Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD221163, Stephanie Sontag, Francis M. Devaney, Judges.
BENKE, J.
Following denial of a motion to suppress brought under Penal Code section 1538.5, Tracy Scott Workman pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, subd. (a)) and admitted a 2001 prior conviction for the same charge. The trial court struck the enhancement, sentenced Workman to a three-year prison term, and stayed the execution of custody pending appeal.
On appeal, Workman contends the trial court erred when it denied his suppression motion. As we explain, we conclude the trial court properly denied that motion and thus affirm his judgment of conviction.
Motion to Suppress Evidence
A. Governing Law
The standard we employ is well settled in our review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence. In evaluating a challenge to the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to its factual findings, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) We then exercise our independent judgment to decide what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the facts and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (Ibid.)
B. Factual and Procedural Overview
Evidence from the hearing on the motion to suppress shows a team of narcotic officers from the San Diego Police Department went to a San Diego residence to conduct a probation search on Mishelle Baker in response to a narcotics complaint. After the officers knocked at the door of the residence and identified themselves, one of the officers opened a small "peep hole" in the door and heard a female voice, later identified as Baker's, say, "Honey, I'm going to jail, " or words to that effect. Baker then reluctantly opened the door and officers went inside. For their own safety, officers secured the inside of the residence and sought to identify all of its occupants.
Police asked Baker and her husband Brent Routley whether anyone else was on the premises of the property. Routley alone responded in the negative. There were several storage sheds on the property and the property itself was laden with "all kinds of junk and personal property, " outhouses, vegetation and walkways and many "hidden areas, " which made the backyard difficult to walk through and view and which police determined were indicative of a drug house.
For safety reasons, one of the narcotics officers went outside to secure the area. While outside, the officer encountered Workman on the premises working on a motorcycle near one of the sheds. The officer was dressed in street clothes, although his badge was clearly displayed. Nonetheless, the officer identified himself as a police officer and asked Workman whether he lived at the property, or words to that effect. Workman denied living there.
During their brief conversation, the officer noticed Workman appeared to have a "weird" or "blank stare" on his face and that Workman appeared anxious. Workman also became uncooperative, refusing to answer the officer's simple follow-up question of whether he had permission to be on the property. Based on his training, the officer suspected Workman might be under the influence. The officer decided to detain Workman, to pat him down for safety purposes and to walk him inside the residence where the remaining officers were completing the probation search. During the patdown, the officer felt a suspicious bulge in Workman's front left pants pocket.
Two officers resumed securing the outside premises. Officers went inside the unlocked shed, near where Workman had been working on the motorcycle, to look for additional persons. Once inside, the officers saw in plain view a bed, a hypodermic needle and a cellular phone that was ringing at the time. In the other sheds, the officers also found mattresses and electrical wiring. During their premises' search, the officers encountered yet another person.
The officers went back inside the residence and one of them conducted a full under-the-influence evaluation of Workman. That officer described Workman as "quite pale. He was pasty. He was cold and clammy to the touch. He was sweating profusely, and the temperature outside was approximately 65 degrees. It was overcast and quite mild for the day. Inside the house was relatively the same temperature so it didn't seem to explain why [Workman] was sweating so much. [¶] [Workman's] breathing was shallow, and -- but kind of rapid, and he also had scabs on his face that appeared to be new and -- or newly picked. They were red and fleshy, and he had burned fingertips. He was unkempt... and [his pulse] was 56 beats per minute which was actually really low...."
The officer also conducted an "internal clocking test[]" on Workman. This test required Workman to close his eyes and estimate when 30 seconds had passed. According to the officer, Workman was unable and/or unwilling to do this test, telling the officer he felt sick, light-headed and was about to pass out. Workman instead put his head down and closed his eyes. The officer then noticed Workman's eyes fluttering. Based on that officer's training and experience and in light of the field evaluation, the officer arrested Workman for being under the influence of a controlled substance.
After the officer admonished Workman, he claimed he had smoked methamphetamine at a friend's house the night before. The officer searched Workman and found in his left pocket two baggies containing a crystallized substance that the officer initially concluded was, and untimely found to be, methamphetamine.
Officers went back outside to take photographs of what they saw and to conduct a more extensive search of the premises. Although officers did not have Workman's permission at that time to conduct a more thorough search of the shed, "at that particular moment, no one claimed -- Mr. Workman said he didn't live there. We were there conducting a probation search that entitles us to search all common areas and the shed at that point was deemed a common area. Okay. And... Mrs. Baker was on probation which basically gave us the authority to search the shed. And Mr. Workman was claiming he did not reside at the residence." At that time, police also had not yet learned from Baker and/or Routley that Workman had been living in the shed for two weeks.
During their more extensive follow-up search of the shed, officers read some text messages on the cell phone that earlier had been ringing. One of the incoming messages on that phone was from "Terry" and said, "I have 300 if you're available." The officers also found pipes with residue and a digital scale.
Workman subsequently signed a consent-to-search form for a more thorough search of the shed. Before Workman signed the form, he asked police whether he could even consent to the search because he did not own the shed. He then admitted to the police that although he did not own the shed, he owned everything inside. As a result of Workman's consent-to-search, police conducted a more thorough search of the shed and found more drug paraphernalia including, among other things, baggies and four pipes.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defense argued that Workman was not "clearly under the influence because there were multiple officers sort of evaluating him at the time, and the officers had the immediate motive of wanting to know what he had in his pocket, and the way to do that was to find him under the influence." The defense also argued the follow-up search of the shed was improper because that search occurred before Workman had signed a consent-to-search form. According to the defense, after the initial search police knew Workman was living in the shed because inside police found a bed, a television and a cellular phone, and because Baker and/or Routley allegedly had already informed police that Workman had been living in the shed for two weeks.
C. Denial of Motion to Suppress and Sentencing
The trial court found police searched the shed and found the scale and hypodermic needle after Workman denied he lived on the property and before the officers learned he was in fact living in the shed. The court therefore denied the motion to suppress.
Workman was subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, subd. (a), count 1), being under the influence of a controlled substance (id., § 11550, subd. (a), count 2) and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (id., § 11364, counts 3, 4 and 5). During trial, Workman pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted a prior conviction for the same charge. The trial court sentenced Workman to a three-year prison term and struck the enhancement.
D. Analysis
1. Detention and Pat Down
We note that unlike in his motion to suppress, in this appeal Workman does not challenge the initial search of his shed. Workman had no legitimate expectation of privacy in connection with the officer's initial search of the shed because there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the findings of the trial court that Workman told the officer he did not live on the property and officers did not learn until after their initial and subsequent search (which we discuss post) that Workman in fact lived in the shed. (See People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 308-309, fn. 1, quoting Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 143 [99 S.Ct. 421] ["The 'capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends... upon whether the person... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' "]; see also People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674 ["In California, probationers may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term."].)
In contrast, in his motion to suppress Workman argued police initially had no right to enter and search the shed because they made no "diligent effort" to discover the shed's owner and obtain permission from that owner before the search. Moreover, Workman argued he gave consent to search the shed "only after he had been arrested; after he was left sick and waiting at the [police] station...."
Workman can, however, challenge the detention and search of his person, which led to discovery of the methamphetamine in his pants pocket. (See People v. Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1340.) The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) " 'A seizure occurs whenever a police officer "by means of physical force or show of authority" restrains the liberty of a person to walk away.' [Citation.] Whether a seizure has taken place is to be determined by an objective test, which asks 'not whether the citizen perceived that he [or she] was being ordered to restrict his [or her] movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.' [Citation.] Thus, when police engage in conduct that would 'communicate[ ] to a reasonable person that he [or she] was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his [or her] business, ' there has been a seizure. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court held that a search warrant founded on probable cause carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while the search is conducted. (See Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 705 [101 S.Ct. 2587].) Our high court thus held: "When, in the course of initiating a search under warrant of a private residence for illegal drugs or related items, police officers encounter on the premises a person whose identity and connection to the premises are unknown and cannot immediately be determined without detaining the person, the officers may constitutionally detain him or her for the period of time required and in the manner necessary to make those determinations and to protect the safety of all present during the detention. If the person is determined to be an occupant of the home to be searched, he or she may be detained, pursuant to [Michigan v.] Summers, for the duration of the search. [Citation.] If the person is determined not to be an occupant, further detention is proper only if justified by other specific, articulable facts connecting him or her to the criminal activity suspected to be occurring on the premises or establishing a danger to the officers if the person is released." (See People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
In People v. Hannah, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 1335 officers went to an apartment to search for a juvenile subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. When officers entered, they encountered defendant sitting in the living room with another male. While one officer went to look for the juvenile, another officer asked the men to remain seated, then questioned them about their identities, relationship to the person who had answered the door and why they were there. The officer determined that defendant may have been under the influence of drugs and attempted to arrest him. Defendant attempted to flee, was apprehended and a subsequent search of his person turned up drugs. (Id. at p. 1339.)
After analyzing People v. Glaser and Michigan v. Summers, among other cases, the court in People v. Hannah concluded: "The nature of the intrusion upon defendant was minimal. Balanced against this was the governmental interest in obtaining information, preventing a suspect from evading the police, and ensuring the safety of the police officers involved. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the initial detention of defendant was reasonable and legal." (51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.)
Similar to the case before us, in People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837 officers went to a residence to conduct a probation search of a probationer. When officers arrived, they saw defendants walking out the front door. One officer ordered defendants to come over, whereupon the officers explained that a term of the resident's probation prevented him from associating with convicted felons. Officers determined both defendants had outstanding arrest warrants, arrested them and during a search incident to their arrest, found drugs.
At their suppression hearing, defendants in People v. Matelski argued that they were not engaged in any criminal activity when they were detained. The People responded that it was reasonable to detain defendants to determine if they were convicted felons in order to ascertain whether the probationer was in violation of his probation conditions. (People v. Matelski, supra, at pp. 841–842.)
Relying primarily on People v. Glaser and People v. Hannah, the court in People v. Matelski balanced the extent of the intrusion against the governmental interests justifying it, and concluded the detentions were constitutionally reasonable. (People v. Matelski, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) The court noted the detention was brief—about 15 minutes, and that "[s]ecurity demands that the persons in the home at the time of the officers' arrival remain there until the officers have completed their investigation." (Id. at p. 850.) Although the officers had neither an arrest nor a search warrant, the court further noted they were not acting randomly, but instead "were conducting a valid search of the home of a probationer who had failed a drug test.... Since the probationer waived his Fourth Amendment rights, the officers were properly able to enter the premises to search it without a warrant." (Id. at p. 851.)
Here, we conclude People v. Matelski is factually similar to the instant case and is legally persuasive. Although the narcotics officers here had no arrest or search warrant, they were conducting a valid home visit to a probationer based on a narcotics complaint. There is no dispute the officers lawfully entered Baker's residence and searched the subject premises—including the outside—pursuant to a "Fourth waiver." In the course of securing the outside area, an officer encountered Workman, after being told by the owners of the property that nobody else was on the property. Workman initially was cooperative, stating he did not live on the property. However, Workman refused to answer a simple follow-up question from the officer about whether he had permission from the owners to be on the property.
In addition to being uncooperative, Workman appeared nervous and had what the officer described as a blank stare on his face, suggesting to the officer trained in the field of narcotics that Workman might be under the influence. Moreover, the officers were there in response to a narcotics complaint, and noted the condition of the yard area was indicative of a home used for drug sales. Because the officer was alone in the backyard when he encountered Workman, for his own safety and for the safety of the other officers he detained Workman inside the premises and with another officer completed securing the outside of the premises.
Although Workman disagrees that he then exhibited signs of being under the influence, we conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the implied finding of the trial court that further detention of Workman was warranted based on "specific, articulable facts connecting him to the criminal activity suspected to be occurring on the premises." (See People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
Having concluded Workman was lawfully detained, the issue becomes whether the officer had the right to conduct a limited pat down search of Workman before he took Workman inside the house for a full under-the-influence evaluation. (See People v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 598-599.) " 'When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he [or she] is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, ' the officer may 'take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.' (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 24 [88 S.Ct. 1868].) This is so regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. (Id. at p. 27.) 'The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger. [Citations.] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his [or her] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch, " but to the specific reasonable inferences which he [or she] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his [or her] experience. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Rios, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 598-599.)
Workman claims that on being contacted by the officer outside, the officer "immediately conducted a patdown search of [him] for weapons even though the [officer] had no reason to believe [he] was presently armed and dangerous." (Italics added.) The record does not support this factual assertion, however, and in any event as we discuss the officer had a right to conduct a limited patdown of Workman under the circumstances.
In People v. Thurman (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 820, police served a search warrant at a private residence for the search of drugs and narcotic paraphernalia, but not the search of defendant. Although defendant and two females sat "silently and passively" on the sofa inside the residence (id. at p. 821), and although defendant did not threaten the officer, the officer ordered defendant to stand and then immediately patted him down for weapons for safety. (Ibid.) The officer felt a large "bulge" in defendant's jacket. (Ibid.) Believing the bulge could be a gun, the officer stuck his hand inside defendant's jacket, squeezed the item and realized it was not a weapon. Instead, the officer testified the item felt like pieces of rock or rock cocaine in a baggie. (Ibid.) The officer removed the item from defendant's jacket and arrested defendant. (Ibid.)
Defendant moved to suppress the baggie containing 12 large rocks of cocaine, arguing the patdown search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because defendant was not a resident of the premises where the warrant was served and was not behaving in a threatening manner. Defendant further argued that the officer had no reason to believe defendant was "armed and dangerous" and therefore under Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, the pat search was unlawful. (People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 821.)
In rejecting these contentions, the court in People v. Thurman relied on the " 'long tradition of armed violence' by the American criminal" discussed in Terry v. Ohio and stated: "illicit drug trafficking, now of epidemic proportion, has brought new dimension to this deplorable tradition. Rare is the day which passes without fresh reports of drug related homicides, open street warfare between armed gangs over disputed 'drug turf, ' and police seizures of illicit drug and weapon caches in warranted searches of private residences and other locales. It is well recognized that '... the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence....' (Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702 [101 S.Ct. 2587].) Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissenting opinion in Ybarra v. Illinois [1979] 444 U.S. 85, 106 [100 S.Ct. 338], citing United States v. Oates (2nd Cir. 1977) 560 F.2d 45, 62: 'In the narcotics business, "firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotic paraphernalia." '
"Finding that the pat search of Terry was not unreasonable and that the revolver which had been seized was properly admitted in evidence against him, the Terry Court concluded: '... that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he [or she] has reason to believe that he [or she] is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he [or she] has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger. [Citations.] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his [or her] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch, " but to the specific reasonable inferences which he [or she] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his [or her] experience. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 822-823.)
The court in People v. Thurman thus held the officer "acted reasonably and prudently in conducting the pat search of [defendant] in the circumstances. Here, a neutral and detached magistrate had judicially approved a warranted search for evidence of drug trafficking at the private residence where appellant was found. The officers whose duty required them to execute the warranted search were thus well aware they were engaged in an undertaking fraught with the potential for sudden violence. They were necessarily cognizant of the very real threat that the occupants of the residence were within an environment where weapons are readily accessible and often hidden, nor could they discount the possibility that one or more of the individuals found inside were personally armed. [¶]... [¶]
"The Terry court observed that there is ' "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." ' [Citations.] The brief, relatively private intrusion upon [defendant's] personal security pales in significance when balanced against the officer's need to protect himself [or herself] and others from the documented potential for violence inherent in a judicially sanctioned search for narcotics in a private residence. The risk of approaching an occupant of a private residence which is the probable site of drug trafficking corresponds to, if not exceeds, '... the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he [or she] approaches a person seated in an automobile.' [Citation.]
" 'In evaluating the validity of an officer's investigative or protective conduct under Terry, the "touchstone of our analysis... is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' " ' [Citation.] '[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.' [Citation.] We hold that where police officers are called upon to execute a warranted search for narcotics within a private residence they have the lawful right to conduct a limited Terry patdown search for weapons upon the occupants present while the search is in progress. Such protective action in the circumstances defined is, in our judgment, manifestly reasonable." (People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 823-824.)
Here, we conclude People v. Thurman is factually similar, and its reasoning persuasive, to our case. Although Workman claims People v. Thurman is inapposite because unlike the instant case police there operated under a search warrant, we conclude that difference is not material because officers here were acting in response to a narcotics complaint and officers determined before their search that the owner of the house, Baker, had a "Fourth waiver."
The evidence in the record shows the officer decided to detain and conduct a limited patdown search of Workman only after reasonably determining that Workman could be under the influence. In addition, before the limited patdown the record shows that Workman was uncooperative and refused to answer even a simple question posed by the officer; that the officer was alone in the cluttered backyard and encountered Workman after being told by the owners of the property that there were no other people on the premises; that for his safety and for the safety of the other officers at the scene, the officer who encountered Workman decided to briefly detain Workman inside the residence until a full under-the-influence evaluation could be completed on Workman; that before taking Workman back into the residence for the full evaluation, the officer did a quick patdown search of Workman for weapons; and that officers were at the subject property in response to a narcotics complaint. Under the circumstances here, we have no hesitation in concluding that the narcotics officer in the instant case acted reasonably and prudently in doing a limited Terry v. Ohio "patdown" search of Workman in the yard.
Indeed, the facts in the case before us are even more compelling than in People v. Thurman for the allowance of a quick patdown search. In People v. Thurman, unlike here, there is no evidence that defendant may have been under the influence or was anything but cooperative with police while sitting on the sofa during the search. Moreover, unlike the officer in People v. Thurman, the officer in the case before us did not pull out the item in Workman's pocket once the officer confirmed it was not a weapon. Instead, the officer notified one of the officers inside the house of the bulge in Workman's pocket and that officer did not search Workman until after Workman was arrested for being under the influence.
That Workman did not appear to pose a threat in the case before us and was merely working on a motorcycle near a shed on the subject property does not "in any measure diminish the potential for sudden armed violence" in what police determined was a potential drug trafficking residential locale. (See People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 823 ["To require an officer to await an overt act of hostility, as [defendant] suggests, before attempting to neutralize the threat of physical harm which accompanies an occupant's presence in a probable drug trafficking residential locale, would be utter folly."].)
Finally, we conclude Workman's reliance on Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. 85 and People v. Sandoval (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 205 are misplaced. In Ybarra, the pat search was conducted on nine to 13 patrons of a public tavern. The Supreme Court regarded the search as a "generalized 'cursory search for weapons.' " (Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, at pp. 93–94.) "When the private residence has been judicially determined as the probable site of narcotic transactions, " (People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 824) or when, as here, that residence has been the subject of a narcotics complaint and the owner is subject to a "Fourth waiver, " we conclude those individuals on the premises, such as Workman, may be "likely to be involved in drug trafficking in one form or another." (Ibid.)
"Moreover, because of the private nature of the surroundings and the recognized propensity of persons 'engaged in selling narcotics [to] frequently carry firearms to protect themselves from would-be robbers, ' [citation] the likelihood that the occupants are armed or have ready accessibility to hidden weapons is conspicuously greater than in cases where, as in Ybarra, the public freely enters premises where legal business is transacted." (People v. Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d.at pp. 824-825.) For these reasons, we conclude Ybarra v. Illinois is distinguishable from our case.
We also conclude People v. Sandoval does not apply here. There, defendant was sitting alone on the steps of a house known for drug activity and was himself known to the police officer from prior drug arrests. Police came to the house to conduct a probation search of the residence of another individual. During that search, defendant was detained and searched, which the Court of Appeal ruled was unlawful. (People v. Sandoval, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.)
However, quite unlike our case, the police officer conducting the patdown search in People v. Sandoval testified "he did not suspect defendant was engaged in criminal activity and the officer had no reason to believe defendant was armed." (People v. Sandoval, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 212.)
In contrast, the narcotics officer here reasonably concluded Workman could be under the influence after the officer unexpectedly encountered Workman in the cluttered area of the back premises of the subject property. In addition, Workman was uncooperative and appeared nervous. We conclude such facts supported a reasonable suspicion Workman had done what users and/or sellers of narcotics often do: arm him- or herself with, or maintain ready access to, a weapon. (See People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 367-368; People v.Thurman, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 822-825.) We thus conclude the limited Terry v. Ohio patdown search of Workman was reasonable under the circumstances.
2. Probation Search of the Shed
We likewise reject Workman's alternate contentions the officers' subsequent search of the shed was unlawful because (1) after he was detained inside the residence officers knew that someone other than Baker—the probationer—had "exclusive control" over the shed and thus officers had no right to search it, and (2) officers were required to make a limited inquiry to determine whether someone other than Baker was living in the shed or sheds.
As to Workman's first contention, we conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding of the trial court that when officers searched the area outside the residence, including the storage sheds located on the subject property, and found the pipes, the scale, the hypodermic needle and other indicia of methamphetamine sales in one of those sheds, they reasonably believed Baker and her husband at a minimum had joint control and/or possession over this area. (See People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 675-676 ["It long has been settled that a consent-based search is valid when consent is given by one person with common or superior authority over the area to be searched, " and that in such circumstances the consent of the other party is unnecessary because the " 'common authority' theory of consent rests 'on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection in his [or her] own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.' [Citations.]]".)
Indeed, the record shows (i) Baker and Routley owned the subject property and they denied anybody else was on the property in response to police questioning; (ii) Workman denied living on the subject property and there is no evidence in the record he changed his story the entire time he was detained inside the residence; and (iii) police only learned from Routley after their subsequent search of the storage shed that Workman had been living in the shed for two weeks. (See People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 675-676.)
Although Workman references evidence in the record that contradicts this specific finding—that police did not discover Workman was living in the shed until after they conducted a thorough search of the shed and uncovered additional evidence of methamphetamine sales (e.g., the scale and the pipes with residue, among other items), because we conclude this finding is supported by substantial, credible evidence, we are not at liberty to adopt a different or contrary finding even in the face of such conflicting evidence. (See People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 362.)
What's more, once police determined Workman had been living in the shed, they obtained his consent to conduct yet another, more thorough search in a consent-to-search form. We thus hold the searches of Workman's shed were not unlawful.
As to his second contention, we disagree the officers were required under these circumstances to inquire who was living in the shed before they searched. In People v. Boyd (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 736, 746-749, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when officers searched a trailer owned by a parolee located adjacent to the parolee's residence and during that search opened defendant's purse, without first inquiring who owned it, and found methamphetamine inside.
In rejecting defendant's argument that the officer's failure to first inquire whether defendant owned the handbag "automatically invalidate[d] the search, " the court in People v. Boyd stated:
"[W]e reject any suggestion that a parole search will automatically be invalidated simply because the officer fails to ask the nonparolee roommate whether the object about to be searched is his or her property. Such a rigid rule would unnecessarily bind the officer to the answer given, regardless of its veracity. The officer should not be bound by the reply in the face of overwhelming evidence of its falsity. Even if the nonparolee roommate's claim of ownership sounds reasonable, reasonable suspicion may be predicated on the parolee's possession or control of the object. The officer must reasonably suspect that the object is owned, controlled or possessed by the parolee for the search to be valid. Depending upon the facts involved, there may be instances where an officer's failure to inquire, coupled with all of the other relevant facts, would render the suspicion unreasonable and the search invalid. However, this is not such a case." (People v. Boyd, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 749, fn. omitted.)
Here, as we have noted, the officers actually asked Workman if he lived on the subject premises, which he denied. The record also shows the officers asked Baker and Routley whether anyone else was on the premises, which Routley answered in the negative. Thus, there is evidence in the record before us supporting the implicit finding that police did make a limited inquiry regarding who was living on the subject premises.
But even if police had not made such inquiry, on this record we nonetheless conclude police reasonably believed that at a minimum Baker had joint control and/or ownership over the entire property, including the storage sheds, and that Workman did not live on the subject property and thus enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the shed. (See People v. Pleasant (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 194, 197-199 [affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress because the probationer's son had no reasonable expectation of privacy when police searched probationer's residence and found in defendant's room, which had been locked, a rifle under the bed because the probationer had access to the keys in the room where the gun was found].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P.J., O'ROURKE, J.