The trial court has broad discretion to sentence the defendant within statutory bounds, and we will not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1987).¶ 43 Here, the trial court imposed a sentence of 14 years on Gouskos and a sentence of 4 years on Dobroveanu, while permitting Dobroveanu to serve his sentence in the federal penitentiary, where he is serving time for other offenses he committed in connection with 4750 Winthrop.

It is well settled that it is not the function of a reviewing court to serve as a sentencing court and, absent an abuse of discretion, the sentence of the trial court will not be disturbed on review. ( People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 154; People v. Wolfe (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1028.) The trial court sits in a superior position to consider and determine the punishment to be imposed, and the trial court's decision is entitled to great deference.

See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir 1986). For state cases, see, e.g., Ex Parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330, 1334 (Ala 1983); State v. Georgeoff, ___ Ariz. ___, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1990) ("breach of a plea agreement must not be raised for the first time on appeal"); People v. Shepeard, 169 Cal.App.3d 580, 586, 215 Cal.Rptr. 401 (1985) ("plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound"), disapproved on other grounds People v. Martin, 42 Cal.3d 437, 229 Cal.Rptr. 131, 722 P.2d 905, 915 n 13 (1986); People v. Macrander, supra, 756 P.2d at 359-61; Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 819 (Del), cert den 434 U.S. 893 (1977); Lopez v. State, 536 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla 1988); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 662 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1983); State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 693 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Ct App 1985); People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 510 N.E.2d 145, 148, appeal denied 517 N.E.2d 1094 (1987); Spivey v. State, 1990 Ind. App. Lexis 499, ___ N.E.2d ___ (April 30, 1990); Parker v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind.App. 1989); Boge v. State, 309 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1981); State v. Smith, 244 Kan. 283, 767 P.2d 1302, 1303-04 (1989); State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114, 1120 (1988) (even an ambiguous plea agreement must be strictly construed in favor of defendant); Com. v. Reyes, 764 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky 1989); State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199, 1204 (La 1989); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976); State v. Williams, 418 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn 1988); Wright v. McAdory, 536 So.2d 897, 901 (Miss 1988); State v. Jones, 1990 Mo App Lexis 764, ___ S.W.2d ___ (May 15, 1990) (if there is a claim of ambiguity "costs of an unclear agreement must fall upon the government" (quoting United States v. Giorgi, supra, 840 F.2d at 1026)); State v. Dinndorf, 202 Mont. 308, 658 P.2d 372, 373 (1983); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d

A difference may be justified by the relative character and history of the codefendants, the degree of culpability, rehabilitative potential, or a more serious criminal record. People v. Eubanks, 283 Ill.App.3d 12, 25, 218 Ill.Dec. 535, 669 N.E.2d 678 (1996) ; People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1028, 109 Ill.Dec. 524, 510 N.E.2d 145 (1987). ¶ 69

A difference may be justified by the relative character and history of the codefendants, the degree of culpability, rehabilitative potential, or a more serious criminal record. People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1987). It is not the disparity that controls, but the reason for the disparity.

A difference may be justified by the relative character and history of the codefendants, the degree of culpability, rehabilitative potential, or a more serious criminal record. People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1987). It is not the disparity that controls, but the reason for the disparity.

The State points out that a plea bargain is a contract that is not to be measured by the subjective beliefs of the parties but instead must be interpreted according to the reasonable expectations of the parties. People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027, 510 N.E.2d 145, 148 (1987). The rights of a defendant are limited to what the parties agreed to, and the courts interpret the terms of the agreement according to the reasonable expectations of the parties.

Furthermore, disparate sentences can be warranted by differences in the nature and extent of participation in the crime or by differences in the criminal records. ( People v. Wolfe (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1028, 510 N.E.2d 145, 149.) Defendant has not provided this court with the criminal records of his codefendants.

A disparity in sentences will not be disturbed if warranted by differences in the codefendants' degree of participation, prior criminal background, and rehabilitative potential. See People v. Wolfe (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 1028, 510 N.E.2d 145; People v. Dixon (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 1073, 1087-88, 480 N.E.2d 128; Earullo, 113 Ill. App.3d at 792. • 3 In the case at bar, the evidence established that defendant was the target of the investigation and that his statements indicated he held an ownership or a possessory interest in the safe.

We note that "[t]he resolution of each case depends upon the essence of the particular agreement and the government's conduct relating to its obligations in that case." People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App.3d 1023, 109 Ill.Dec. 524, 527, 510 N.E.2d 145, 148 (1987). Although each instance described above is said by appellant to constitute bad faith on the part of the police department, the circuit court rules otherwise.