Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record supports the hearing court's determination that the defendant's statement to the police was voluntarily made (see, People v. Ceruti, 209 A.D.2d 711; People v. Perkins, 177 A.D.2d 720). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in rendering a Sandoval ruling permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant as to one prior felony conviction and two misdemeanor convictions without inquiry into the underlying facts or even the names of the crimes (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371; People v. Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703). Viewing the evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The officer had a number of ongoing investigations in that area as well as pending cases in the Jamaica courthouse. He feared for his safety if the courtroom was not closed. Under these circumstances, we find that the factual showing was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom (see, People v. Martinez, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 604 N.Y.S.2d 932, 624 N.E.2d 1027; People v. Campbell, 204 A.D.2d 474, 614 N.Y.S.2d 170; People v. Leybovich, 201 A.D.2d 670, 607 N.Y.S.2d 982). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in rendering a Sandoval ruling permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant as to one prior misdemeanor conviction and the sentence imposed thereon, without inquiry into the underlying facts (see, People v. Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703, 599 N.Y.S.2d 293; People v. Cook, 187 A.D.2d 524, 590 N.Y.S.2d 750). The defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05[2] or without merit (see, People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 430 N.E.2d 885; People v. Thomas, 186 A.D.2d 602, 588 N.Y.S.2d 395).
The County Court properly exercised its discretion in allowing inquiry into the fact that the defendant had prior felony and misdemeanor convictions and into the sentences imposed for those convictions while preventing inquiry into the underlying facts or nature of those crimes (see, People v. Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 238-239; People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371; People v. Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703; People v. Tirado, 192 A.D.2d 755).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court's compromise Sandoval ruling did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see, e.g., People v. Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703; People v. Cruz, 176 A.D.2d 751). The defendant's challenge to the trial court's instructions regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt has not been preserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.
As a result, the trial court properly refused to preclude the testimony of the undercover officer (see, People v Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937, 940; People v Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 520-521; People v Vasquez, 141 A.D.2d 880, 881-882; People v Wells, 144 A.D.2d 400). The court properly exercised its discretion in its Sandoval ruling, which only permitted inquiry into the defendant's prior felony and the sentence of three years imprisonment imposed thereon, and which precluded any inquiry into the type of crime or underlying facts (see, People v Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 238-239; People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703; People v Tirado, 192 A.D.2d 755). Nor do we find any merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly or unfairly marshaled the evidence in its charge to the jury.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it must be determined whether the defendant was afforded meaningful representation at the time and under the circumstances of the representation (see, People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703). A defense counsel's "mere losing tactics" are not to be equated with ineffective assistance of counsel (People v Baldi, supra, at 146). Furthermore, as long as a defendant is afforded meaningful representation, the courts may not, aided by the wisdom of hindsight, second-guess matters of defense counsel's trial strategy (see, People v Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796).
The language contained in the indictment merely identifies defendant's acts as public, rather than private wrongs and such language need not be stricken on the ground that it is prejudicial. This motion is denied (see People v Gill, 164 A.D.2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]; People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703 [2d Dept 1993]; People v Garcia, 170 Mise. 2d 543 [Westchester Co. Ct. 1996]).
As the phrase "against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of New York" merely identifies the defendant's alleged acts as a public rather than a private wrong, Defendant's motion to strike such language from Indictment Number 21-0448 is denied (see People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703, 704 [2d Dept 1993], Iv. denied 82 N.Y.2d 761 [1993]; People v Gill, 164 A.D.2d 867, 867 [2d Dept 1990], Iv. denied 76N.Y.2d 893 [1990]). 7. MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
The language concluding the indictment merely identifies the defendant's acts as public, rather than private wrongs and such language should not be stricken as prejudicial. This motion is denied (see, People v Gill, 164 A.D.2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]; People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703 [2d Dept 1993]; People v Garcia, 170 Misc.2d 543 [Westchester Co. Ct. 1996]).
The language concluding the indictment merely identifies the defendant's acts as public, rather than private wrongs and such language should not be stricken as prejudicial. This motion is denied (see, People v Gill, 164 A.D.2d 867 [2d Dept 1990]; People v Winters, 194 A.D.2d 703 [2d Dept 1993]; People v Garcia, 170 Misc.2d 543 [Westchester Co. Ct. 1996]).