In the past this court has disbarred attorneys when they have used their clients' funds for their own benefit. E.g., People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1988); People v. Foster, 733 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1987); People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo.

Under Standard 4.11 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986), "[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." As we stated in People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo. 1988), "[o]ur case law is consistent with ABA Standard 4.11 in that we generally impose the sanction of disbarment in cases involving the theft of client property." This is especially true when, as here, the attorney converts his client's funds for the attorney's own benefit.

By stealing her client's property, an attorney "destroys the element of trust which is essential to the attorney-client relationship" and "damages the public's perception of attorneys and its confidence in our legal system." People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 793 (Colo. 1988). Secondly, the respondent contends that disbarment is not appropriate because she did not knowingly fail to perform services for her client.

Matter of Kleinsmith , 2017 CO 101, ¶ 14, 409 P.3d 305.See People v. Wolfe , 748 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo. 1988) (misappropriation of client funds for personal use was very serious misconduct that outweighed all mitigating factors, including evidence that the misconduct was an aberrant act that would not be repeated, and warranted disbarment rather than suspension). Here, no mitigating factors apply—much less extraordinary mitigation—that would justify the application of a lesser sanction.

Because most of the conduct forming the basis of the present disciplinary proceeding occurred before the imposition of the six-month suspension on the respondent in Williams, 824 P.2d at 815, we elect to consider that suspension as more appropriately establishing part of a pattern of misconduct under ABA Standards 9.22(c) rather than as a prior disciplinary offense under 9.22(a). But cf. People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 791 (Colo. 1988) (treating letter of admonition based on conduct occurring after the conduct at issue but resulting in an earlier disposition as "part of [respondent's] disciplinary record within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 241.15(a)," which requires "the respondent's prior disciplinary record" to be taken into consideration by a hearing board in recommending discipline). This approach to consideration of the respondent's earlier disciplinary proceeding does not affect our conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.

Cf. People v. Broadhurst, No. 90SA309 (Colo. Nov. 13, 1990) (payment made by lawyer pursuant to confession of judgment not entirely voluntary and not mitigating factor); People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo. 1988) (lawyer's forced repayment of client's fund not mitigating factor). Accordingly, we suspend the Respondent Jack L. Richtsmeier from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. Because the respondent is on disability inactive status, the order of suspension is effective immediately.

While we acknowledge that under some circumstances making restitution to an aggrieved client in order to rectify the consequences of the lawyer's misconduct may be an appropriate mitigating factor to consider on the issue of discipline, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.32(d), the respondent's payment of $25,000 to the estate of Geraldine Webber was made pursuant to his confession of judgment and was not entirely voluntary. See People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo. 1988) (lawyer's forced repayment of client's funds not a mitigating factor). Under the circumstances present here, therefore, the respondent's repayment cannot serve to offset his flagrant violation of professional obligations to his client. A sanction less than disbarment under the circumstances of this case would unduly depreciate the serious nature of the respondent's misconduct in the eyes of both the legal profession and the public.

We have emphasized that a lawyer's theft of his client's funds destroys the attorney-client relationship and "severely damages the public's perception of attorneys and its confidence in our legal system." People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789, 793 (Colo. 1988). The harm is especially great in cases like these, where the clients reposed their friendship and trust in the attorney for many years only to find their confidence betrayed and large sums of money lost. McMahill's conduct was predatory and wholly reprehensible.

We do not consider Geller's repayments to his clients to be mitigating factors because both were compelled after the client had made demand through new counsel and/or filed a grievance. People v. Wolfe, 748 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1988); Standard 9.4(a). III.