Supreme Court denied the motion, and we now affirm. After we granted defendant leave to appeal herein, the Court of Appeals expressly stated that “a resentencing to correct the flawed imposition of PRS does not vacate the original sentence and replace it with an entirely new sentence, but instead merely corrects a clerical error and leaves the original sentence, along with the date of that sentence, undisturbed” (People v. Boyer, 22 N.Y.3d 15, 24, 977 N.Y.S.2d 731, 999 N.E.2d 1176; see People v. Hall, 124 A.D.3d 795, 796, 998 N.Y.S.2d 658; People v. Miller, 118 A.D.3d 1463, 1464, 987 N.Y.S.2d 786, lv. denied24 N.Y.3d 1003, 997 N.Y.S.2d 122, 21 N.E.3d 574). Because defendant was lawfully sentenced on the predicate offense in question before he was convicted of the offense for which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender, “it qualifies as a prior [violent] felony conviction” (People v. Wood, 115 A.D.3d 613, 613, 986 N.Y.S.2d 328, lv. denied22 N.Y.3d 1204, 986 N.Y.S.2d 424, 9 N.E.3d 919). We thus conclude that the court properly denied defendant's motion.

We now affirm. In People v. Boyer (22 N.Y.3d 15, 977 N.Y.S.2d 731, 999 N.E.2d 1176), the Court of Appeals made clear that “a resentencing to correct the flawed imposition of PRS does not vacate the original sentence and replace it with an entirely new sentence, but instead merely corrects a clerical error and leaves the original sentence, along with the date of that sentence, undisturbed” ( id. at 24, 977 N.Y.S.2d 731, 999 N.E.2d 1176;see People v. Gathor, 115 A.D.3d 612, 613, 986 N.Y.S.2d 327). “Because the date defendant received a lawful sentence on a valid conviction [of burglary in the second degree] precedes the date of conviction for the instant offense, it qualifies as a prior [violent] felony conviction” ( People v. Wood, 115 A.D.3d 613, 613, 986 N.Y.S.2d 328,lv. denied22 N.Y.3d 1204, 986 N.Y.S.2d 424). We thus conclude that there is no basis upon which to set aside the sentence imposed on defendant as a second violent felony offender.