Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CM022016
HULL, J.A jury convicted defendant Gregory Scott Woodcox of using a false compartment with intent to transport a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8, subd. (a)). In bifurcated proceedings, the court found four prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) to be true.
Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals, contending the trial court erroneously denied his request to represent himself with advisory counsel. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
About 2:00 p.m. on October 12, 2004, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Travis Lawler stopped defendant’s car, smelled non-burning marijuana inside the car and searched the car with defendant’s consent but found no marijuana. Defendant denied there was any marijuana in the car, claiming he had hit a skunk which accounted for the smell. When the deputy was not convinced, defendant claimed he had recently smoked a joint but none remained in the car. The deputy called for a canine unit and continued to search the car. Hidden deep inside a speaker well, the deputy found a bag containing a total of 16.3 grams of marijuana in several baggies.
Discussion
On May 11, 2005, Butte County Superior Court received defendant’s written motion to substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) “and/or” to represent himself “with assistance of counsel.” On May 23, 2005, the court received defendant’s supplemental written motion to substitute counsel.
On May 31, 2005, after a hearing, the court denied defendant’s Marsden motions. The court also denied defendant’s motion to represent himself with assistance of counsel motion, stating: “There’s no authority in the law that gives him the right to represent himself with the assistance of an attorney. That’s different than representing yourself without an attorney. [¶] So for those reasons and also for the reason that the public defender contract in this county does not cover providing assistance to self-represented litigants, that motion is denied as well. [¶] We are in recess.”
Defendant concedes that courts have consistently held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel after having waived the right to counsel in order to represent himself but that a trial court has the discretion to appoint counsel to assist a pro se defendant. (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183 [79 L.Ed.2d 122, 136]; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581]; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 723; People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 709-712.) Defendant argues here that the trial court erroneously concluded there was no legal authority for appointing advisory counsel and failed to recognize that it had discretionary authority to appoint the same.
Defendant’s contention is based on a misinterpretation of the record. The trial court stated, “There’s no authority in the law that gives him the right to represent himself with the assistance of an attorney. That’s different than representing yourself without an attorney.” We construe the trial court’s statements as noting that while defendant had the constitutional right to represent himself, defendant did not have a right to the assistance of advisory counsel while representing himself. And that is correct. The law allows the assistance of advisory counsel only on the court’s determination that such assistance is appropriate. It is not the defendant’s right. Exercising its discretion, the trial court denied defendant’s request. Defendant has not argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to represent himself with the assistance of counsel. And it appears advisory counsel was unnecessary in that this was not a complex case or one in which unusual circumstances required the appointment of an advisory counsel. Defendant’s contention is rejected.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.