Given this material factual distinction, Tran does not control. Defendant also cites People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402 for the principle that defendant’s indigence alone qualified him for full coverage of all necessary ancillary expenses. In Worthy , an indigent defendant was represented by a private attorney whom the defendant had agreed to pay, but who told the court he was "serving pro bono, because appellant was destitute."

The right to counsel includes the right to [ancillary services] that will assist counsel in preparing a defense." ( Anderson v. Justice Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 398, 401; accord Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319; see also People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 [constitutional right to such services in noncapital cases; due process and equal protection are also implicated].) The defendant must make an adequate showing of need for such services ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 320), but the superior court does not question Tran's showing.

"But within the rule just stated is its limitation: the burden is on the defendant to make a showing of need, before the court is required to appoint an expert." ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) It is only necessary ancillary services to which an indigent is entitled.

However, California law provides generally for court-appointed necessary expert services for defendants who establish indigency. SeePeople v. Worthy, 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402, 406 (Ct.App.1980). As far as Casey's counsel was concerned, however, Casey was not indigent.

Thus, in order to support a request for the appointment of an expert witness, a defendant must show both that he is indigent and that the witness is necessary to his defense. (Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-320; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal. App. 3d 514, 520.) The decision whether to grant a defendant's request for the appointment of an expert witness rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

In making the ruling, the court shall be guided by the need to provide a complete and full defense for the defendant. Cal. Penal Code § 987.9 (extended to all cases by People v. Worthy, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). Cal. Penal Code § 987.9 (extended to all cases by People v. Worthy, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).

Courts from other jurisdictions have held that a defendant is entitled to State-funded expert services in circumstances comparable to the petitioner's, as well as when a defendant is being represented pro bono. See, e.g., Ex parte Sanders, 612 So.2d 1199, 1201 (Ala. 1993) (holding indigent defendant has right to public funds to hire expert although represented by counsel retained by family); Dubose v. State, 662 So.2d 1189, 1191 (Ala. 1995) (following Sanders); People v. Worthy, 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402, 406 (1980) (concluding that, upon a proper showing of necessity, trial court must provide an indigent defendant expert services, without regard to whether his counsel is appointed or pro bono); People v. Evans, 271 Ill.App.3d 495, 208 Ill.Dec. 42, 648 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1995) (concluding that indigent defendant entitled to expert witness funding although represented by private law firm where services provided on pro bono basis); English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293-94 (Iowa 1981) (holding Sixth Amendment authority for furnishing investigative services at public expense without regard to whether indigent represented by private counsel); State v. Jones, 707 So.2d 975, 977-78 (La. 1998) (holding, although indigent defendant was represented by counsel retained by defendant's father, he was eligible for state-funded necessary services); State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1988) (holding that an indigent pro se criminal appellant must be given access to a trial transcript on a limited ba

According to defendant, Dr. Coleman's testimony was contrary to state and federal law recognizing that psychiatric opinions may be helpful to the court and jury. (See, e.g., § 987.9; Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68 [84 L.Ed.2d 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087]; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) We had occasion to consider similar testimony by Dr. Coleman in People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 698-700 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253] (hereafter Babbitt), in the course of ruling on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising from the prosecutor's reliance on Dr. Coleman's testimony to disparage opinions by defense experts.

A defendant seeking appointment of an expert under Evidence Code section 730 must make a showing of need and the decision to grant or deny the request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402]; Collins v. SuperiorCourt (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 47, 52 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 273].) These same principles govern a request for appointment of advisory counsel.

A right to ancillary defense services will thus arise if Corenevsky has demonstrated the need for such services by reference to "`the general lines of inquiry he wishes to pursue, being as specific as possible.'" ( Faxel, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 330; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514, 520-521 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 402].) Although such motions can be granted only if supported by a showing that the investigative services are reasonably necessary ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 939), it has been recognized that because of the early stage at which the request typically arises, it will often be difficult for counsel to demonstrate a clear need for such funds.