Opinion
A121701.
6-25-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHANIEL LEE WOODWARD, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Appellant Nathaniel Lee Woodward appeals from a conviction following his no contest plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized after he was stopped on a suspicion of engaging in prostitution. We affirm the judgment.
Background
On July 26, 2007, defendant was charged by information with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); one count each of possession of methadone, oxycodone and morphine (§ 11350, subd. (a)); and a misdemeanor count of possession of paraphernalia (§ 11364, subd. (a)). The information alleged further that each of the felony violations was committed while defendant was on bail (Pen. Code, § 12022.1) and that defendant had suffered two prior "strike" convictions (Pen. Code, § 1170.12) and served one prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5).
All statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise noted.
This information subsequently was consolidated with two additional informations charging defendant with various drug related offenses. Both were dismissed following the entry of defendants no contest plea.
On August 31, 2007, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. The following testimony was presented at the suppression hearing:
On May 20, 2007, Eliza Skaggs was working as the front desk clerk at a hotel at 3000 Santa Rosa Avenue in Santa Rosa. Around 5:00 p.m., she noticed a woman loitering in the parking lot. After confirming that she was not a hotel guest, she asked her to leave the property. As the woman continued to linger in the parking lot, Skaggs saw three cars drive up and the occupants speak with the woman. "They would conversate for a while. [The occupants would] kind of flirt with her. She would walk back and forth and kind of lean on the vehicles." Skaggs was aware of a serious problem with prostitution in the area. She called the police because she believed the woman was a prostitute.
She continued to watch the woman until the police arrived. The woman walked across the street to a restaurant. There, she spoke with the driver of an older red car. She walked back and forth by the car, leaned toward the car and reached into the window before getting into the passenger side of the car.
Deputy Garrett Hall arrived and was met by Skaggs. Hall knew that the 3000 block of Santa Rosa Avenue was a "relatively high crime" area and he had frequently responded to prostitution calls in the area. He testified that he "back[s] up officers and contact[s] people on the Avenue all of the time that are involved in prostitution" and had spoken to women in the area who were "pretty straightforward" that they were working as prostitutes. Skaggs explained to Hall what she had seen and pointed across the street to the restaurant parking lot, saying, "Shes right there. . . . Look, theyre leaving right now." Hall followed the vehicle, turned on his lights and initiated a traffic stop to investigate possible criminal activity of prostitution.
Initially, Hall spoke with the female passenger and asked her to step out of the car. Based on her appearance and the fact that she did not know the drivers name, Hall believed that she was a prostitute. He asked her to wait in the back of the patrol car. While speaking with the female passenger, Hall noticed that defendant was moving inside the car. Hall described defendants movements as "low movement . . . from side to side and his hand, he wasnt reaching up. His hands were down low. He was moving around to the point where the vehicle was physically moving, just kind of moving quick." Hall was concerned that defendant might be trying to conceal a weapon.
Hall approached the drivers side of the vehicle. He told defendant he was investigating a report he was involved in prostitution. Defendant did not know the passengers name. Defendant became aggressive and defensive when Hall asked to see his drivers license. He yelled, "What did you stop me for? What did you pull me over for?" Then, defendant opened the drivers side door quickly, reached under the seat and closed the door again. Based on defendants "movements inside of the vehicle, his aggressive demeanor and his irrational behavior" Hall was "concerned for [his] safety." He asked defendant to step out of the car. He "wanted to separate [defendant] from his vehicle so he didnt pull out a gun and shoot [him]."
As defendant got out of the car he "squared off" in a "fighting stance" with his fists clenched "in an aggressive manner." Hall asked him to turn around so he could conduct a pat search for weapons. Defendant turned, but when Hall attempted to secure his hands for the search, defendant grabbed Halls hands, turned towards him and began yelling. Hall attempted to calm defendant and then placed him in handcuffs to conduct the search.
Defendant was wearing "loose fitting baggy clothing." As Hall patted his right pants pocket, he felt a cylindrical object with a round bulbous end. He knew "right away" that it was a crank pipe because they are "pretty distinct." Hall pulled on the pipe and asked, "Whats that?" Defendant responded, "Its my crank pipe." Hall removed the pipe from defendants pants and arrested him for possession of a methamphetamine pipe. A further search of defendants body produced two baggies of methamphetamine. A handheld scale and $200 in cash was found during a search of the vehicle.
The court denied defendants motion to suppress. The court found that "Deputy Hall had a reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle" and that "[b]ased on [defendants] furtive movements within the vehicle . . . and [defendants] aggressive behavior with the deputy . . . there was sufficient justification to remove the defendant from the vehicle." The court also found that the pat down search was justified based on "defendants subsequent conduct outside of the vehicle, getting in a boxers stance, . . . the clenching and unclenching of his fists, . . . coupled with baggie clothes." Finally, the court found that Hall did not exceed the permissible scope of the pat down search. The court explained, "During the pat down search, the deputy felt a round object with a bulbous end that, based on his training and experience, felt like, to him, to be a pipe itself to ingest narcotics. . . . [¶] [D]efendant was validly arrested at this point based on the plain touch doctrine and consequently all items seized from the defendants person [and] from the vehicle he was operating at the time of his arrest were legally obtained incident to [a] lawful arrest."
On April 1, 2008, defendant pled no contest to possession for sale of methamphetamine and admitted the two prior strike convictions. The remaining charges were dismissed. On May 29, 2008, after granting defendants motion to strike one of his prior convictions, the court sentenced defendant to six years in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
1. Standard of Review
In evaluating a challenge to the trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial courts ruling and defer to its factual findings, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then exercise our independent judgment to decide what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
2. Motion to Suppress
A police officer may detain a person for questioning or other limited investigation without a showing of probable cause to make an arrest. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21.) A temporary detention for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity is less intrusive than an arrest and therefore may be based on a level of suspicion that is less demanding than that required to establish probable cause. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230.) To justify a detention as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the detaining officer must be able to "point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (Id. at p. 231.)
Here, Hall initiated the traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. As the trial court noted, "Skaggs is a citizen informant, and therefore, she is presumed to be reliable." Her testimony was both detailed and credible. In addition, both Skaggs and Hall testified that the 3000 block of Santa Rosa Avenue had a serious prostitution problem. (See People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 240 ["An areas reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment"].) This testimony was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal prostitution.
Once defendant was detained, Hall was justified in conducting a pat down search for weapons. "A limited, protective patsearch for weapons is permissible if the officer has `reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. [Citations] ` "[W]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others," the officer may conduct a patdown search "to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon." [Citation.] "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." " (In re H.H. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 653, 657-658.) Here, while Hall was speaking with the female passenger near his patrol car he observed defendant reaching low in the car, as if he were trying to hide something under the seat. Then, when Hall approached the car, defendant became hostile and aggressive and at one point opened the car door attempting to reach under the seat. Under the circumstances, the officer was justified in removing defendant from the vehicle and conducting a cursory search for weapons.
Hall did not exceed the permissible scope of the patdown search when he seized defendants pipe. A police officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search "so long as the officers search stays within the bounds marked by [Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1]." (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 373.) Analogizing to the plain-view doctrine, the Supreme Court has explained, "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing and feels an object whose contour and mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy beyond that already authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context." (Id. at pp. 375-376.) Hall testified that the distinct shape of the pipe made it immediately apparent to him that it was a narcotics pipe. Defendant questions whether Hall impermissibly "grabbed [the pipe] a little bit" to confirm what he thought he felt. Halls testimony, however, clarifies that he patted the pipe in the pocket twice with an open hand to confirm that it was contraband. He testified, "I patted it one time, went crank pipe, pat, crank pipe. Then I opened the pocket." Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendants motion to suppress.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Siggins, J.
Jenkins, J.