Opinion
F060403
10-25-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP ROY WOODLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Cara DeVito, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. F06909792)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gary D. Hoff, Judge.
Cara DeVito, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted appellant Phillip Roy Woodley (Woodley) of two counts of murder with special circumstances, two counts of first degree robbery, and one count of first degree burglary. Woodley contends the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a thorough investigation into juror misconduct, which failure warrants a reversal of all his convictions. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 1982, Woodley and his father, Roy Woodley, had a falling out. In February 2005, Woodley met Jeffrey Rancour. Woodley and Rancour regularly used methamphetamine together three or four times a week. Woodley paid Rancour for his drugs by painting Rancour's apartment and working on Rancour's car.
In July 2005, Woodley asked Rancour if he was "down with coming up" on something. Rancour understood "coming up" to mean acquiring a valuable item that could be sold at a higher price. On July 20, 2005, Woodley picked up Rancour and they drove to Roy Woodley's house. On the drive, they smoked methamphetamine and Woodley said something to the effect that it was a "good day" to "come up." When they arrived at the house, Woodley's stepmother, Angie Woodley, was surprised to see them. The two men stayed about 10 minutes and then left.
On July 21 or 22, Woodley again picked up Rancour and drove to Roy and Angie's house. They smoked methamphetamine on the drive. Angie again let them into the house; they began talking. Roy was in the shower; eventually he came into the front room and sat down in a recliner.
We will refer to Roy Woodley and Angie Woodley by their first names, not out of disrespect but to avoid any confusion to the reader.
After talking for a few minutes, Woodley suddenly ordered his father to get on the floor. Roy and Angie did not take him seriously, so Woodley, using a more forceful voice, again ordered his father to the floor. When Roy took too long, Woodley pushed him. Woodley ordered Angie to put her hands behind her back and he began binding her with tape. Rancour fumbled when he tried to tape Roy, so Woodley did it.
Woodley took Angie down the hall. Roy asked Rancour what was going on; Rancour told Roy he did not know. When Woodley returned to the front room, he began yelling at his father. Woodley accused Roy of never giving him anything; Roy responded, "that's not true, I loved you."
Woodley directed Rancour to tie Roy's hands with an extension cord. Woodley lunged at Roy and appeared to punch him in the ribs. Woodley then went to the kitchen sink where he washed his hands and a knife. Roy tried to stand up. Woodley returned to the front room with the knife and began stabbing Roy. Afterwards, Woodley again went to the kitchen and washed his hands.
Rancour walked to the back room and saw Angie lying on the floor. The door to the bathroom was open and Rancour saw drops of blood in the sink. Rancour went back to the front room and saw Woodley going through Angie's purse.
Woodley directed Rancour to drive Roy's truck and to follow him back to Selma, where Woodley parked his car and got into the truck. The two men drove to Ronald Berry's house and Berry helped remove the camper shell and unload the tools from the truck. After the truck was unloaded, the men went inside and "smoked some dope."
Rancour made various phone calls trying to "get rid of the truck." Woodley and Rancour then drove the truck to meet up with Mark Haltom, who was going to try to get rid of the truck. Woodley and Rancour then followed Haltom to Larry Sigera's house. Woodley had a $1,500 check from Roy's account. While the men ingested drugs, Haltom's girlfriend, Amanda Gonzalez, called a relative at a bank to see if she could cash the check.
Woodley gave Haltom and Gonzalez some credit cards. Sigera drove them all back to Berry's house in Selma. On the way back to Selma, they used one of the credit cards at a gas station. Woodley told Rancour he was expecting an inheritance from his father's estate and would split it with Rancour.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 22, 2005, Angie's daughter, Angela Gonzales, and her boyfriend, Dominic Padilla, discovered Roy's and Angie's bodies.
On July 23, Dr. Venu Gopal, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on both bodies. Gopal determined that Roy had been stabbed 31 times with the same blade. He opined that the number of stab wounds and the repetitive nature of the wounds indicated a crime of passion in which the victim and perpetrator knew each other. The cause of Roy's death was multiple stab wounds that penetrated the right carotid artery and left lung.
Just before performing these two autopsies, Gopal had performed an autopsy on Dallas Mossey, who had died in a motorcycle accident. Mossey's DNA was found in scrapings taken from under Roy's fingernails. The parties stipulated that if no other evidence supported a connection between Mossey and the crime scene, cross-contamination from the autopsies was the most likely cause for the presence of Mossey's DNA.
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Gopal indicated that Angie's cause of death was perforation of the right lung and heart due to multiple stab wounds. Her injuries included five stab wounds on the left side of her neck, four on the right side of her neck, three on the front of her chest, three on her right back, and two on the lower part of her chin.
Woodley was interviewed by police on August 1, 2005; he stated he had been at his father's house the Wednesday before the murders. He claimed his fingerprints were on Angie's purse because he had helped her look for a paper with lottery numbers on it.
Various telephone calls between Woodley and Valerie Jimenez were recorded by law enforcement on December 12, 2006. Jimenez told Woodley the sheriff's department wanted her to come in and answer some questions about why she had loaned her car to Woodley. Woodley told Jimenez to "Just tell them everything you know," to which Jimenez responded, "How stupid that is." Woodley also asked her why she was "panicking."
Woodley was charged with two counts of murder, with the special circumstances of robbery, burglary, and multiple murders. He also was charged with first degree robbery and first degree burglary. As to all counts, it was alleged Woodley personally used a knife. It also was alleged that Woodley had suffered a prior serious felony conviction.
Prior to Woodley's trial, Rancour pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter and three theft-related offenses.
On April 9, 2010, a jury found Woodley guilty of all charges and found the special circumstances and the personal use of a knife allegation true. Woodley admitted the prior serious felony conviction.
On June 14, 2010, the trial court imposed two consecutive life-without-parole terms for the murder convictions. The terms for the robbery and burglary convictions were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
DISCUSSION
Woodley's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by not making a thorough enough inquiry into juror misconduct. We disagree.
Factual summary
On March 29, 2010, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court informed the parties:
"Staff has informed the court that a juror contacted the court with a concern about a statement that Juror Number One apparently made to those other jurors concerning what coworkers may feel about the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this matter. I've spoken to counsel off the record in chambers concerning suggested responses to that. My inclination is to bring Juror Number One in and ask her whether she made the statement and, if so, whether that would affect her ability to be fair and impartial in this case and whether she could put aside anything she may have heardThe trial court then asked if either party wished to be heard on the suggested procedure; neither party raised any objection or concern about the procedure.
from anyone else and to further not engage in such conversations or repeat such conversations."
The trial court then brought in Juror No. 1 and stated the following:
"The court's received some information that at lunch the other day you had made a comment to other jurors that coworkers of yours had expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and I want to ascertain whether or not that is something that, one, did occur, that there was some comment about that?"Juror No. 1 then responded, "There was a comment made that somebody said in a joking way in my presence."
Juror No. 1 reported that her supervisor at work had indicated she knew on which jury Juror No. 1 was serving. Juror No. 1 responded to the comment by stating, "I don't want to talk about it." Another person then came up and made a comment to the effect, "I hope that jury finds that guy guilty." At that remark, Juror No. 1 got up and left her two coworkers.
The trial court asked if there was anything about the "conversation or contact" that would make Juror No. 1 feel she could not keep an open mind or be fair and impartial in the case. She responded, "No, not at all. It was said in jest. And they don't have any authority over me or any pressure." The trial court commented that Juror No. 1 took "appropriate" action to remove herself from the conversation. After this exchange, the trial court asked if either party had any questions of Juror No. 1; both parties responded negatively.
The trial court then went on to state:
"I want to thank you for ending the conversation as you did. I'm going to again remind you that you can't form or express any opinions on the case or allow anyone to talk to you about the case or allow them to give you their opinions about the issues in this case. I'm also going to direct you not to discuss with the other jurors what we discussed with you here at this timeJuror No. 1 then returned to the jury room. The trial court asked the parties if they wished to be heard on the admonition or the conversation with Juror No. 1; both parties responded, "No." The trial court asked if both parties were ready for the full jury to come in; both parties responded, "Yes."
and you will remain on the jury subject to all the other admonitions that the court's given you."
Analysis
Woodley now contends the trial court's inquiry was insufficient because (1) it did not interview the other jurors to see who had heard Juror No. 1's comment from her coworker, and (2) it failed to confirm that the impartiality of the other jurors was not affected by the remark.
A. Forfeiture
The California Supreme Court stated in People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 126 that when the defendant does not "seek a more extensive or broader inquiry of the juror at the time, or in any other way object to the trial court's course of action," a claim of inadequate examination of a juror is forfeited.
Here, Woodley and his counsel were present during the questioning of Juror No. 1 and had multiple opportunities to object to the procedure; no objection was raised. When Woodley fails to object to the trial court's method of inquiring into possible juror misconduct, he cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 126-127.) On this record, Woodley has forfeited his contention that the trial court conducted an inadequate inquiry into possible juror misconduct.
B. Merits of Woodley's argument
Considering the merits of Woodley's contention, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
"'The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct—like the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a juror—rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]'" (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478.) A hearing regarding a juror's alleged misconduct "'is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute "good cause" to doubt a juror's ability to perform his [or her] duties and would justify his [or her] removal from the case. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "The specific procedures to follow in investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a matter for the trial court's discretion. [Citation.]" (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 676.)
"When a trial court is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court 'must "make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary"' to resolve the matter. [Citation.]" (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1255 (Hayes).)Although courts should promptly investigate allegations of juror misconduct "to nip the problem in the bud" (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532), they have considerable discretion in determining how to conduct the investigation. "The court's discretion in deciding whether to discharge a juror encompasses the discretion to decide what specific procedures to employ[,] including whether to conduct a hearing or detailed inquiry." (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989.) "'The hearing should not be used as a "fishing expedition" to search for possible misconduct, but should be held only when the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred.'" (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604.)
Here, the trial court acted promptly to conduct an inquiry upon receipt of information indicating possible juror misconduct. The trial court spoke to both counsel in chambers regarding the potential misconduct issue; that conversation was not reported. After that chambers conversation, the trial court announced the procedures to be followed in investigating the potential misconduct. On the multiple opportunities to inquire further of Juror No. 1, other jurors, or object to the procedures, Woodley raised no objection.
A fair inference from the questioning of Juror No. 1 is that her remark to other jurors was no more than that a coworker had commented on the case in a "joking way." It is not apparent that Juror No. 1 stated any more than this in one passing remark during lunch. The comment did not convey any outside information about Woodley or the crimes of which Woodley was being accused. Juror No. 1 was admonished by the trial court not to listen to remarks from others about the case, not to repeat those remarks, and not to talk to other jurors about what was discussed during the questioning in the courtroom.
When the questioning of Juror No. 1 revealed that no prejudicial misconduct had occurred, the trial court declined to conduct any further inquiry, a decision with which Woodley concurred at the time. Juror No. 1's responses during the questioning revealed that she considered any remark she had heard from a coworker to be a joke; she did not engage with the coworker; and the remark did not affect her impartiality. The record, at most, indicates that Juror No. 1 had made one passing remark during lunch about a coworker's joking remark. There was no showing of potential prejudice.
Arguably the trial court would have been obligated to conduct a further inquiry if "the defense [had come] forward with evidence that demonstrate[d] 'a strong possibility' of prejudicial misconduct." (Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1255, quoting People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419.) No such evidence was brought forth and the trial court was under no obligation to conduct further inquiries.
Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the method and extent of inquiry into potential juror misconduct. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CORNELL, J. WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P.J. FRANSON, J.