People v. Woodbourne

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Devers

    82 A.D.3d 1261 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

    In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the People demonstrated that the defendant, with the requisite mental state, acted in concert with and intentionally aided another person in shooting the victim ( see People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830; People v Whatley, 69 NY2d 784, 785; People v Cancel, 70 AD3d 960; People v Woodbourne, 237 AD2d 547; People v Cheng, 232 AD2d 651; People v Armistead, 178 AD2d 607, 608; People v Johnson, 162 AD2d 620). "The question of whether the defendant was acting under duress is primarily one of credibility, which is to be determined by the jury" ( People v Torres, 158 AD2d 730, 731; see People v McKinnon, 78 AD3d 864, 864, lv denied 16 NY3d 744). Upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633). The defendant's contention that the County Court erred in admitting into evidence a video recording of his statement to the police is unpreserved for appellate review, as he did not object to the admission of the recording at trial ( see CPL 470.05).

  2. People v. Brun

    58 A.D.3d 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 9 times

    When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty of aiding the robbery as the getaway car driver ( see People v Mott, 147 AD2d 595, 595; People v Turner, 141 AD2d 878, 878-879). Based upon the totality of the conduct of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances ( see People v Mejia, 297 AD2d 755, 756; People v Woodbourne, 237 AD2d 547, 547), the proof was legally sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant shared the intent of Beamon and Poole to rob the restaurant in Freeport and, thus, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt as an accessory to robbery in the first degree (three counts) ( see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.15), robbery in the second degree (three counts) ( see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.10), and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree ( see Penal Law § 265.09 [a]). The evidence also was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of facilitation in the fourth degree ( see Penal Law § 115.00).

  3. People v. Woodbourne

    12 A.D.3d 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)

    November 1, 2004. Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated March 24, 1997 ( People v. Woodbourne, 237 AD2d 547), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Orange County, rendered February 24, 1995. Before: Prudenti, P.J., Ritter, Santucci and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

  4. People v. Reed

    265 A.D.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 22 times

    As we will see infra, inasmuch as the Legislature clearly did not intend to preclude accessory liability in a first degree murder prosecution, the statutory references to single actors clearly may be construed as applying to multiple actors as well. It is settled that a person may be convicted of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 Penal) via accessorial liability upon proof of a shared intent to kill (see, e.g., People v. Ficarrota, 91 N.Y.2d 244; People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830; People v. Whatley, 69 N.Y.2d 784; People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839; People v. Ortega, 258 A.D.2d 335; People v. Woodbourne, 237 A.D.2d 547; People v. Adams, 185 A.D.2d 326; People v. Gonzalez, 143 A.D.2d 681), and the second degree murder statute also makes express reference to "a person" and "he causes the death" and "the defendant". Clearly, statutory references to single actors do not preclude an interpretation applying the law to multiple actors.

  5. People v. Carrion

    265 A.D.2d 564 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    The inference of his guilt was consistent with, and flowed naturally from, the facts proved. The proof was sufficient for the jury to infer that it was equally the purpose of both the defendant and the unapprehended individual to forcibly take money from the cash register, and that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for the commission of the offense (see, People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830;People v. Woodbourne, 237 A.D.2d 547). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see,CPL 470.15[5]). However, the defendant correctly contends that the sentence imposed upon his conviction of reckless endangerment in the first degree, as a persistent violent felony offender, was in error.

  6. People v. Kise

    248 A.D.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we conclude that the verdict was legally sufficient. Given defendant's familiarity with the weapon and her inculpatory statements, we find that "there is [a] valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury" that defendant's conduct was reckless (People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495; see, People v. Hubert [King], 238 A.D.2d 745, lvs denied 90 N.Y.2d 859, 860; People v. Woodbourne, 237 A.D.2d 547). Also unavailing is defendant's contention that County Court abused its discretion in imposing restitution in the amount of $33,908.09.

  7. People v. Rosado

    248 A.D.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The proof was sufficient for the jury to infer that it was the purpose of both the defendant and his coperpetrator to rob and to cause the death of the victim, and that the defendant therefore possessed the requisite mental culpability for the commission of each offense for which he stands convicted ( see, People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 832; People v. Woodbourne, 237 A.D.2d 547; People v. White, 162 A.D.2d 646). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

  8. People v. Devers

    82 A.D.3d 1261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)   Cited 6 times

    In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( seePeople v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the People demonstrated that the defendant, with the requisite mental state, acted in concert with and intentionally aided another person in shooting the victim ( seePeople v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 527 N.Y.S.2d 731, 522 N.E.2d 1029; People v. Whatley, 69 N.Y.2d 784, 785, 513 N.Y.S.2d 110, 505 N.E.2d 620; People v. Cancel, 70 A.D.3d 960, 897 N.Y.S.2d 444; People v. Woodbourne, 237 A.D.2d 547, 656 N.Y.S.2d 891; People v. Cheng, 232 A.D.2d 651, 648 N.Y.S.2d 1011; People v. Armistead, 178 A.D.2d 607, 608, 577 N.Y.S.2d 667; People v. Johnson, 162 A.D.2d 620, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1004). " The question of whether the defendant was acting under duress is primarily one of credibility, which is to be determined by the jury" ( People v. Torres, 158 A.D.2d 730, 731, 551 N.Y.S.2d 860; seePeople v. McKinnon, 78 A.D.3d 864, 864, 911 N.Y.S.2d 404, lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 744, 917 N.Y.S.2d 626, 942 N.E.2d 1051). Upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( seePeople v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).