Opinion
F041901.
10-21-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHANIEL ALLAN WOODYARD, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Janis Shank McLean and Jennifer M. Runte, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
With his fist, Nathaniel Allan Woodyard broke Edward Sweetens nose, split his lip, and knocked out a tooth. A jury found him guilty in count I of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and in count II of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (d)) and found true the allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury during commission of the count I offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
DISCUSSION
A. Shackling
Woodyard argues that the courts refusal to conduct an inquiry after a juror might have seen him outside the courtroom in shackles violated due process. The Attorney General argues the contrary.
1. The record
A bailiff escorting Woodyard to the courtroom in shackles saw a juror about 10 feet away. The bailiff reported that he did not know whether the juror saw the shackles but that if the juror had looked he could have seen them. Woodyard reported that he made eye contact with the juror and asked the court to inquire whether the juror saw his shackles and, if he did, whether that prejudiced him and whether the juror mentioned that to any other juror. The court denied the request.
The court offered to admonish the jury not to consider Woodyards custodial status during deliberations. Woodyard declined the offer and moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion. "Unfortunately, the configuration of this courthouse is not such that we have a method of getting people from the jail to the courtroom, at least to this courtroom, unobserved," the court noted. "So those sorts of things happen."
2. The law
The record fails to establish that the juror outside the courtroom actually saw Woodyards shackles. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C).) In the absence of that showing, the error, if any, is harmless. (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 651, overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) "One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient." (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 591.)
Even if Woodyard had established that the juror actually saw his shackles, the record shows that the configuration of the courthouse makes occasional sightings like that inevitable. Brief observations by a juror of an accused in shackles, whether inside or outside the courtroom, generally are not prejudicial. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 988; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 287, fn. 2, and cases cited.) The court denied Woodyards request for an inquiry, but he declined the courts offer of an admonition. On that record, assuming arguendo that he had established that the juror actually saw his shackles, the error, if any, was harmless. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
B. Sentencing
Woodyard argues that the court relied on improper factors to impose the middle term on count I and that a remand for resentencing is necessary to ensure uniformity under the determinate sentencing law. The Attorney General argues the contrary.
1. The record
At the probation and sentencing hearing, the court noted as circumstances in aggravation Woodyards habitual "involve[ment] in violent conduct" and "numerous prior convictions, both as a juvenile and as an adult," and as a circumstance in mitigation his apparent remorse. The court also noted service of a prior prison term and parole status but attributed those circumstances in aggravation to his codefendant. Finally, acknowledging deference to legislative sentencing guidelines, the court "decline[d] to aggravate the sentence in this case" and imposed the middle term on count I.
2. The law
Woodyard acknowledges that by attributing comments about service of a prior prison term and parole status to his codefendant the court might simply have misspoken but argues that the court instead might have considered as a circumstance in aggravation his codefendants criminal record. Whether the record shows the one or the other is entirely speculative, but we need not resolve the ambiguity. The determinate sentencing law does not require the court to "state reasons for imposing the middle term of imprisonment as distinguished from the upper or lower term." (People v. Arceo (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 117, 121; Pen. Code, § 1170, subds. (b), (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e).) Even if the record of the courts reasons for imposition of the middle term is confusing, the absence of a duty to state reasons for that sentence choice bars relief on appeal. (People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 780, 785-786.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.