The defendant's purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid ( see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 267, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645; People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145). However, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to afford him a second chance to attend the substance-abuse treatment program after he violated the plea agreement and in imposing the enhanced sentence ( see People v. Rodriguez, 46 A.D.3d 356, 846 N.Y.S.2d 907; People v. Wilson, 11 A.D.3d 206, 207, 784 N.Y.S.2d 478; People v. Floyd, 306 A.D.2d 496, 761 N.Y.S.2d 836; see also People v. Gary, 106 A.D.3d 932, 964 N.Y.S.2d 656; People v. Emma, 101 A.D.3d 1146, 1147, 956 N.Y.S.2d 495). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant validly waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement ( see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145;People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108;People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022;cf. People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645). This waiver encompassed the defendant's claim on appeal that the Supreme Court should have exercised its discretion to give him a second chance to attend a treatment program, despite the fact that he violated the plea agreement ( see People v. Rodriguez, 46 A.D.3d 356, 846 N.Y.S.2d 907;People v. Wilson, 11 A.D.3d 206, 784 N.Y.S.2d 478). MASTRO, J.P., CHAMBERS, LOTT and SGROI, JJ., concur.
Before: Lippman, P.J., Saxe, Nardelli, Williams and Moskowitz, JJ. Defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal, which forecloses review of his claim that, even after he undisputedly violated his plea agreement by misconduct at, or absconding from, two drug programs, the court should have exercised its discretion to give him a chance to enter a third program or directed a more thorough evaluation of his eligibility for such a program ( see People v Wilson, 11 AD3d 206, lv denied 3 NY3d 743). In any event, the court properly exercised its discretion when it imposed sentence pursuant to the plea agreement, without ordering a full mental health evaluation in order to determine whether defendant merited placement in a drug program more suited to his alleged psychiatric condition, since there is nothing in the record to support defendant's assertion that he had any psychiatric background warranting such an evaluation.
Before: Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Marlow, Catterson and Malone, JJ. Defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal, which forecloses review of his present claim that the court should have exercised its discretion to give him a second chance to complete drug treatment, notwithstanding his conceded violation of his plea agreement ( see People v Wilson, 11 AD3d 206, lv denied 3 NY3d 743). Were we to find otherwise, we would find that the court properly exercised its discretion, especially since defendant immediately absconded after being directed to enter a drug program, and was also arrested and convicted of a new crime ( see People v Valles, 21 AD3d 855, lv denied 6 NY3d 760).