Where the alleged improper remarks are not a material factor in the defendant's conviction or where they do not result in substantial prejudice to the defendant, we will not reverse the defendant's conviction. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 391 (1985); People v. Sims, 285 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605 (1996); People v. Witted, 79 Ill. App. 3d 156, 165 (1979). Unless we can say that the jury would have reached a contrary verdict absent the improper remarks, we will not award the defendant a new trial.
Upon examining this point of error, we find that the prosecution's unanswered query did not constitute a material factor in defendant's conviction and that, had the question not been asked, the jury would not have reached a different conclusion. See People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 165, 398 N.E.2d 68. Defendant's next citation of alleged prosecutorial error concerns two references by the State to a pretrial ruling by the court.
• 7, 8 The questions to be asked of prospective jurors during voir dire are largely a matter within the trial court's discretion. (See People v. Phillips (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 362, 367, 425 N.E.2d 1040; People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 164, 398 N.E.2d 68.) Where proposed questions touch upon "matters of law or instructions," however, they are prohibited by rule. (87 Ill.2d R. 234.)
It is well established that limitation of voir dire questioning may constitute reversible error where its effect is to deny a party a fair opportunity to probe an important area of potential bias or prejudice among prospective jurors. ( Gasiorowski v. Homer (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 989, 991, 365 N.E.2d 43, 45.) The purpose of voir dire examination is to permit counsel to ascertain whether the minds of prospective jurors are free from bias and prejudice. ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 164, 398 N.E.2d 68, 76.) Voir dire examination is to be initiated by the trial judge and may be supplemented by the parties at the court's discretion. ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 164.) How much latitude the trial judge gives to the parties in their supplemental examination is also at his discretion.
The issue is whether "the jury could * * * have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made." ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 168.) If a reviewing court "cannot say that the prosecutor's [improper] comments did not contribute to the defendant's conviction," the court should order a new trial.
The trial court did not abuse discretion in not submitting the questions. We would observe that a like issue was presented in People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156. There the defendant submitted a question similar to those here for the voir dire examination.
A defendant is entitled to a trial free from improper prosecutorial argument, but a conviction will only be reversed if such remarks were material to the conviction and resulted in substantial prejudice. ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 165.) Each case must be decided on its own facts. ( People v.Bigsby (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 277, 281.
Next, defendant contends that he did not receive a fair trial due to certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument, specifically that to S.W. touching and bumping were not the same thing; that S.W.'s statements to her aunts and grandmother may have been unconsciously influenced by their concern for the defendant; and the suggestion on rebuttal that David Asma's testimony concerning the statements of S.W. and Polly W. was influenced by the fact he worked for the public defender's office. A defendant is entitled to a trial free from improper prosecutorial argument, but a conviction will only be reversed if such remarks were material to the conviction and resulted in substantial prejudice ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 165; People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 408, 415), and each case must be decided on its own facts. ( People v. Bigsby (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 277, 281.) Generally, a prosecutor is allowed great latitude in making a closing argument.
( People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill.2d 111, 133-34, 538 N.E.2d 428.) Plain error may be considered only in cases where the evidence is closely balanced ( People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 239, 522 N.E.2d 1146); the evidence of defendant's guilt in the present case is overwhelming. Considering the one comment which was not waived, defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial, for the jury would have reached the same result absent any of the remarks. ( People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 165, 398 N.E.2d 68.) All statements relating to defendant's arrest for possession of a gun were proper to demonstrate defendant's identity. ( People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 62, 473 N.E.2d 840.) Each comment raised was either based on a reasonable inference drawn from the facts in evidence ( People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 100, 552 N.E.2d 743), invited by defense counsel's argument ( People v. Dixon (1982), 91 Ill.2d 346, 350-51, 438 N.E.2d 180), or served to discredit defense counsel's argument ( People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 526, 538 N.E.2d 500).
In determining whether the prosecutor's comments or arguments constituted prejudicial error, the test employed is whether the jury would have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made. ( Pittman, 126 Ill. App.3d at 594, 467 N.E.2d at 925; People v. Witted (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 156, 165, 398 N.E.2d 68, 76.) In making this determination, reference must be made to the content of the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.