Opinion
504 KA 15–00704
04-27-2018
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES A. HOBBS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (DANIEL GROSS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES A. HOBBS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (DANIEL GROSS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of robbery in the second degree ( Penal Law § 160.10[2][b] ), defendant contends that Supreme Court should have granted that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking recusal on the ground that the justice presiding over the case had represented defendant in a prior criminal matter. Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ), and the valid waiver encompasses his contention (see People v. Smith, 138 A.D.3d 1415, 1416, 29 N.Y.S.3d 726 [4th Dept. 2016] ). We note in any event that, contrary to defendant's contention, there is no per se recusal requirement based on a court's prior representation of a defendant (see People v. Glynn, 21 N.Y.3d 614, 618–619, 977 N.Y.S.2d 692, 999 N.E.2d 1137 [2013] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.