See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir 1986). For state cases, see, e.g., Ex Parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330, 1334 (Ala 1983); State v. Georgeoff, ___ Ariz. ___, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1990) ("breach of a plea agreement must not be raised for the first time on appeal"); People v. Shepeard, 169 Cal.App.3d 580, 586, 215 Cal.Rptr. 401 (1985) ("plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound"), disapproved on other grounds People v. Martin, 42 Cal.3d 437, 229 Cal.Rptr. 131, 722 P.2d 905, 915 n 13 (1986); People v. Macrander, supra, 756 P.2d at 359-61; Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 819 (Del), cert den 434 U.S. 893 (1977); Lopez v. State, 536 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla 1988); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 662 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1983); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 693 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Ct App 1985); People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 510 N.E.2d 145, 148, appeal denied 517 N.E.2d 1094 (1987); Spivey v. State, 1990 Ind. App. Lexis 499, ___ N.E.2d ___ (April 30, 1990); Parker v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind.App. 1989); Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1981); State v. Smith, 244 Kan. 283, 767 P.2d 1302, 1303-04 (1989); State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114, 1120 (1988) (even an ambiguous plea agreement must be strictly construed in favor of defendant); Com. v. Reyes, 764 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky 1989); State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199, 1204 (La 1989); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976); State v. Williams, 418 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn 1988); Wright v. McAdory, 536 So.2d 897, 901 (Miss 1988); State v. Jones, 1990 Mo App Lexis 764, ___ S.W.2d ___ (May 15, 1990) (if there is a claim of ambiguity "costs of an unclear agreement must fall upon the government" (quoting United States v. Giorgi, supra, 840 F.2d at 1026)); State v. Dinndorf, 202 Mont. 308, 658 P.2d 372, 373 (1983); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d

The difference may be justified by the relative character and history of the codefendants, the degree of culpability ( Patterson, 100 Ill. App.3d at 212, 426 N.E.2d at 982), rehabilitative potential, or a more serious criminal record. ( People v. Wolfe (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 510 N.E.2d 145.) Nor is disparity between the sentences of a defendant who pleaded guilty and one who chose to go to trial automatically suspect ( People v. Coustin (1988), 174 Ill. App.3d 824, 529 N.E.2d 89), for a trial court may properly grant leniency to the defendant who pleads guilty and thereby insures prompt and certain application of correctional measures, acknowledges his guilt, and demonstrates a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct.