We therefore conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in light of the compelling interest of both the State and the individual in accurate dispositions. See Ala. Code § 15-12-21 (Supp. 1984); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.85.100 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4013 (1978) (capital cases; extended to noncapital cases in State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P.2d 335 (App. 1980)); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 17-456 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 987.9 (West Supp. 1984) (capital cases; right recognized in all cases in People v. Worthy, 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1980)); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-403 (Supp. 1984); State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 363 A.2d 33 (1975); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 4603 (1983); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.216; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 802-7 (Supp. 1983); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982); People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); Owen v. State, 272 Ind. 122, 396 N.E.2d 376 (1979) (trial judge may authorize or appoint experts where necessary); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 19; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4508 (Supp. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 31.070, 31.110, 31.185 (1980); State v. Madison, 345 So.2d 485 (La. 1977); State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me. 1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 261, § 27C(4) (West Supp. 1984-1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.20a(3) (Supp. 1983); Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1983); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.030.4 (Supp. 1984); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-201 (1983); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264 N.W.2d 876 (1978) (discretion to appoint psychiatrist rests with trial court)

A defendant seeking appointment of an expert under Evidence Code section 730 must make a showing of need and the decision to grant or deny the request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402]; Collins v. SuperiorCourt (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 47, 52 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 273].) These same principles govern a request for appointment of advisory counsel.

A right to ancillary defense services will thus arise if Corenevsky has demonstrated the need for such services by reference to "`the general lines of inquiry he wishes to pursue, being as specific as possible.'" ( Faxel, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 330; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 520-521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) Although such motions can be granted only if supported by a showing that the investigative services are reasonably necessary ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 939), it has been recognized that because of the early stage at which the request typically arises, it will often be difficult for counsel to demonstrate a clear need for such funds.

According to defendant, Dr. Coleman's testimony was contrary to state and federal law recognizing that psychiatric opinions may be helpful to the court and jury. (See, e.g., § 987.9; Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68 [84 L.Ed.2d 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087]; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) We had occasion to consider similar testimony by Dr. Coleman in People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 698-700 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253] (hereafter Babbitt), in the course of ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising from the prosecutor's reliance on Dr. Coleman's testimony to disparage opinions by defense experts.

Some courts view the right secured in Gideon as additionally requiring the assistance of experts or investigators when necessary to provide an indigent with the effective assistance of counsel. E.g., Mason v. State of Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1145 (1975); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967); Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965); People v. Worthy, 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1980); People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. in and for Co. of Washoe, 453 P.2d 421 (Nev. 1969). Other courts, however, hold the view that the Constitution does not create any right to such expert assistance. E.g., Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966); Corbett v. Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo. 1967); State v. Chambers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P.2d 27 (1969); Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536, 192 S.E.2d 249 (1972); Bimbow v. State, 315 N.E.2d 738, 743-44 (Ind. App. 1974); Utsler v. State, 171 N.W.2d 739 (S.D. 1969); Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1968).

) At this investigatory stage of the proceedings, it would be inappropriate to give Barrett the Hobson's choice of going forth with his discovery efforts and revealing possible defense strategies and work product to the prosecution, or refraining from pursuing these discovery materials to protect his constitutional rights and prevent undesirable disclosures to his adversary. (See People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 525, fn. 3.) The District Attorney's reliance upon this court's decision in Department of Corrections v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1087, is misplaced.

For ancillary defense services other than expert witnesses (e.g., investigators, law clerks), funds may be authorized under Penal Code sections 987.2, 987.8 or 987.9. ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-321 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360]; Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 575 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787]; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-520 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402]; People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 327, 330 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 132].) However, it is only necessary services to which the indigent defendant is entitled, and the burden is on the defendant to show that the expert's services are necessary to his defense.

"But within the rule just stated is its limitation: the burden is on the defendant to make a showing of need, before the court is required to appoint an expert." ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) It is only necessary ancillary services to which an indigent is entitled.

d to investigator paid by public funds upon showing of necessity and indigency); In re Cannady, 600 A.2d 459, 461-62 (N.J. 1991) (New Jersey Public Defender Act requires office of public defender to provide all other necessary expenses of representation, not just for indigents represented by office of public defender); State v. Wool, 648 A.2d 655, 659-60 (Vt. 1994) (Vermont Public Defender Act provides right to services and facilities of representation and cannot be conditioned on acceptance of services of attorney appointed by public defender); see also English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Iowa 1981) (Iowa R. Crim. P. 19(4) is "authority for permitting an indigent defendant represented by private counsel to obtain the testimony of expert witnesses at trial at public expense"); cf. Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1980) (judge's refusal to provide publicly funded expert to indigent defendant with private counsel was violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments);People v. Worthy, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402, 405-06 (Cal.Ct.App. 1980) (defendant represented by private counsel constitutionally entitled to publicly funded experts if defendant showed indigency and necessity); Widdis v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 968 P.2d 1165, 1167-68 (Nev. 1998) (criminal defendant with private counsel entitled under Sixth Amendment to reasonable defense services at public expense based on showing of indigency and necessity). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3) (Supp.

( People v. Castaneda (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 334, 339 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 9].) (10) Where there is no motion to strike an expert's answers to questions, a reviewing court cannot reach the claim of error. ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 527 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) (11a) The plaintiff failed to properly and timely object to most of the hearsay statements in Dr. Whaley's testimony.