under the influence are (1) the issuance of a citation; (2) the administration of field sobriety tests; (3) the transportation to a police station ( Gamblin, 251 Ill. App.3d at 771); (4) the police officer's continuing possession of an individual's driver's license; (5) the handcuffing of the individual or the placing of the individual into a squad car ( Lewallen, 247 Ill. App.3d at 354); and (6) the duration of the individual's detention ( People v. Wozniak, 199 Ill. App.3d 1088, 1092 (1990)). No formal declaration of arrest is necessary for an arrest to occur.

• 1, 2 Therefore, according to the statute, the prerequisite for a valid arrest for DUI is the issuance and service of a written citation sufficiently apprising the defendant he is, or has been, charged with DUI. According to section 11-501.1(a) of the Code, if a suspect has not been properly arrested for DUI by the service of a uniform citation, the statutory summary suspension shall not issue. In People v. Wozniak (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1088, 557 N.E.2d 996, the defendant's summary suspension was properly rescinded because defendant had not been properly arrested pursuant to section 11-501.1(a) of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1(a).) This court made clear in Wozniak that the statutory summary suspension provisions are triggered by an arrest pursuant to statute for DUI. The issuance of a uniform citation is the pivotal prerequisite that must be fulfilled in order to arrest a suspect for DUI.