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People v. Wilson

Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District.
Nov 20, 2003
No. F040344 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)

Opinion

F040344.

11-20-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THEODORE ODELL WILSON, JR., Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew H. Wilson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey D. Firestone and Brian Alvarez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Appellant Theodore ODell Wilson, Jr. was convicted by a jury of inflicting corporal injury on his cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), felony false imprisonment (§§ 236/237), and misdemeanor cruelty to a child by inflicting injury (§ 273a, subd. (b)). The jury found appellant was armed with and personally used a handgun while committing the first offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1); § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)), and was armed with a handgun while committing the second (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant was sentenced to seven years in prison.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

FACTS

Appellant met Denise in March 1999 and they began dating. Within weeks he moved into her home, and the next year their son was born. On July 30, 2001, when Denise was in the bathroom getting ready for work, she and appellant got into an argument about how Denise was dressed. He said she looked like "a tramp and a ho." He continued to nag her. She told him she was going to call the police unless he left her alone. She was uncomfortable and intimidated by appellants presence, but eventually she walked past him, picked up the phone, and started dialing 911. Before she could finish, however, appellant punched her in the face. She fell to the floor, and appellant kicked and punched her while she was on the floor.

Denises six-year-old son ran into the room and screamed, "Ted, stop. Leave mom alone. Leave mommy alone." The boy pulled on appellants leg, and appellant grabbed him and threw him across the room. The boy hit his back on the bed and suffered a palm-sized bruise on his arm.

Appellant yelled to Denise that he did not respect her. He took a loaded .38 caliber handgun from the headboard of the bed and held the gun to Denises temple. He screamed, "You know what, bitch, today is your judgement day. Youre going to die." Denise was lying on the floor, scared, crying, and bleeding. She believed appellant was going to kill her and she asked him why he was doing this and pleaded with him. When the baby started crying, appellant backed away and lowered the gun; Denise jumped up and grabbed the baby. Appellant began to calm down; he sat on the bed and set the gun on an open shelf.

Denises face was swollen and bruised, her inner lip was cut, and she had a "bloody eye." Her ribs were sore where appellant had kicked her. She called in sick to work. She did not try to leave the house because she was afraid of appellant and was afraid of what he might do to the children. She was in fear for her life. Although appellant had regained composure, she did not want to get him emotional again because she was afraid he might kill them all. She thought he was like a time bomb and she did not want to trigger an explosion. Appellant followed her throughout the house, staying within two feet of her wherever she went. She held the baby as much as possible because she felt it afforded her some protection. Appellant allowed her to go outside to smoke a cigarette, but he accompanied her. She felt like a prisoner and started devising a strategy for getting out of the house.

Denise told appellant the baby had a fever and she needed to take him to the doctor. Appellant calmly accompanied her and the children as she drove to the doctors office. Denise parked the car and appellant got out and closed the door. Denise immediately locked the car doors, drove away, and called the police from her cell phone.

When Denise got home, she waited in the car for the police to arrive, as she was instructed. Appellant returned home before the police arrived, but he stayed 50 to 60 feet away and stared coldly at Denise. When the police arrived, they searched the property and found appellant in the garage. They also found the loaded handgun in the headboard. Denise received medical attention for her injuries and missed about 10 days of work.

The prosecution also presented evidence that appellant had committed several prior acts of domestic violence against two other women.

DISCUSSION

I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Appellant contends the trial court denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. First, he argues he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because any such waiver did not apply to trial, and, even if it did, the trial courts admonition was inadequate because it did not inform him of the nature of the charges, the elements of the offenses, the possible defenses, or the possible punishments. Second, he argues the trial court failed to readvise him of his right to counsel at the arraignment, as required by statute. He explains that the only direct discussion regarding his waiver occurred on August 15, 2001, before the preliminary hearing, and that the trial court was required to readvise him of his right to counsel after that hearing and before trial. The People counter that the record does in fact reflect both a valid waiver and a readvisement, and that any errors were nevertheless harmless.

A. Facts

At the Faretta hearing held on August 15, 2001, the day before the preliminary hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

Faretta v. California (1976) 422 U.S. 806.

"THE COURT: At this time let me call the case of Mr. Theodore Wilson. Mr. Wilson, you indicated yesterday or the day before, I cant remember which it was, that you were going to make a motion to represent yourself.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.

"THE COURT: And could you advise the Court as to your educational background that leads you to believe you are able to competently defend yourself in court?

"THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I have a B.A. degree from the University of South Carolina, I have a Masters Degree from California State University here in Fresno.

"THE COURT: What are your degrees in?

"THE DEFENDANT: In counseling in Fresno. Ive completed the MFCC program, Marriage, Family, Child Counseling, licensed program. Along with the personnel services credential, State of California. I do adequate research. ... I know how to use a law library.

"THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself before?

"THE DEFENDANT: I sued a judge for a hundred million dollars.

"THE COURT: Were you successful?

"THE DEFENDANT: They put me in jail until the lawsuit was dismissed.

"THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, you understand that one of the ramifications of representing yourself is if you are in fact convicted you cannot

"THE DEFENDANT: Sir, its all on me.

"THE COURT: Pardon me?

"THE DEFENDANT: Its all on me. I understand that.

"THE COURT: Thats correct. And you also understand that the person youre going up against is a person who has gone to law school, has studied law.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And is probably much more conversant with the codes than are you and the laws than you are.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: At this point, Mr. Wilson, it is your decision that you do wish to represent yourself; is that correct?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Are the People satisfied or are there other questions the People wish to ask with regards to competency to represent himself?

"[PROSECUTOR]: Well submit it, judge.

"THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, I am going to find that you are competent to represent yourself at this time under the California case law. I will advise you, however, before I relieve counsel as attorney of record you understand that if you represent yourself, you dont — you are not eligible to get any advice or counsel from the Public Defenders Office. You will need to qualify for the services of the Public Defender. They will not be able to help you anymore.

"THE DEFENDANT: I do understand that, sir. I have another question for you. Am I assigned investigators and paralegals to do the paperwork for me?

"THE COURT: You may make a request to have a — probably not a paralegal but an investigator assigned if you show reason why you need an investigator to do your footwork because obviously youre not going to be able to do that if youre in jail.

"THE DEFENDANT: Thats correct.

"THE COURT: So you would have to make that request through the normal channels, Mr. Wilson.... And at this point, Mr. Wilson, do you believe that you are now going to be representing yourself, that you will be prepared to proceed tomorrow after noon at 1:30 with the preliminary hearing?

"THE DEFENDANT: With the preliminary hearing theres nothing that I do anyway. Its just them saying what their case is, right, to be bound over for Superior Court.

"THE COURT: You would have the opportunity to cross-examine, you would have the opportunity to present evidence if you chose to do that

"THE DEFENDANT: Right.

"THE COURT: — at the preliminary hearing. But if you believe that youre prepared to proceed with the preliminary hearing tomorrow, we can go tomorrow afternoon.

"THE DEFENDANT: Okay, or we can do it this afternoon.

"THE COURT: Well, we arent going to be able to do it this afternoon ...."

On November 6, 2001, the People dismissed and refiled the complaint. At the hearing that day, appellant waived the preliminary hearing and formal arraignment on the information. The court again asked appellant whether he wished to proceed without counsel.

"THE COURT: ... [¶ ] By arraigning you, by your agreement to be arraigned today on the refiled complaint, I have not asked you whether you wish to have counsel appointed for

"[THE DEFENDANT]: Pro per, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Youre electing to proceed pro per?

"[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Do you need any additional advisement about your rights to either retain counsel or have counsel appointed for you in this matter?

"[THE DEFENDANT]: No, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: You[r] request to proceed pro per, both on the refiled complaint and the information that will be deemed filed today contains the same charge.

"[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: ...[Y]oure waiving formal arraignment and further advisement of statutory and constitutional rights as to the new information thats being filed as of todays date?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor."

On November 30, 2001, at a hearing on appellants request for ancillary equipment in the preparation of his defense, the court addressed appellants argument that he did not have the same access to materials as the public defenders office.

"THE COURT: ... I think Ive got to address that because obviously you understand that you could have access to the same resource as the Public Defender has by having a Public Defender appointed to represent you.

"THE DEFENDANT: Well, sir, thats true and its not true. Public Defenders are public pretenders, Your Honor. Ive used a Public Defender in the past, when you tell them to do a certain thing rather than do it they question you. They dont realize that theyre working for you and that you have a good insight on your own case.

"I have a Masters Degree. Im a real estate broker. Youre probably familiar with me from before so Im no dummy and I know what happened. I was there that gives me a major advantage. When I tell a Public Defender this is what I want you to do and he begins to question that I dont need him.

"And, you know, if I decide to represent myself which the Constitutional says

"THE COURT: Absolutely.

"THE DEFENDANT: — I should be able to do that especially when I know I can put in as many hours as possible as I can get access to the law library to research my case rather than spending five or ten minutes with my case and then an hour before jury trial. You know, Ive been through that already.

"I dont want to go through that again, you know, using a Public Defender Your Honor. I have — when I can speak for myself and do a much better job.

"THE COURT: And I have to say, sir, you do a very good job speaking for yourself. And I mean that in the absolute sincerest possible manner. You are [a] well spoken and well written individual, but I have to bring that up because when you bring that issue up about the Public Defenders Officer because you had that in writing I have to address it. Do you understand that?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: All right. And so, the other thing is that when you talk about the Public Defenders and I understand, sir, you say you have a Masters, you understand the Public Defender any of those have basically a doctorate. So theyre actually more educated than what youre talking about in a particular are, no less.

"THE DEFENDANT: I understand, you know, but they are not willing to use it as effectively as Im willing to use my Masters."

On January 4, 2002, the day trial began, the court heard pretrial motions and also informed counsel of his expectations regarding scheduling, motions, and objections. The court stated:

"If there are objections — and, Mr. Wilson, same instructions I give in all cases to all attorneys before we start trial. Its a list I go through. But one additional instruction obviously is youre representing yourself. From what I can see, youre well-prepared, but you need to follow the same rules as [the prosecutor] will because I hold all attorneys to the same rules...."

B. Waiver and Admonition

Every criminal defendant possesses both the right to be represented by counsel at all the critical stages of a criminal prosecution (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 223-227) and the right to represent himself or herself (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 819). The right to counsel, which is self-executing, persists until the defendant affirmatively waives it. (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 513; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464-465.)

"The loss of the right to counsel by means of words or conduct is often referred to as `waiver of the right. [Citation.] This terminology is not precise; waiver is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur. (See Freytag v. Commissioner (1991) 501 U.S. 868, 894, fn. 2, conc. opn. of Scalia, J. [noting that waiver and forfeiture have so often been used interchangeably that it may be too late for precision].)" (King v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 929, 938.)

"The requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel are (1) a determination that the accused is competent to waive the right, i.e., he or she has the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or her; and (2) a finding that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, i.e., the accused understands the significance and consequences of the decision and makes it without coercion. (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400-401 & fn. 12; People v. Lawley [(2002)] 27 Cal.4th [102,] 139.) The trial court may not determine a defendants competency to waive counsel by evaluating his ability to present a defense. (Godinez v. Moran, supra, at pp. 399-400; U.S. v. Arlt (9th Cir. 1994) 41 F.3d 516, 518.)

"On appeal, we examine de novo the whole record — not merely the transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itself — to determine the validity of the defendants waiver of the right to counsel. (People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 24.) [¶] ... [¶]

"In order to make a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a defendant `should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." [Citation.] (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self- representation; the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1048, revd. on another point in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318.)

"In People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 (Lopez), the court enumerated a set of suggested advisements and inquiries designed to ensure a clear record of a defendants knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. First, the court recommended the defendant be cautioned (a) that self-representation is `almost always unwise, and the defendant may conduct a defense `"ultimately to his own detriment" [citation]; ( b) that the defendant will receive no special indulgence by the court and is required to follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure and evidence in making motions and objections, presenting evidence and argument, and conducting voir dire; (c) that the prosecution will be represented by a trained professional who will give the defendant no quarter on account of his lack of skill and experience; and (d) that the defendant will receive no more library privileges than those available to any other self-represented defendant, or any additional time to prepare. Second, the Lopez court recommended that trial judges inquire into the defendants education and familiarity with legal procedures, suggesting a psychiatric examination in questionable cases. The Lopez court further suggested probing the defendants understanding of the alternative to self-representation, i.e., the right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel at no cost to the defendant, and exploring the nature of the proceedings, potential defenses and potential punishments. The Lopez court advised warning the defendant that, in the event of misbehavior or disruption, his or her self-representation may be terminated. Finally, the court noted, the defendant should be made aware that in spite of his or her best (or worst) efforts, the defendant cannot afterwards claim inadequacy of representation. (Id. at pp. 572-574.) As indicated above, the purpose of the suggested Lopez admonitions is to ensure a clear record of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, not to create a threshold of competency to waive counsel. ( See People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1048; Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 399-400.)" (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069-1071.)

In this case, even if the trial courts admonition was inadequate, any deficiency was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) "`Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless. [Citation.] The question is whether, `on the whole record ... the error ... [is] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]" (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 583.) Thus, we look to the whole record and ask "whether appellant would have decided in favor of professional legal representation had he been fully informed of the dangers and risks of his decision to proceed in pro. per." (People v. Noriega (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 311, 321.)

Here, the court did inform appellant that his opponent would be an attorney who had gone to law school and who was probably much more conversant in the law, that appellant would not be eligible for any assistance from the public defenders office, that appellant would not be able to conduct the "footwork" of his investigation while in jail, and, in so many words, that he would be responsible for his own conviction. In addition, the court inquired into appellants education and familiarity with legal procedures. However, given the excruciatingly intricate warnings that the appellate courts seem to require as a condition to a valid waiver, the trial courts admonition at the Faretta hearing should have been more extensive. The court did not expressly tell appellant that self-representation is generally a bad idea that often results in a worse outcome for a defendant. Furthermore, some of the courts other advisements may have come too late. As in most cases, the court probably could have used more words with more emphasis to stress to appellant the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. Nevertheless, in our view, no amount of verbiage, no amount of accentuation, would have been enough to deter this defendant from waiving his right to counsel with respect to all phases of the prosecution.

We cannot imagine a record that could more emphatically demonstrate the dogged, vainglorious intention to conduct ones own defense in a criminal action. If anything is manifest from the exchanges between appellant and the court it is that appellant was stubbornly determined to represent himself throughout the criminal proceedings, regardless of the obstacles of which he was aware, about which he was warned, or which he might encounter, even if unexpected. The record displays appellant as cocksure of his talents and his ability to do a better job than any mere lawyer, particularly a public defender. Even as appellant discovered the practical disadvantages of self-representation, he steadfastly invoked his right to represent himself and maintained his position that self-representation was the more advantageous strategy. He emphatically stated his disregard for public defenders and repeatedly stressed that he was educated, competent, and dedicated to his cause, which he no doubt was. He said he believed he could devote more time and consideration to his case than any public defender, and, despite his lack of legal credentials, could represent his case better than an appointed lawyer.

Indeed, appellants statements to the court disclose that he would have demanded that any appointed defender act as his agent rather than as his lawyer. Appellant made abundantly clear his expectation that a public defender would do nothing more than implement appellants instructions and carry out without question or hesitation appellants own defense plan.

Had appellant been convicted at a trial at which he was represented by counsel because the trial court denied his self-representation motion, we have no doubt appellant would be before us with the claim that the trial court had prejudicially erred by not permitting appellant to handle his own defense.

Based upon appellants persistent self-confidence and degrading conception of public defenders, we also conclude that appellant, on August 15, intended to waive his right to counsel for both the preliminary hearing and the later trial. He acknowledged that he understood that if he were convicted, he would be responsible for the adverse result, and the hearings after August 15 confirm that he intended to represent himself throughout the proceedings and had no intention of allowing a public defender to represent him at any point during the prosecution of the charges against him.

C. Readvisement

Section 987, subdivision (a), requires that the trial court inform a defendant of his or her right to appointed counsel and obtain a waiver of that right at the time the defendant is arraigned on the information. (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 360-361.) "Although section 987 requires this additional advice and inquiry at the arraignment on the felony information as a prophylactic safeguard, nothing in the language of the statute provides that when a defendant previously has been informed of his or her right to counsel at trial and has been adequately warned of the pitfalls of representing oneself at trial, the defendants prior waiver of counsel and exercise of the constitutional right to represent himself or herself shall not `carry over or be legally `effective in the absence of a renewed warning and waiver." (Id. at p. 364.) "When a defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings (including trial), and voluntarily and knowingly has invoked the right to represent himself or herself throughout all the proceedings, the trial courts failure to provide a new advisement and obtain a renewed waiver at the arraignment (as required by § 987) does not operate to terminate or revoke the defendants validly invoked constitutional right to represent himself or herself at trial." (Id. at p. 365.) A trial courts violation of the statutory duty is analyzed under the Watson standard of harmless error. (Id. at pp. 364-365.)

Section 987, subdivision (a), provides: "In a noncapital case, if the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, he or she shall be informed by the court that it is his or her right to have counsel before being arraigned, and shall be asked if he or she desires the assistance of counsel. If he or she desires and is unable to employ counsel the court shall assign counsel to defend him or her."

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

"The complete record of the trial court proceedings often will shed light upon whether a defendant, despite the absence of an explicit readvisement by the ... court at arraignment, nonetheless was aware that he or she had the right to appointed counsel at the subsequent proceedings and whether an explicit advisement at the arraignment would have been likely to lead the defendant to reconsider the decision to represent himself or herself and request that counsel be appointed. (Accord, United States v. Vonn ( 2002) 535 U.S. 55, 74-76.) [¶] In some cases, the exchange between the [court] and the defendant during the initial advisement and waiver may raise questions as to whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly intended to waive his or her right to counsel throughout the entire proceedings or only at the preliminary hearing. In People v. Sohrab [(1997)] 59 Cal.App.4th 89, for example, the defendant, unlike defendant here, expressed equivocation in the municipal court proceedings as to whether he desired to represent himself and, if so, at what stages of the proceedings. (Id. at pp. 92-95.) Under such circumstances, a superior courts failure to obtain a new and clear indication that the defendant desired to represent himself or herself at trial might well be prejudicial under the Watson standard." (People v. Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 365.)

Here, appellant did in fact receive a second advisement of his right to counsel at his (waived) arraignment hearing. On November 6, appellant waived formal arraignment on the information. The trial court informed appellant he had the right to appointed counsel and he responded that he wished to proceed in pro. per. The court repeated its question to confirm appellants position, and then asked if appellant needed any additional advisement regarding his right to counsel. Appellant stated he did not and he waived any further advisement.

Even assuming the trial court failed to fully comply with section 987, subdivision (a), the record establishes, for the reasons expressed above, that any failure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, based upon the record as a whole, there was utterly no probability that appellant was unaware of his right to be represented by appointed counsel at trial or that he would have accepted the appointment of counsel had the court made a more rigorous inquiry at the time set for the arraignment.

As mentioned previously, the court briefly addressed the matter again on November 30, explaining that appellant would have access to the public defenders equipment if he chose to have a public defender appointed to represent him. Appellant again vehemently refused the services of counsel.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE — FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Appellant contends the felony false imprisonment conviction should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of violence or menace during the period after he beat Denise.

Section 236 defines false imprisonment as "the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another." Personal liberty is violated when the victim is compelled to remain where he or she does not wish to remain, or to go where he or she does not wish to go. (People v. Reed (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274, 280.) "It is the restraint of a persons freedom of movement that is at the heart of the offense of false imprisonment &# 8230;. [Citation.] `"`The wrong may be committed by acts or by words, or both, and by merely operating upon the will of the individual or by personal violence, or both ...." [Citation.]" (Ibid .) False imprisonment becomes felonious when it is committed "by use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit ...." (§ 237.) "`"Violence" ... means the "`the exercise of physical force used to restrain over and above the force reasonably necessary to effect such restraint." [Citation.] `Menace is defined as `"`a threat of harm express or implied by word or act." [Citation.]" (People v. Reed, supra, at pp. 280-281.)

Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331), we find evidence sufficient to establish that appellant restrained Denise in the house by means of menace — that appellants actions implied to Denise that he would harm or kill her or the children if she attempted to leave the house. After appellant beat Denise, held a loaded gun to her head, and threatened to kill her, he placed the loaded gun on an open shelf and proceeded to shadow Denise, step by step. She said she felt like a prisoner in her home because she was afraid that, if she attempted to leave, appellant would kill her or the children. It matters not that appellant no longer held the gun in his hand; he was "armed" within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), because the gun was readily available for his use. (People v. Becker (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 294, 297 [§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), is designed to deter persons from creating potential for death or injury resulting from very presence of firearm at scene of crime; not necessary that defendant utilize or even carry gun, enough that gun is available for use].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, J., Buckley, J.


Summaries of

People v. Wilson

Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District.
Nov 20, 2003
No. F040344 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Wilson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THEODORE ODELL WILSON, JR.…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District.

Date published: Nov 20, 2003

Citations

No. F040344 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003)