Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed 2d 266 (2009) ; U.S. v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2011). See , The People of the State of New York v. Wright, 56 N.Y.2d 613, 435 N.E.2d 1088, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Ct. App. New York 1982). A defendant is entitled to be sentenced in accord with the law, and is entitled to be sentenced by a judge who is acting in conformity with such law.
I agree with the New York Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial court has the "inherent power to correct [an] error made at sentencing . . . `which is, plainly, the result of some inadvertence on [the judge's] part, and which our reason tells us is a mere mistake.'" People v. Wright, 56 N.Y.2d 613, 614, 435 N.E.2d 1088, 1089, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (1982) (citation omitted). In this case, the trial court "corrected" its failure to orally order defendant to pay the $100 assessment by including the $100 assessment in its Sentence of Imprisonment.
See State v. Hatton, 409 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1987). Finally, in People v. Wright, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. 1982), the appellate court upheld the trial court's action in correcting an "inadvertent error" in a judgment of conviction which the record clearly indicated resulted when the trial judge misspoke. None of these cases supports the proposition that a district court may modify a legal sentence after a defendant has begun to serve it based on a re-argument of the relevant case law.
A court's power to rethink a ruling is much narrower after the case is no longer pending. As the Court of Appeals said long ago in Bohlen v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 121 N.Y. 546, 550–551, 24 N.E. 932, courts “should not, after the final judgment, by amendment, change a ruling upon the law, or alter the decision upon the merits, for, by so doing, the substantial rights of the adverse party would be really affected” (id. at 551, 24 N.E. 932 [emphasis added]; see People v. Wright, 56 N.Y.2d 613, 614, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473, 435 N.E.2d 1088 ; People v. Minaya, 54 N.Y.2d 360, 365, 445 N.Y.S.2d 690, 429 N.E.2d 1161 ; Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N.Y. 323, 327, 122 N.E. 204 ). The Court was more categorical in Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865, 456 N.E.2d 806, in which it rejected the contention that a court had the inherent power to vacate a plea after the defendant had already been sentenced: “[i]n no instance have we recognized a court's inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over defendant's objection where the error goes beyond mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record and where the proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment” (id. at 169, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865, 456 N.E.2d 806 ; see Matter of Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 452, 541 N.Y.S.2d 737, 539 N.E.2d 565 ).
Moreover, the courts possess a common-law "power * * * to correct errors or mistakes concerning sentences." (People v Minaya, 54 N.Y.2d 360, 364; see also, People v Wilson, 56 N.Y.2d 613.) It is well settled that a defendant mistakenly sentenced as a predicate felony offender must be resentenced. (See, People ex rel. Hirschberg v Orange County Ct., 271 N.Y. 151; People v Stinson, 151 A.D.2d 842; People v Colwell, 103 A.D.2d 169.) More recently, it has been held that a defendant sentenced as a violent felony offender, who is really only a second felony offender, is also entitled to be resentenced, despite the fact that the sentence imposed would also have been authorized for a second nonviolent felony offender.